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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis discusses the involvement of informally housed communities in shaping 
local government policies aimed at poverty alleviation. Involving the poor in the design 
of anti-poverty policies at local level is regarded as an invaluable opportunity that 
should be used by municipal governments to make poverty alleviation efforts more 
demand-driven and therefore more relevant to the people they are meant to benefit. 
The argument is that because the poor know about poverty first-hand, they would be 
in a position to revive local government’s capacity to respond effectively to their 
needs. But this does not come without a price. Because of the complexity of public 
management, participative democracy is liable to slow down the process of 
governance. It may also become advantageous to the interests of some people or 
groups of people at the expense of others if attention is not paid to the representation 
and consideration of all the voices in the community—to name two drawbacks. For 
this reason, it is essential to the realization of an effective bottom-up approach to anti-
poverty policy-making that certain conditions are in existence and practical issues of 
involvement are worked through. Accordingly, it is the intention of this study to focus 
on two particular areas (conditions and practical issues that would  facilitate the 
process of involving informally housed communities in the design of local government 
policies that affect their lives), which are investigated with particular reference to the 
South African context. Drawing upon a series of field surveys and a broad selection of 
relevant works of scholars from both the international and local scene, the picture that 
emerges is that there needs to be a proper level of government’s commitment, 
capacity and legally binding responsibility coupled with a healthy degree of 
community’s motivation, ability and organizational capacity in order to involve the poor 
in local governance efficiently. The study has also found that there needs to be proper 
forms of involvement (the most relevant of which are identified as an ombudsman, 
public meetings and residents’ committees) that are to be employed with attention to 
such issues as stakeholders to be engaged, degree of participation, timing of 
involvement and topics for which public debate may be sought. 
 v  
Key Terms 
 
 
Citizen participation; community development; informal settlements; local government; 
policy-making; poverty alleviation; shacks; slums; South Africa. 
 
 vi  
Contents 
 
 
Abstracts ……………………………………………….……………………………….…… IV 
Key Terms ……………..……..………………………………………………...……….…… v 
Contents ……………………..………………………………………………...……….…… vi 
Figures and Tables ……………....….…………………………………………..…….…… ix 
Acknowledgements …………………..……………….……………………………….…… X 
 
1 Introduction: Proceeding on a ‘Journey of a Thousand Miles’ ..… 1 
Research Topic …………………………………………………………………….…… 4 
Research Objectives ……………………………………………….…………………… 7 
Research Methodology ………………………………………………………………… 9 
Questionnaire Administered to Residents of Informal Settlements ……………..……… 19 
Questionnaire Administered to Local Government Officials ………..…………………… 23 
 
2 Informal Settlements: A Hard Life for Hundreds of Millions ….... 28  
Definition ………………………………………………………………………..……… 30 
Origins …......…………………………………………………………………………… 32 
Distribution ………………………………………………………...…………………… 37 
Housing Conditions …………….……………………………………………………… 40 
Security of Tenure ……........................……………………………………………… 42 
Infrastructure and Social Amenities …………….…………………………………… 45 
Household Structure and Women’s Status ……….………………………………… 51 
Community Organization ……………………...……………………………………… 53 
Employment Situation ………………………………………………………………… 56 
Policy Options  ………………………..………………………………………………… 59 
 
3 South Africa’s Informal Settlements: A Hard Life for Almost 
One-Third of the Population ……………….………………………… 66 
Chronicles ……………………………………………………………………………… 68 
 vii  
Mapping ………………………………………………………………………………… 77 
Government Policies ……………………..…………………………………………… 84 
 
4 Arguments and Experiences regarding the Involvement of 
Informally Housed Communities …………………….……………… 93 
Risks to Development …………….……..…………………………………….……… 95 
Opportunities for Development ..……………………………………………...……… 98 
A Concise History ……………………….…………………………………………… 101 
Contemporary Practices ………………………………………………………..…… 103 
The Brazilian Experience: Alvorada Programme, Belo Horizonte …………..………… 104 
The Argentinean Experience: Barrio San Jorge, Buenos Aires …………..…………… 105 
The Indonesian Experience: Kampung Improvement Programme, Surabaya ……..... 107 
 
5 Conditions for Involving Informally Housed Communities …... 108 
Local Government’s Willpower: Ideological Resources ………………….....…… 111 
Local Government’s Capacity: Decentralization of Powers and Functions ….… 127 
Local Government’s Obligation: Legislative Responsibilities …………....……… 141 
Informally Housed People’s Availability: Interest and Positive Expectations ….. 148 
Informally Housed People’s Competence: Neighbourhood knowledge …….….. 154 
Informally Housed People’s Collective Power: Social Action Groups ……..…… 157 
 
6 Practical Issues in Involving Informally Housed Communities  ... 170 
Forms of Involvement …………….……….………………………………………… 172    
Ombudsman ……………………………..…………..……………………………………… 175 
Public Meetings …………………………………..…………………………….…………… 179 
Residents’ Committee ……………..………………………………………………..……… 181 
Further Practical Issues …….……………….…………………………………….... 186 
Stakeholders to Be Engaged …………..………………………………………………….. 186 
Degree of Participation ……….……………………………………………………………. 189 
Timing of Involvement …………………..………………………………………………….. 191 
Topics for Which Participation Should Be Sought ……….……………………………... 192 
Evaluating the Participation Process ….…………............................................... 197 
 viii  
 
7 Conclusion: Fostering a Bottom-Up Approach to Anti-Poverty 
Policy-Making ………...……………………………………...........….. 199 
 
Bibliography …….………………………………………………………... 214 
 
 
 ix  
Figures 
and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1.1 A Section of ‘Brazzaville’ Informal Settlement, Atteridgeville …..…… 11 
 
Figure 1.2  A Section of ‘Morgan Village’ Informal Settlement, Mamelodi …....… 12 
 
Figure 1.3  A Section of ‘Plastic View’ Informal Settlement, Soshanguve ….…… 13 
 
Figure 1.4  A Section of ‘Choba’ Informal Settlement, Olievenhoutbosch …….… 14 
 
 
Table 2.1  Informal Housing in Developing World Cities ………………….……… 36 
 
Table 3.1  Informal Housing in Urban South Africa …….………………………… 76 
 
Table 3.2 Informal Housing in Rural South Africa ………………………...……… 78  
 
Table 3.3  Informal Housing in the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan 
Municipality ………………………………..……………………………… 80 
 
Table 6.1  Topics for Which the Involvement of Informally Housed Communities 
 May Be Sought ………………………….……………………………… 193 
 
 
 
 x  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I am grateful to the respondents living in the surveyed informal settlements for 
teaching me, during the eight months of field research, what I would never have learnt 
from books. I am also grateful to the interviewees working for the City of Tshwane 
(Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality and, in particular, to those working for the Housing 
Division for their time and willingness to contribute to this thesis. Special thanks must 
go to the members of the South African Communist Party who are passionately active 
in the surveyed informal settlements for their precious assistance, especially during 
the initial phase of the field research. Last, but not least, I am grateful to my promoter 
for making the writing of this thesis more valuable and almost stress-free. 
 
 1  
Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Proceeding on a ‘Journey 
of a Thousand Miles’  
 
 
A giant pine tree grows from a tiny sprout. A tall 
building begins with a heap of earth. A journey of a 
thousand miles starts with one step. 
 
Lao Tzu 
Ancient Chinese Philosopher 
Tao Te Ching, Sixth Century BC      
 
 
Poverty eradication is an overriding development goal. According to the World Bank’s 
statistics, the number of people living on less that one dollar a day (at 1993 
purchasing power parity) is about 1,1 billion worldwide and the corresponding number 
of those living below two dollars a day totals about 2,7 billion or 45% of the world 
population—the great majority of whom are living in the developing world. Given the 
evidently inadequate progress made thus far in this respect, it is increasingly 
recognized that a series of substantial challenges at different levels and in various 
directions have to be dealt with if the serious problems confronting such a large 
number of fellow humans are to be solved in a sustainable way. Some of these 
challenges have international dimensions and demand profound changes in the 
political, military, commercial, financial and technological relations between all nations 
of the world and, in particular, between the Northern and Southern regions. Others are 
of a more national character and include such diverse issues as economic 
underdevelopment, exploitative labour practices, inadequate social assistance and 
social security, illiteracy, despotic regimes, political corruption, ethnic conflicts, gender 
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bias, religious fundamentalism, excessive population and cultural barriers to individual 
well-being. While the aforementioned play an important role in poverty generation, 
which specific factor is relatively more responsible for these levels of poverty around 
the world is quite difficult to establish, especially because they are strongly 
interdependent. As a result of the variety and interdependency of the causes behind 
the spread of poverty, there seem to be a critical need for multidimensional and 
integrated strategies to be systematically employed at local, national, regional and 
global levels so as to overcome poverty all over the world. From what has just been 
mentioned, it can be deduced that there is quite a bit to do. So, where does one start? 
 
As pointed out by the ancient Chinese Philosopher Lao Tzu about 25 centuries ago, 
even enormous efforts start with one step. While I cannot claim to know precisely what 
should be the first step towards the eradication of poverty in the world and although I 
subscribe to the school of thought who argue that a good deal of the cause of poverty 
lies at international level and solutions must therefore be sought at that level, I think 
that it is imperative that the governments of the countries and cities where poverty has 
the strongest incidence lay part of the foundation of the cross-boundary efforts 
necessary to make poverty history. The implication of this is the establishment or 
consolidation of good-governance practices at national and local level so as to enable 
the governments of the developing world to be better at preparing, administering and 
monitoring policies for the benefit of their communities—especially for the sake of the 
poor section of society. The need for good governance as the essential basis for 
poverty eradication can be restated as the need for good quality of government action 
in respect of the whole range of public policies that most directly affect the poor, which 
is considered necessary regardless of the role the state should play in promoting 
economic and social equity—a role that, in principle, can be interventionist, facilitative 
or merely regulatory. By drawing on Knight et al. (2002), Kjœr and Kinnerup (2002), 
Kinuthia-Njenga (1999) and the World Bank (1992), it is possible to identify three 
intertwined core dimensions of good governance which need to be taken into account 
in the fight against poverty: first, government competence in the design and 
implementation of laws, institutions and policies conducive to a better quality of life 
and opportunities for the poor (competent governance); second, government 
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accountability in the administration of public resources intended for the poor with 
particular focus on keeping a tight rein on corruption and nepotism (accountable 
governance); and third, involvement of the poor themselves, not only in the 
implementation, but also, and most significantly, in the formulation of government 
decisions that more directly affect their livelihood (participative governance), which is 
the focus of the present thesis. In respect of the latter, although it would be naïve to 
contend that only the poor know how to deal with the problem of figuring out what to 
do about poverty and it would be injudicious to overlook the difficulties and possible 
drawbacks associated with the participation of poor communities in government 
policy-making, it goes without saying that the poor know about poverty first-hand and, 
therefore, their involvement not simply in the execution but also, and more importantly, 
in the design of government policies that affect their lives is worth being taken 
seriously and tried out.  
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Research Topic 
 
 
Every day, everywhere, countless people of diverse backgrounds engage in a 
multiplicity of voluntary activities by investing time, effort or money on a voluntary 
basis, that is, without pay or with only modest compensation for the expenses they 
incur. All these activities can, in principle, be regarded as cases of community (or 
public) participation, which can then be referred to as any activity that is undertaken 
voluntarily in the public domain. Community participation is equivalent to civic 
voluntarism and manifests itself in a variety of different contexts, in different ways and 
for different reasons. For example, some people volunteer on a regular basis whereas 
others give of their time. Some people volunteer out of a desire to help others less 
fortunate or to honour the memory of a loved one, whereas others may do so in the 
hope of moving into a paid position. Whatever their commitment, people volunteer in 
their community by helping with soup kitchens, homeless shelters, AIDS orphanages 
and river clean-ups or far away from their own country in areas where earthquakes, 
floods, hurricanes, tsunamis or other tragedies have left their mark, to name but a few 
contexts. Similarly, some people are involved with religious institutions, charities, 
hospitals and the like whereas others volunteer for political, environmental or social 
campaigns. Some participate in the workplace or in their children’s school, whereas 
some others are involved in neighbourhood associations or in town hall meetings. 
People’s contribution is also wide-ranging. Some are prepared to provide physical or 
intellectual work to the organization for which they volunteer, whereas others are able 
to make monetary contributions to their favourite causes. 
 
Voluntary activities can be classified as political or non-political, depending on the 
volunteer’s intention or motivation for doing something to influence government 
action—although the borderline between the two classes may sometimes be blurred. 
More specifically, voluntary engagement in politics or political participation can, in the 
main, be defined as any voluntary activity that is intended to influence, or results in the 
influencing of, what governments at various levels decide to do. Political voluntarism, 
however, is anything but a homogeneous group of activities. Voting at elections, for 
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example, is the basic means of political participation in every democracy. But ordinary 
people who want to participate in politics may ask for much more than having a vote in 
the selection of presidents, parliamentarians, mayors or councillors. Among other 
things, they may affiliate with political parties and work as volunteers in electoral 
campaigns. They may also lobby international agencies and national or local 
governments through signing petitions and attending marches or other mass 
demonstrations. Or they may directly participate in the governing process by attending 
government’s meetings open to the pub lic and interacting with elected and non-
elected officials with a view to influence the decision-making process that affects their 
collective life. 
Although the researcher shall have occasion to mention different forms of political 
participation, or civic activism with political implications, the present thesis is intended 
to examine the direct involvement of the public in government policy-making. The 
direct participation of lay citizens and organizations in the process in which 
governments set goals to be reached and actions are planned to achieve these goals 
is usually referred to as participative governance and is defined as direct in the sense 
that the people represent their interests directly to political decision-makers and not 
just indirectly by voting for the selection of representatives who are responsible for 
making political decisions. As pointed out, among others, by Burke (1968), Stewart 
(1976), Hughes (1985) and Meyer and Theron (2000), participative governance is a 
political process that involves public hearings, public meetings, government–
community working groups and other modes of civic engagement in which a plurality 
of community members are directly involved in determining the social, economic and 
physical development of the place in which they live—a circumstance that would 
suggest a significant democratic step forward compared to the mere voting at 
elections every four or five years. The involvement of the public in shaping 
government policies is discussed with regard to the local level of government. This 
choice is not only made on account of the fact that it is at local level (rather than at the 
level of provincial or central government) where a higher proportion of interested 
citizens and organizations may have an opportunity to convey their precious 
knowledge on local conditions to government officials and pressure them to be more 
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responsive to their needs and priorities but also because local government is that 
branch of government that is concerned with matters that most directly impact on 
people’s lives and livelihood. As far as the target population is concerned, it is the 
intent of this study to investigate the involvement of communities living in poverty—
more precisely, it focuses on the engagement of informally housed communities 
whose conditions of living constitute one of the most complex challenges (if not the 
most) confronting the great majority of the cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Last but not least, South Africa was chosen as the geographical focus of the study, 
not only because of the considerable incidence of informal housing (nearly one-third 
of the population spend their lives in informal dwellings in urban or rural South Africa) 
but also for being one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of wealth 
and income distribution.   
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Research Objectives 
 
 
Participative governance is praised for its pro-development effects (Stiefel and Wolfe 
(1994), Long (2001) and Knight et al. (2002)). It is maintained that failing participative 
governance there would be little room for anything but paternalistic state intervention 
and unremarkable community-based self-help initiatives. The key assumption behind 
this statement is that people are aware of their social needs and priorities, and 
possess useful knowledge that can help refine the government policy-making that 
impacts on their lives. While acknowledging that different people are able to contribute 
to development to different extents, the principle that no one is so ‘poor’ in ability or 
knowledge that he or she is unable to contribute something to the development of 
society as well as that no one is so ‘rich’ that he or she does not require co-operation 
at all is espoused. Put differently, the involvement of communities in shaping 
government policies is regarded as a development opportunity and it is maintained 
that the state should be encouraged to make the best use of it, which also happens to 
be the viewpoint of the researcher. The realization of a grassroots or bottom-up 
approach to development (and in particular to poverty eradication), however, does not 
come easily or may even turn out to be a chimera whenever certain conditions are not 
in existence or practical issues of involvement are not worked through. Accordingly, it 
is the intention of this study to delve into the conditions and practical issues that would 
make possible or facilitate the involvement of poor communities in the design of 
government policies that affect their lives. More precisely, the present thesis is meant 
to discuss the involvement of informally housed communities in shaping local 
government policies on poverty alleviation in the context of South Africa, with 
particular emphasis on the following objectives: 
(1) exploring the conditions that would enable the involvement of communities living in 
informal settlements 
(2) examining the practical issues that would allow their participation to be effective. 
 
The aforesaid objectives serve as reference points for the research work, thus 
resulting in both the data and analysis reflected in this thesis being geared towards 
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achieving them. This thesis comprises seven chapters. Following the present 
introductory chapter which outlines the topic, objectives and methodology of the 
research, Chapter 2 is an effort to bring to light some of the hard reality that hundreds 
of millions of informally housed residents continue to suffer across the developing 
world at the beginning of the third millennium.  Complementarily, Chapter 3 provides 
an overview of South Africa’s informal settlements with particular emphasis on their 
origins, their distribution around the country and government policies targeted at 
attempting to reach out to the needs of the informally housed population. In Chapter 4, 
objections to and appeals for the involvement of the poor in shaping government 
policies relevant to their community are discussed followed by a short history of 
popular participation from ancient Greece to the present and an account of three real-
world experiences in engaging the poorest of the poor in the developing world. The 
aforesaid chapters can be seen as preparatory to the double focus of the research, 
that is, as mentioned earlier, to investigate the conditions that would enable the 
involvement of informally housed communities (which is dealt with in Chapter 5) and 
to examine the practical issues that would allow their participation to be of use (which 
is tackled in Chapter 6). In the final chapter, Chapter 7, the conclusion of the study is 
drawn.  
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Research Methodology 
 
 
Last but not least, it is important to explain how the research was accomplished or, in 
other words, how the researcher went about collecting the data necessary to achieve 
the research objectives. The research methodology, or information collection process, 
started with a literature survey. The list of writings used by the researcher in preparing 
this thesis can be subdivided into three main study areas, which are seldom brought 
together in a single study. The first study area contains writings on the origins and 
dynamics of informal settlements and possible options for government intervention in 
poverty alleviation. The second study area includes works relating to open 
government and community involvement in policy-making. The third area comprises 
studies on decentralization and local government management. The research 
objectives guided the selection and review of the existing literature on the research 
topic, which served as an important source of knowledge for the compilation of the 
seven chapters into which the present study is organized. Altogether the bibliography 
consists of 216 entries, the greater majority of which is devoted to discussing issues 
related to the three aforesaid study areas within the context of South Africa or the 
developing world.     
 
In conjunction with the literature review, it was fundamental to conduct a series of field 
surveys to secure first-hand information on the research topic. All field surveys were 
conducted between January and August 2005, and involved in-depth interviews with 
80 respondents—52 informal settlers and 28 local government officials living in, or 
working for, the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM)—who 
were asked by the researcher to convey their views and feelings on selected issues 
related to the subject of community participation. All informally housed interviewees 
reside in four different informal settlements whose selection was made in two steps. 
First, a list of informal settlements suffering from the worst residential conditions in 
terms of physical infrastructure and environmental degradation was drawn following a 
few preliminary talks with CTMM officials working for the Housing Division of the 
Department of Housing, City Planning and Environmental Management. From the list 
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of informal settlements existing in the CTMM, the researcher chose to focus on the 
following four because they afforded him the opportunity to gain relatively easier and 
safer access to the resident community. 
 
The first informal settlement is located in Atteridgeville (Ward 7), about 20 kilometres 
west of Pretoria, and is referred to as ‘Brazzaville’ as a tribute to the support the 
African National Congress (ANC) received from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville 
during the liberation struggle against apartheid (Figure 1.1). Brazzaville is reported to 
house about 3 100 families (a figure that is regarded as an underestimation by the 
community leaders) and has a history that starts in 1997. Over two-thirds of the land is 
privately owned while the remaining section belongs to the municipality. The owners 
are willing to sell the land to the municipality but no negotiation is in progress—the 
reason being that most of the settlement’s land (both the privately and publicly owned 
portions) is said to be dolomitic (although the community has never been presented 
with a geological survey on this issue) and therefore subject to ground movements 
that would require higher public investments in housing development (especially in 
respect of house foundations) which is supposed to be low-cost. But although the 
relocation of the community to a more suitable land seems to be the most convenient 
solution and is not, in principle, resisted by the residents as long as it would take place 
within a reasonable distance, a proper destination area is still to be found and the 
timeframe is uncertain as a result of the ward councillor’s minimal interaction with, and 
scarcely co-operative attitude towards, the community. In this regard, it is for example 
reported that the ward councillor calls ward committee meetings as and when he 
pleases (which happens to be rare) rather than at least once a month as he is 
supposed to do according to the CTMM’s rules relating to the functioning of ward 
committees. Alongside what is perceived as an unhelpful attitude on the part of the 
ward councillor—which has actually never been constructive , especially since the 
community scored a landmark court victory against the CTMM which was seeking the 
eviction of the residents without offering them proper alternative accommodation 
towards the end of 1998—it also appears that the Regional Office of the Speaker is 
not very keen on doing anything more than writing reports on how bad things are. 
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Figure 1.1 A Section of ‘Brazzaville’ Informal Settlement, Atteridgeville 
 
 
 
The second informal settlement is located in Mamelodi East (Ward 17), about 20 
kilometres east of Pretoria and is called ‘Morgan Village’ (Figure 1.2)—named this 
way after one of the ‘comrades’ who were particularly active in the area. In 1996–97, 
the first settlers started to occupy this state-owned piece of land which today houses 
slightly fewer than 400 families. The great majority of the community is expected to be 
relocated to a serviced site to be constructed in Nellmapius (about 5 kilometres apart) 
so as to make space for the construction of a road (K54) connecting Mahube Valley to 
Bronkhorstspruit Road. The few remaining families are supposed to remain where 
they are and patiently wait for a plan of action by the CTMM. Although the necessity of 
relocating the largest part of the community is undisputed, the timeframe for doing so 
and the residential conditions to be found in the destination area have yet not been 
disclosed to the residents. This can be attributed to rather centralistic and allegedly 
deceitful management of the ward committee on the part of the ward councillor, which 
impedes serious, frank and constructive dialogue on the various concerns of the 
community. As a matter of fact, there is a general lack of trust on the part of the 
informally housed community in respect of the ward councillor, which has developed 
particularly since the murder of Jimmy Thulare—the popular local leader of the South 
African Communist Party (Mamelodi Branch) who used to reside in the same ward 
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before being killed, allegedly for political reasons, on 10 May 2004. In this rather 
frozen and sterile relationship between the ward councillor and the community living in 
the area of concern, the role of the Regional Office of the Speaker is perceived by the 
greater part of the informally housed community, at best, as negligent and, at worst, 
complicit. This unenthusiastic feeling about the Regional Speaker is motivated by his 
alleged excessive familiarity, not only with the ward councillor, but also with the 
various municipal officials who are believed not to do their best to act in the interest of 
the community, which is said to impair objectivity and independence of judgement in 
the exercise of his official duties. 
 
Picture 1.2  A Section of ‘Morgan Village’ Informal Settlement, Mamelodi East 
 
 
 
The third informal settlement is located in the southern portion of Soshanguve (Ward 
37), about 30 kilometres north-west of Pretoria, and is referred to as ‘Plastic View’ 
(Figure 1.3). This land began to be occupied in 2000–01 and today is estimated to 
house approximately 1 500 families. The origin of the name is sadly ironic: owing to 
the geological structure of the soil which does not allow the surface to dry out before 
two or three days after heavy rains, and even then, drying may be only superficial, 
residents who need to walk around or reach the nearest railway station are compelled 
to wrap their shoes in plastic bags to protect them against the mud in the streets—the 
plastic is then dumped everywhere across the settlement. Most of the land belongs to 
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the state-owned company Transnet/Spoornet (the largest transport operator in 
Southern Africa), which has plans to develop the area for railway use. Accordingly, a 
council resolution was passed for the residents to be relocated to a relatively nearby 
place—though even the most basic aspects of the project are wrapped in absolute 
mystery as a result of both a dearth of planning within the local government 
departments involved in the process and excessive concern about not interfering with 
government officials in the execution of their duties on the part of the ward councillor. 
This absence of settlement planning can also be attributed to the non-representation 
of Plastic View on the ward committee, which can be traced back to a lack of 
proactive attitude on the part of both the ward councillor and the Regional Office of the 
Speaker in complying with their responsibilities to ensure diversity of interests and 
geographic representation on the ward committee in question. 
 
Figure 1.3 A Section of ‘Plastic View’ Informal Settlement, Soshanguve 
 
 
 
Finally, the fourth informal settlement is located in Olievenhoutbosch (Ward 48) near 
the affluent town of Centurion, about 25 kilometres south of Pretoria, and is named 
‘Choba’ after its supposed landowner (Figure 1.4). The settlement houses about 3 500 
families and has a history that goes back to the birth of the new South Africa in 1994. 
Although contested, the land is thought to belong to a now deceased, wealthy, 
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seemingly intimidating, old businessperson who demands the payment of rent (from 
R50 to R100 a month) from each and every family. As it seems that he never 
bothered to register the land in his own name before his death, there is an ongoing 
land ownership dispute between him (now his heirs) and the CTMM alongside the  
failed attempt by the municipality to purchase the land. In principle, the future of the 
community does not seem to be in question: almost everyone sounds confident that 
the people will be relocated in the area. Practically speaking, however, it is still 
unclear to the community when, where and how the relocation is going to take place 
especially as a result of the political sidelining of the ward councillor—a man who is 
widely regarded as honest but also too often unavailable to his constituency—by his 
own party (ANC). This not only resulted in a three-month suspension followed by his 
resignation just a few months before the new local government elections but also, and 
most disturbingly, in the Machiavellian marginalization of the councillor-led ward 
committee and just about any other form of non-factional, non-opportunistic 
community participation in the ward’s decision-making process. 
 
Figure 1.4 A Section of ‘Choba’ Informal Settlement, Olievenhoutbosch  
 
 
 
Once a sample of four informal settlements was deemed acceptable, it was necessary 
to decide from whom (both residents and local government officials) the researcher 
was going to collect information. As per the selection of a sample of informally housed 
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interviewees, the focus was on two target groups: community leaders and ordinary 
residents. The first group (community leaders) was chosen among the members of 
various residents’ committees (including ward committees) operating in the aforesaid 
settlements: a sample of 36 respondents (highly representative in terms of numbers) 
was selected in stages and almost equally divided among the four surveyed informal 
settlements. Two-thirds of them were male and one-third were female. All 
respondents were aged 20 or above and a large number of them were aged between 
31 and 46 (83,3%). The level of school education of the respondents was limited, 
ranging from Standard 5 (Grade 7) to Standard 10 (Grade 12). Only one-fourth of the 
respondents were working full-time at the time of the interviews, whereas the 
remaining three-fourth were without any full-time job or without any job at all. Among 
those who were working full-time, the most typical occupation was that of service and 
sales workers (55,6%) followed by clerical workers (33,3%) and skilled workers 
(11,1%). Questions on income were generally avoided not to run the risk of upsetting 
the interviewee and being looked upon with suspicion. The selection of a relatively 
good number of respondents from the community leadership, compared to the 
selected sample of ordinary residents, is justified by the fact that they are considered 
to be in a better position to provide useful data on the research topic. Interviews with 
committee members were individually conducted so as to reduce external influences 
on the respondent to a minimum. In one case, however, prior to individual interviews, 
it was also possible to hold an ad hoc committee meeting, which was attended by 
almost all the members of the committee, during which the researcher had an 
opportunity to inform the interviewees of what he was doing and answer questions 
from the participants. The second group (ordinary residents) consisted of 16 
respondents who were identified with the help of a few community leaders. 68,8% of 
them were female and 31,2% were male. A higher quota for women was set up on 
purpose to make up for their inevitable under-representation among the sample of 
community leaders. The age of the respondents spanned from 18 to 75. Their level of 
school education was, on average, lower than that of the sample of community 
leaders, ranging from Standard 5 (Grade 7) to Standard 8 (Grade 10). Regrettably, 
only two respondents were working full-time at the time of the interviews, whereas 
twelve were working part-time or not at all. The remaining two interviewees were 
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retired persons, one of them aged 75 and the other 65. As mentioned above, the 
researcher cannot report on the income levels  of the respondents because questions 
on income were purposely avoided. Most of the interviews with ordinary residents 
were individual, with the exception of two small groups of two and three people. In 
respect of the relatively small size of the sample of ordinary informally housed 
respondents, it is worth pointing out that the researcher is aware that at first glance it 
could appear as a methodological weakness because it may not be taken as fully 
representative of the general community, at least in terms of numbers. However, it will 
be clear from a reading of the actual wording of the questions posed to the 
respondents that a good degree of depth of inquiry is believed to have been achieved 
and this made up for the limited representation of the sample. Given cost and time 
constraints, the only other workable option to small numbers of in-depth interviews 
would have been a relatively larger-scale survey based on a standardized 
questionnaire with open questions limited to a minimum, which would have been more 
representative and shown some quantitative results. Conversely, it is the opinion of 
the researcher that the lesser depth of the information that would have been collected 
through a questionnaire with closed questions would have jeopardized the qualitative 
understanding of the topic of the survey and virtually made the answers of the 
respondents of little use. It is finally worth noting that thanks to the initial mediation of 
a bunch of resident friends (students at the University of South Africa) and local 
political activists (members of the South African Communist Party), it was a relatively 
straightforward matter to approach the respondents, make them fully aware of the 
purpose of the research and obtain their consent to take part in the survey. There was 
then a limited need to motivate both community leaders and ordinary residents of 
informal settlements to sit with the researcher and answer all his questions as they 
were usually willing to talk and provide the information being sought. 
 
As per the selection of a sample of local government officials, it was, first of all, 
necessary to identify the concerned departments (along with divisions and sections) of 
the CTMM that would have been worth approaching to discuss the research topic. 
After being provided with a bigger-picture overview of who does what in the municipal 
administration by the Office of the Municipal Manager, it was decided to make contact 
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with the following departments and offices: the Department of Housing, City Planning 
and Environmental Management, the Department of Social Development, the  
Integrated Development Planning (IDP) Office and the Office of the Speaker—the 
last-mentioned is responsible for the establishment and functioning of ward 
committees which, on paper, are the single most influential community vehicle for 
impacting on the municipal budget and IDP. Although a sample of 24 respondents 
was selected from all the above municipal units, it was decided to engage more 
deeply with those officials who bear most of the responsibility for dealing with informal 
settlements and are therefore regarded as the most important sources of relevant 
information on the research topic. Accordingly, most of the interviewees worked for 
either the Office of the Speaker (33,3%) or the Department of Housing, City Planning 
and Environmental Management’s division, named the Housing Division (50%)—more 
precisely, for the three sections of the Housing Division called Informal Settlements, 
Land Invasion and Community Liaison Section, Waiting List and Subsidy 
Administration Section and Housing Development and Provision Section. It is also 
worth noting that both headquarters and regional managers participated in the 
survey—among the latter, the sample was limited to those responsible for the areas 
under which the four informal settlements selected as the case study for this research 
fall. All respondents were generally found reasonably willing to answer the greater 
part of the questions prepared for them as well as engage in further discussions on 
social, economic and political issues with the researcher. It is also important to point 
out that the councillors for Wards 7, 17, 37 and 48 also took part in the survey, though 
with limited success. They were found not particularly willing to answer the questions 
prepared for them or too concerned with seeking to disseminate various political 
slogans to give the impression that everything is rosy or under control. Last but not 
least, the researcher deemed appropriate to gather additional information from a few 
knowledgeable people outside the two aforementioned groups of respondents (i.e., 
residents of informal settlements and local government officials). Interviews have 
accordingly been arranged with a high-ranked official at the Office of the Public 
Protector and a few Police officers engaged in the prevention of crime in the surveyed 
informal settlements. 
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Before starting data collection, the researcher drafted two different questionnaires, 
which were to undergo a process of refinement as interviews progressed. The first 
questionnaire was administered to a sample of residents of informal settlements—
both community leaders and ordinary people. The second was submitted to a sample 
of local government officials, including the four ward councillors. Both questionnaires 
are divided into three sections: the first section contains personal and ice-breaking 
questions; the second section includes questions that help improve the understanding 
of the conditions to secure the participation of residents of informal settlements in the 
formulation of local government policies, which is the first objective of this thesis; and 
the third section incorporates questions to expand knowledge of the practical issues 
needed to work out how to involve informally housed communities in local government 
policy-making, which is the second objective of the present thesis. All interviews with 
informal settlers took place at the respondent’s dwelling and the time to complete the 
questionnaire ranged in most cases from four to six hours. The reason for the 
extended interviews is to be found in the need to explain to the interviewees the kind 
of information for which the researcher was searching, to clarify the more complicated 
questions that may have caused some confusion as well as to respect the 
respondents’ desire to talk extensively about their experiences, hopes and fears. 
However, interviews with municipal officials were conducted in the office of the 
interviewee and lasted about two hours. All interviews were held in English and no 
particular communication difficulty was experienced by the researcher. Language 
assistance was not requested except in a couple of cases. No recording devices were 
used. The evidence reproduced in this thesis was compiled from the extensive notes 
taken by the researcher. It is also worth stating that due care was taken by the 
researcher to explain to the respondents the intent of the survey so as to try to avoid 
the insurgence of unjustified expectations or misunderstanding. What follows is a 
great deal of the questions posed to the two groups of respondents. Italics indicate the 
actual wording of the questions, which differed slightly from case to case. Although 
the questions have been numbered and reordered in a sequence that makes the most 
sense to the thesis, they were actually brought up in different order depending on the 
course taken by the conversation. 
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Questionnaire Administered to  
Residents of Informal Settlements 
 
Section 1: Introductory Questions 
The first section contains questions concerning the identity, life experience and living 
conditions of the respondents. Following the first few interviews, it was instead 
decided to avoid questions on income, rent and other potentially sensitive monetary 
matters if the researcher felt the risk of upsetting the interviewee and being looked 
upon with suspicion. 
1. When did you arrive here? From where? With whom? 
2. Who are you living with? 
3. What do you (and your family members) do for a living? 
4. What school did/do you go to? 
5. What made you move to this place? 
6. How would you describe your living conditions? What do you miss most of all? 
7. What kind of relation do you have with your neighbours? 
8. What are your plans for the future? 
9. Are you on the Housing Waiting List? If yes, since when? If not, why not? 
 
Section 2: Conditions for the Involvement of Informally Housed Communities 
(Research Objective No. 1)  
The second section groups questions revolving around the following three issues: 
first, the respondent’s rating of the work of the residents’ committees; second, whether 
or not and why the respondent would feel personally motivated in getting involved in 
meetings with the ward councillor or local government officials; and, third, whether or 
not the respondents lack and what they think they lack in terms of resources such as 
time, skills and experience, which may be useful to their community in the course of 
the participation process. The researcher has drawn on the answers of the 
interviewees primarily in the preparation of the second three paragraphs of Chapter 5. 
10. Are you serving on a residents’ committee (or other community-based organization 
such as youth or women’s forums)? Do you attend the mass meetings called in the 
settlement? If yes, would you say the reasons why you do so? If not, why not? 
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11. Are you satisfied with the work of the residents’ committees? Do you regard the 
members of the committees as representative of the whole community? (If the 
respondent is a committee member) Are you happy with your work on the 
committee? 
12. Are there any projects in place around here that are run by non-residents such as 
people of the church, volunteers or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? If 
yes, what are they all about? Are you satisfied with their work? Do these people 
liaise with the residents’ committee and the community in general? 
13. What is the relation, if any, between your residents’ committees and those 
operating in other informal settlements?     
14. Are you an active member of any political organization? If yes, what is your role in 
the organization? Would you state the reasons why you do it? If no, why not? 
15. Are you an active member of your parish, that is, are you involved in anything 
other than attending services? Would you state the reasons why you do it? If not, 
why not? 
16. Do you spend any time on charitable or other voluntary work? If yes, would you 
state the reasons why you do it? If not, why not? 
17. What do you think about the councillor/local government officials in respect of their 
commitment and accountability to your community? 
18. Imagine that you are given the opportunity to participate in regular government–
community meetings. Would you be willing to attend? If willing, why would you like 
to meet with municipal officials/ward councillor? Do you think you would be able to 
make them listen to and consider your problems and views? Would you be more 
willing to discuss personal/family problems or issues relevant to the community in 
general? Do you think you have enough time to commit yourself on a regular 
basis? If not willing, reasons for non-participation were investigated, why aren’t 
you willing to have contact with the ward councillor/local government officials? The 
interviewer sometimes mentioned such possible reasons as: don’t have enough 
time; like to take care of your problems yourself (don’t care about politics); don’t 
trust these people (don’t want to mingle with them; think you might get into 
problems); don’t think it is worth it (they can’t help you; think you can’t have any 
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impact); prefer to wait and see what happens. What would encourage your 
participation? 
19. Let us now imagine for a moment that you are the councillor of this ward or even 
the mayor of the city! What would you do to improve the conditions of the area 
where you live and make its inhabitants better-off people? And what do you think 
would be the major obstacles in realizing what you suggest? 
 
Section 3: Practical Issues in Involving Informally Housed Communities 
(Research Objective No. 2) 
The third section explores the organizational capacity, or lack thereof, of the surveyed 
communities and how they liaise with the local government and ward councillor. It also 
encourages interviewees to suggest practical recommendations to improve the liaison 
process between the local government and their community. The answers of the 
respondents provided the researcher with helpful information primarily for the writing 
of Chapter 6. 
20. What matters are dealt with by the residents’ committee (or other community-
based organizations such as youth or women’s forums) that are in place around 
here? Who are the people serving on the committee? How are they selected? 
21. How often do the committee members meet? Where? Can you say what happens 
during these meetings? What have been the committee’s major achievements? 
What are its plans for the future? 
22. How does the committee liaise with the councillor/local government officials and 
what topics are discussed? Does it interact with the ward committee? And with the 
provincial government? How does the committee relate with the community in 
general? 
23. Do you have mass meetings around here—meetings where all residents are 
invited to participate? How often do they occur? Where? Who participates? Can 
you tell me what happens during these meetings? 
24. Do the councillor/local government officials attend these mass meetings? If yes, 
what do you remember about the latest mass meeting attended by the 
councillor/local government officials? If no, why not?   
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25. Do you think it is more useful that the councillor/local government officials liaise 
essentially with community representatives (residents’ committee) or should they 
also be directly accountable to the whole community by attending mass meetings 
on a regular basis? 
26. Should outsiders such as people of the church, volunteers or professionals 
participate in government–community meetings in support of the residents? 
27. What should be the main subjects dealt with in these meetings? 
28. Do you think that it is government’s responsibility to come up with project 
proposals about which the community could then express their opinions or would it 
be better the other way around, that is, the community should come up with its 
own proposals to submit to the government? 
29. What should the frequency of government–community meetings be? When should 
they be convened? Where? 
30. What do you know about the Office of the Speaker and the Public Protector? (If 
the respondent knew about them well or once the researcher had briefly provided 
some information about their role and responsibilities) Would you be willing to 
approach complaint-handling institutions such as the Office of the Speaker or the 
Public Protector and lodge your complaints against the ward councillor or 
municipal officials? If yes, why? If not, why not? 
31. Are there any government-funded projects going on/being planned around here 
that you are particularly excited about? What levels/departments of government 
are involved? What does the community know about the contractual 
agreement/proposal between the government and the contractor (what exactly 
they have to do, when and how much it is going to cost)? Were/are community 
representatives being involved in the decision-making process between the 
government and contractor? Are community representatives (and the community 
in general) offered an opportunity to liaise with the contractor/subcontractors? If 
yes, what do they discuss? 
32. What do you know about the government housing programme called ‘People’s 
Housing Process’? (If the respondent knew the programme well or once the 
researcher had described it briefly) Do you think the residents’ committee could be 
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interested in the opportunities made available by the programme to informally 
housed communities?  
33. Do you have any practical recommendations to try to build constructive relations 
between the ward councillor/local government officials and your community—
something that the residents’ committee is not currently doing but you think or feel 
it should be done? 
 
Questionnaire Administered to 
Local Government Officials   
 
Section 1: Introductory Questions 
The first section contains questions about the respondents’ position within the CTMM, 
their office’s responsibilities as well as their academic and professional experience. It 
also tries to collect quantitative and qualitative data on informal settlements in the 
geographic area of responsibility of the interviewees and discusses the ways in which 
the municipality is trying to cope with the problem of informal settlements. 
1. What is your current position? Would you tell me something about your academic 
and professional background? 
2. Which areas (also in terms of wards) are under your responsibility? 
3. Would you describe your office in terms of responsibilities, human resources and 
financial means? What is the level of coordination between your office and other 
municipal offices? 
4. Within the area of your responsibility: How many families live in informal 
dwellings? What do you know about the history of land occupation—when and why 
did it occur and develop to the present stage? Are current statistics regarding 
informal settlements different from those of four to five years ago (reference was 
made to the 2001 census data)? Why is that so: Housing provision? Community 
resettlement? Evictions? Land invasion? 
5. What priorities need to be addressed as regards informal settlements (within the 
area of your responsibility)? 
6. How does your office think to deal with these problems: in particular, are you 
focusing on relocation, in situ upgrading or requesting court orders for eviction? If 
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relocation is involved, can you talk about a success story of relocation? If 
settlement upgrading is being done, can you talk about a success story of in situ 
upgrading? If evictions are carried out, what do you expect people to do once they 
are evicted?  
7. What is your personal vision of the future of informal areas for which you are 
responsible? 
 
Section 2: Conditions for the Involvement of Informally Housed Communities 
(Research Objective No. 1) 
The second section focuses on the following three issues related to the government–
community liaison process: first, government’s willingness (in terms of values and 
moral responsibility) to liaise with informally housed communities; second, 
government’s capacity (in terms of staffing and funding) to interact with communities 
living in informal settlements; and, third, government’s responsibilities (in terms of 
laws and by-laws) to link up with the informally housed population. The researcher 
has drawn on the answers of the respondents primarily in the preparation of the first 
three paragraphs of Chapter 5. 
8. How would you describe the people living in informal settlements with particular 
reference to their community leaders and organizations (community-based and 
external)? 
9. How do you think the communities living in informal settlements would be of any 
help to your office? And what do you think may be the disadvantages or risks of 
liaising with informally housed communities? How would it be possible to 
overcome these situations? 
10. Do you feel any moral obligation to consult the communities living in informal 
settlements before your office makes a decision that affects their lives? 
11. What are the human and financial resources allocated to liaise with informally 
housed communities?  
12. Does the municipality have any policy or by-laws with respect to government–
community liaison? What exactly are your obligations as municipal official with 
regard to engaging with informally housed communities?  
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Section 3: Practical Issues in Involving Informally Housed Communities 
(Research Objective No. 2) 
The third section explores how government–community liaison occurs in practice 
before encouraging respondents to offer practical recommendations to try to build a 
constructive relation between the municipality and the communities living in informal 
settlements. The researcher has drawn on the answers of the interviewees principally 
in the preparation of Chapter 6.  
13. Let us talk about how government–community liaison occurs in practice: How does 
your office liaise with informally housed communities? Are they given an 
opportunity to have a say about their own future or are they just approached to 
ensure they know what the government wants to do and support it? 
14. What practical problems are you encountering in relation to government–
community liaison? 
15. Who among the people living in informal settlements do you liaise with? Should 
outsiders such as people from the church, volunteers and NGOs participate on 
their behalf? 
16. What is the frequency of government–community encounters? When are they 
convened? Where? 
17. When do you start to liaise with informally housed communities—at an early stage 
of the planning process or only when a relocation or in situ upgrading programme 
has been finalized by the municipality in conjunction with the developer 
(contractor)? Why is that so? 
18. What are the main subjects dealt with in the government–community meetings? 
19. Do you think that it is municipality’s responsibility to come up with project 
proposals about which informally housed communities could then express their 
opinions or would it be better the other way around, that is, informally housed 
communities should come up with their own proposals to submit to the 
municipality? 
20. How does government–community liaison change, if at all, during electoral 
periods? 
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21. Do you have any practical recommendations to improve relations between the 
municipality and the communities living in informal settlements—something that 
the government is not currently doing but you think or feel it should be done? 
 
Finally, it is important to restate that great care was taken to explain (especially to 
informally housed respondents) all questions that may not have been straightforward. 
Although this resulted in prolonged interviews, the outcome was satisfactory in that it 
was possible, in the vast majority of cases, to collect information relevant to the 
objectives of this thesis. All responses were carefully examined and compared by the 
researcher in order to find differences and similarities between them. In this respect, it 
is worth drawing attention to the fact that the largest part of the evidence from the field 
research is woven into the discussion presented in the core chapters of this thesis, 
that is, Chapters 5 and 6. In these two chapters, considerations deriving from the 
literature and from the field research are brought into productive interplay as each 
research objective is addressed. In fact, this thesis employs the methodological 
device of presenting the evidence from the interviews, not on its own, but in the 
relevant sections of argumentation. The field research is thus included, not as a 
separate object, but as a key element of a synthetic argumentative strategy. As far as 
the evidence from the field surveys goes, it will suffice to report here that one of the 
most striking findings is the apparent contradiction, among the majority of informally 
housed respondents, between feelings of mistrust, suspicion and resentment towards 
local politicians and public servants, which are normally expected to lead to alienation 
and disengagement of the poor if not social unrest, and a strong desire to be involved 
in the local government policy-making. It is the opinion of the researcher that what, at 
first look, may seem like a contradiction, it should rather be regarded as the logical 
result of understanding the power of participation as well as the result of positive 
thinking, especially common among the respondents from the community leadership, 
about what could be accomplished if only they were given a meaningful opportunity to 
be involved. Regrettably, it seems that a meaningful opportunity for participation is not 
to be expected to be made available to the poorest communities of South Africa any 
time soon. In this respect, it is worth recalling a striking difference of opinion between 
the two groups of respondents on how well (or rather how poorly) the existing 
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government–community liaison efforts are performing. On the one hand, there are 
various local government respondents (especially the ward councillors) who proudly 
regard current community participation tools (e.g., ward committees and local imbizos) 
as totally satisfactory ways to be answerable to the poorest of the poor. On the other 
hand, the great majority of informally housed respondents not only point to the under-
representation and blatant disregard for their voices in the ward committee but also 
more or less explicitly refer to the practice of Imbizo (government–community liaison 
initiatives) as a ‘political game’ orchestrated by politicians to bring to public notice that 
they are accountable to the poor as prescribed by constitutional and legislative 
provisions.  
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Chapter 2 
Informal Settlements: 
A Hard Life for  
Hundreds of Millions 
 
 
How many years can some people exist before 
they’re allowed to be free? How many times can a 
man turn his head pretending he just doesn’t see? 
 
Bob Dylan 
American Poet and Singer 
Blowin' in the Wind, 1962 
 
 
In the developing world, about one billion people live in indecorous, normally 
overcrowded and unhygienic areas known as informal settlements, which feature the 
worst in physical infrastructure, socio-economic conditions and environmental 
degradation. A striking number of citizens in urban and rural regions have no choice 
but to settle in corrugated iron shacks or mud-and-thatched huts without indoor 
plumbing, electricity and other conveniences, with little or no access to education, 
healthcare and other community services, and doomed to poverty-stricken lives 
because of unemployment or precarious and unprofitable job opportunities. Each 
informal settlement, however, is unique in that it has its particular history, community 
and identity, and it is therefore not easy to generalize about an issue that concerns all 
developing countries almost without exception. 
 
Given the complexity of the subject, this chapter intends to focus on selected topics 
relating to the composite reality of informal settlements by drawing, among other 
sources that are mentioned in the sequel of the chapter, on the UN-Habitat’s Survey 
 29  
of Slums and Squatter Settlements of 1982, which contains many insights that remain 
useful today, and on the reports entitled Cities in a Globalizing World: Global Report 
on Human Settlements and The State of the World’s Cities, which were compiled by 
the same agency of the United Nations in 2001. While it is not claimed to be 
exhaustive, it is hoped that this chapter would provide a useful, albeit general, 
understanding of the hard reality that hundreds of millions of fellow human beings 
continue to suffer at the beginning of the third millennium. The chapter starts with an 
explanation of the term informal settlement. It is followed by an overview of the origins 
of the phenomenon together with data on the distribution of informal settlements 
around the world. Housing conditions, security of tenure, infrastructure and social 
amenities, household structure and women’s status, community organization and the 
employment situation are then considered before drawing attention to the policies that 
can be employed to address the challenges posed by sprawling informal settlements 
and ultimately reverse the causes of this misery. It should be noted that this chapter 
serves as a background reading for the following one, which deals with the 
specificities of South Africa’s informal settlements. Despite differences across regions 
and countries, there is, in fact, a link between informal settlements across the South, 
which the researcher hopes to shed light upon through the present chapter. 
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Definition 
 
 
Informal settlements are dilapidated residential areas where living conditions are 
uncomfortable, unhealthy or downright hazardous to residents. Within these 
settlements, most families live in shacks of corrugated iron, in decrepit buildings with 
crumbling ceilings or in thatched huts with walls of poles and mud. They have limited 
or no access to basic utilities such as running water, indoor sanitation, electricity, 
sewerage and garbage collection. The same is true of essential services such as 
clinics, schools and crèches. Each informal settlement is, however, unique in respect 
of a variety of matters including location, layout, environmental hazards, residential 
density and shelter consolidation. Other differences relate to the level of servicing, 
which may be limited to basics such as communal water standpipes and pit latrines, 
or include relatively more sophisticated facilities and services such as sewerage, 
drains, electricity and paved roads. There are also differences of great significance if 
one looks at issues such as the social arrangements and relationships found in the 
settlement and the socio-economic links with the rest of the city or the rural areas 
where relatives and friends of residents of urban informal settlements continue to 
reside. Last but not least, while in the developing world the large number of slums has 
become synonymous with rapid urban growth, it is important to mention two relevant 
points regarding informal housing and homelessness worldwide. The first point is that 
severe shelter deprivation exists in most rural areas across the South and can be as 
bad as in the worst inner-city slums. The second point is that informal or substandard 
housing is by no means limited to free-standing informal settlements: prevalently but 
not only in developing countries. There are, in fact, many people who sleep in 
unsympathetic buildings or outbuildings such as backyard shacks, garages or sheds 
that are adjacent to formal houses along with many others who have no place to 
spend their nights except on benches, pavements, parks, graveyards, old trains, 
under a bridge or on somebody’s doorway. 
 
A further contrast drawn by the literature is between informal settlements and squatter 
camps, the latter relating to the illegal occupation of buildings or land on which 
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structures are erected without building permission. In this respect, it is worth noting 
that while there is no doubt about the importance of defining the legal status of 
occupancy—for example, as regards the subject matter of this research, it is evident 
that any attempt to liaise with local governments and informally housed communities 
would be seriously affected by a tense history of conflict between landowners 
(whether state or non-state) and residents over the land—the distinction between 
legal and illegal occupation is frequently blurred. To begin with, it is often difficult to 
establish whether or not the occupation is illegal, given the fact that tenure rights are 
unclear or in dispute due to a variety of informal agreements between owners, renters 
and subrenters, not to mention situations such as silent acceptance of occupation by 
the state or traditional (communal) patterns of tenure which may pose quite a 
complicated legal puzzle. Second, and most importantly, this distinction loses its 
usefulness if one looks at a number of real problems (e.g., environmental decay, 
social marginalization and the dearth of job opportunities) that frequently confront non-
squatter citizens no less than their squatter fellows. From a development perspective, 
I therefore prefer to use the term informal settlement (also referred to as shanty-town, 
slum, very low-quality human settlement and the like) to describe both 
legal/authorized and illegal/unauthorized human settlements, which are in need of 
radical improvements or community relocation to a more suitable residence.  
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Origins 
 
 
Poor housing conditions and homelessness have a very long history, which has 
affected countless people from time immemorial. It is, for the most part, the history of 
unequal development between and within regions and communities of the world, 
which, as per the World Bank statistics of 2001, has resulted in over one billion people 
living on less than one dollar per day (at 1993 purchasing power parity)—the vast 
majority of whom live in the South, where the socio-economic conditions of most 
countries are lagging very much behind those in the North. Despite problems with 
international comparison of poverty data, living with as little as one dollar a day clearly 
entails a lack of means to acquire minimum material comfort, which, among other 
things, is likely to result in people staying in shacks, huts or on the streets, barely 
surviving. Why are the poor poor and the homeless homeless? Since it is necessary 
to have a practical understanding of a problem before engaging in the analysis of its 
causes, the researcher draws on Wratten (1995) and others quoted in the sequel of 
the paragraph to discuss briefly the meaning of the term poverty before trying to see 
what lies behind it. Broadly speaking, the state of being poor relates to having less of 
what is needed to achieve a minimum level of material well-being. Although what 
actually it is that people need to attain some minimum comforts in the material sphere 
may be questionable and the answer usually varies according to one’s experience of 
living and mindset, it seems unreasonable to regard as free from poverty a life that 
does not assure safe and proper access to water, food, health-care, housing, 
schooling and social security. Besides, it is worth mentioning that poverty can be 
considered anything but a good thing for the advancement of humanity at either 
individual or community level: at individual level, the lack of opportunity to satisfy basic 
human needs inhibits the full development of the human nature—notwithstanding the 
fact that many poor people reveal a miraculous richness of human feelings lost to 
many others; at community level, poverty is not only the primary enemy to the 
realization of equitable social development but also one of the most pernicious 
obstacles to peace and democracy—despite the fact that freedom from poverty does 
not necessarily entail reconciliation and equity within and between nations. When it is 
 33  
acknowledged that fighting poverty must be central to the progress of humankind, one 
should start to think over what it is that has to be fought against or, in other words, 
consider the causes of poverty. Whereas the exact origins of poverty should be 
studied at country level and, within each country, at grassroots level, it is possible to 
recount two general explanations of poverty, which are part of the debate on whether 
it is the poor themselves who should be held most responsible for their being poor, or 
rather whether the rich and the mighty should be blamed for the perpetration of 
poverty. Scholars such as Lewis (1966:23) point a finger at cultural and psychological 
forces, which would produce attitudes of ‘fatalism, helplessness, dependence and 
inferiority’ that dispirit the individual’s ability to strive for and achieve self-
improvement. Other scholars such as Fanon (1967), Hayter (1981), Rodney (1981) 
and Castells (2000)—whose views on the matter are to a greater extent in line with 
the researcher’s—suggest that poverty is rather the result of external forces, or 
‘structures and processes of the total system’ as Valentine (1968:142) puts it, which, 
stressing the logic of competition over co-operation and individualism over community, 
are apt to benefit the usual suspects at local, national and international level to the 
detriment of the people in general. Whether poverty is understood as individual 
responsibility due to apathy or collective responsibility bred by the system, the crude 
fact that its alleviation is one of the greatest unfinished tasks of humanity cannot be 
belied. As a matter of fact, hundreds of millions of fellow humans continue to have 
limited or no access to nutrition, housing, health-care, schooling and non-precarious 
jobs, coverage in the event of being without a job, sick, disabled, aged or subjected to 
violence as well as protection against natural disasters, wars or epidemics—an 
unfortunate situation that, if reversed, would raise their living standards to decent 
levels. 
 
As mentioned earlier, many people in the South live without a roof over their head or 
reside in informal dwellings erected in both urban and rural areas, each of them with 
an interesting story that could be told. Yet, as the field surveys supporting this 
research are conducted on urban soil, and because the range of problems related to 
urban informal settlements is exceptionally serious, the researcher intends to put 
particular emphasis on the analysis of the origins of informal settlements located in 
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the cities or their peripheries. Again, while it is important to bear in mind that the 
circumstances leading up to the formation of an informal settlement are somehow 
unique and deserving of special attention, it is possible to examine the typical 
background conditions responsible for adding fuel to the flames of poverty in most 
urban centres of the developing world, that is, vast migration of people from rural 
areas and intense population growth. As Litvin (1998:5) puts it, ‘country-dwellers in 
developing countries are moving to the cities . . . pushed by a scarcity of farm jobs 
and . . . pulled by the hope of better jobs and a better life’. Besides the insufficiency of 
job opportunities, the fact that so many rural villages present a dilapidated 
appearance is also part of the cause that wins the people over to leave. As a result, if 
governments want to keep the people in the rural areas, not only must they develop 
the rural economy but also service the villages with utilities and amenities that 
increase the attractiveness of the place. To put it differently, it is necessary to reverse 
the urban bias in governments’ development strategies and genuinely converge 
development efforts towards a two-pronged policy capable of addressing urban as 
well as rural priorities. Rural development would then not only stand for meeting the 
legitimate needs and aspirations of the rural population but would also cut off a great 
deal of rural–urban migration, which is one of the major sources of the continued 
sprawling of informal settlements in the urban fabric. Apart from the economic reasons 
and the lack of services mentioned above, which are of primary importance, it is also 
worth pointing out that another factor contributing to this population drift from the 
countryside is the desperation of some people, mostly women, who are willing to 
accept almost any cost to escape the discrimination and oppression they suffer in 
their rural home. Migration routes to the cities of the developing countries, however, 
are not limited to those from the rural areas: they also comprise international migration 
and resettlement from other urban districts within the same country. Once again, most 
people move for economic reasons : real and perceived national and international 
unevenness in job opportunities and standards of living urges people from the least-
developed regions to migrate to more prosperous ones, holding the view that things 
will improve. Others, instead, migrate to escape political or religious persecution at 
home. That being said about migration patterns, it is important to stress that urban 
development is more likely to end up being unsatisfactory in a situation where the 
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natural growth rate of the population is above what is considered acceptable and not 
expected to fall back into line in the immediate future. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning that although in the developing world the population growth rate has come 
down a little since the 1990s, it is estimated (Litvin, 1998:5) that it ‘remains fast 
enough to push the world’s population above 9 billion by 2050, from around 6 billion 
today’. Most of that growth will be in the urban areas of developing countries. 
Particularly when combined with inconsiderate city planning, intense population 
growth results in a much greater difficulty if not complete inability of the municipal 
administrations to provide quality services to the people. As a result, if governments 
are concerned about the welfare of all their citizens, they should take further steps to 
curtail excessive growth of the population, especially as far as the poor communities 
are concerned. The researcher holds the opinion that the use of a long-term strategy 
based on enhanced awareness and distribution of family planning methods such as 
contraceptive pills, condoms or diaphragms—rather than activities promoting abortion 
services, which should remain the last resort—and the assurance that these methods 
are of the highest quality would not only be wise but decisive. Failing to promote rural 
development and to take care of rampant population growth will continue to account 
for the fast-growing increase in size of urban agglomerations and for a great deal of 
the enormous difficulties displayed by most cities in the developing countries ‘to cope 
economically, environmentally and politically with such acute concentrations of 
people’, as argued by Todaro and Smith (2003:311), which, while worsening the well-
being of all city-dwellers have a particular negative impact on that of poor urban 
dwellers. Apart from that, it is worth adding that the problems of the poor sections of 
the urban population are also generated by the ‘bias in public policies, investments 
and services [which] is largely only in favour of the better-off inhabitants and more 
powerful industrial, commercial and financial concerns’, Hardoy and Satterthwaite 
(1989:310) contend. All things considered, without sorting out the problems of growing 
city congestion and reversing government’s bias leaning in favour of the more affluent 
parts of the population, the miserable living conditions of the most deprived section of 
the urban community will persist indefinitely. Among other things, the poor do not 
have adequate housing opportunities: because the cost of housing is out of proportion 
to poor people’s earnings and access to housing subsidies and other forms of finance 
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for the poor normally prove to be defective, they have to go for the cheapest and most 
uncomfortable housing option, thus leading to the proliferation of slums and squatter 
settlements in so many cities throughout the South. 
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Distribution 
 
 
Starting from the 1950s and 1960s up to the present time, informal settlements have 
been growing very rapidly in most cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America: from the 
favelas in Brazil to the bidonvilles in francophone Africa and the bustees in India to 
name but a few of the local names, informal settlements ‘have been doubling in size 
every 5 to 10 years’, Todaro and Smith (2003:313) report. As a result, in several 
developing world cities, more than half of the population is informally housed or 
without a roof over their head (Table 2.1). Although owing to possible inaccurate 
estimations and divergences in the definition of the term informal housing these 
figures are reliable only to a certain extent, the researcher believes they do not 
overestimate the problem. However, the relative figures for the cities of developed 
countries are comparatively very low but not non-existent: in spite of their wealth, 
every Northern metropolis leaves some of its people with little option but to squat on 
pavements, greens and the like, or residing in squalid neighbourhoods, which are 
frequently inhabited by ethnic minorities and referred to as ghettos,. 
 
As regards the location of informal settlements within a country, there are three basic 
possibilities: inner-city, suburban and rural. What follows is a brief overview of how the 
location of an informal settlement would affect its characteristics. Informal settlements 
located within the city are usually smaller in size due to the scarce availability of land 
for low-income housing. Many informally housed people settle in pockets of land and 
interstices, thus resulting in rather high population density. Urban informal settlements 
are very common in Latin America and India. Overcrowding is particularly high in such 
settlements owing to the additional fact that informal dwellings are often multi-storey 
structures (especially in Latin America) or are very close one to the other (especially 
in India) rather than being primarily single-storey and detached, as it happens to be in 
Africa. Despite being located within the city, it is a characteristic of many Indian 
informal settlements to be extensive in size. Urban informal settlements have some 
location-related advantages and disadvantages: advantages consist in being near to 
clinics, schools, social amenities and job opportunities created by the city economy—
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although access to them is potential rather than consequent; disadvantages lie in 
possible geological instabilities or steepness of the land, which, along with high 
residential density, do not make for an easy upgrading of the site and every now and 
again turn out to be quite harmful to the residents. Informal settlements 
 
Table 2.1  Informal Housing in Developing World Cities 
 
     
City 
As a % of 
City Population 
 
    
     Africa and Middle East   
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  79  
    Casablanca, Morocco 70  
    Ankara, Turkey 60  
    Cairo, Egypt 60  
    Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 53  
    
 Asia   
    Calcutta, India 67  
    Karachi, Pakistan 44  
    Manila, Philippines 35  
    Jakarta, Indonesia 26  
    
 Latin America   
    Bogotà, Colombia 60  
    Caracas, Venezuela 54  
    Mexico City, Mexico 46  
    Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 20  
    
    Source:  Todaro and Smith, Economic Development, 2003:294  
   
 
located on the outskirts of the cities, instead, are usually more extensive in size and 
lower in population density. Owing to the larger available space, suburban informal 
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settlements are on the whole technically easier to upgrade—although higher 
infrastructural investments may be required to integrate the settlements, especially 
those erected on the hillsides, with the rest of the city. Some suburban informal 
settlements are situated next to railway stations, some near industrial areas and 
others where landless people meet the least resistance from authorities and 
landowners. They are prevalent in Africa where most informally housed people get to 
settle in the peripheries of the urban centres. There are also a number of informal 
settlements that are located in the countryside. While access to social amenities and 
public utilities depends on local circumstances, still too many rural villages continue to 
be marginalized into very poor living conditions: many traditional dwellings have not 
changed much over the centuries and access to primary schools, clinics or general 
stores are missing or quite difficult. Furthermore, the indispensable water needed for 
farming, cooking and washing has to be fetched from watercourses and carried 
(usually by women) in buckets on their heads as water pipelines are hardly extended 
to reach remote (and sometimes even less remote) rural settlements. Most rural 
villages are generally small in size, housing as little as a few hundred people or fewer 
and are close to maize fields or other farming or grazing lands, which are the heart of 
the rural economy. Rural villages exist everywhere in the developing world where 
about 50% of the population live in rural areas. This is not to say that all villages of the 
South are substandard human settlements but it is important to note that the living 
conditions in many of them definitively call upon governments to refocus their 
development policies. 
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Housing Conditions 
 
 
The most apparent aspect of informal settlements is the ramshackle conditions of 
houses. Because residents cannot afford the necessary tools, materials and know-
how to build appropriate foundations, walls, roof and all other housing components, 
not only do most informal dwellings have erratic structures but they also fail to form a 
stable whole providing adequate protection from the elements. Within the urban 
setting, most informally housed families live in small shacks made of corrugated iron 
sheets interspersed with plywood, plastic and cardboard. Some spend their lives in 
tents of nylon and plastic and, especially inside inner-city slums, quite a few get to 
reside in decrepit brick structures. In the rural areas, instead, most informally housed 
people shelter their families in round, thatched-roof huts made of brushwood daubed 
with dried mud or cow dung. The problem with these dwellings is clearly not only 
aesthetic. Especially in the case of houses purposely built with quickly removable 
materials so that the settler can rapidly take them up and relocate to other sites in the 
event of abrupt eviction, informal dwellings could also cause harm to the residents: 
while the integrity of the houses is compromised by a faulty building process, the 
frequent use of inflammable building materials poses a constant risk of fire, which, in 
the case of high-density settlements, would be likely to spread to the whole 
neighbourhood. Additional problems result from poor lighting and ventilation: where 
lighting happens to be meagre or improper at night as well as daytime due to little or 
no access to electricity and minimal window openings, people are likely to suffer from 
eye strain and headache while doing their homework; where ventilation is inadequate, 
there is a risk of air toxification. Notwithstanding their being constructed out of 
disparate materials and containing just a small number of essential possessions, most 
informal dwellings openly reveal the resident’s desire for respect: it is amazing to see 
how many people do all the chores in and around their homes with tireless zeal and 
manage to live in a clean and tidy place. It is also worth noting that housing conditions 
may vary a lot among settlements and within a settlement. Factors that weigh on the 
structural consolidation of the houses and betterment of the interiors include the 
perception of the risk of eviction, household income and how long a family has been 
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residing in the settlement. Housing improvements appear to occur over time and are 
related to a significant reduction of the risk of eviction and greater sources of income. 
As a matter of fact, some houses—usually those of the initial settlers—are in better 
condition and on a larger plot; others—usually those of the last families to arrive—are, 
instead, huddled together in terrible conditions.  
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Security of Tenure 
 
 
Because of its being directly linked to housing improvements (whether state- or 
individually funded), one of the most important factors that should be carefully 
considered in addressing the dire housing conditions facing the informally housed 
population is security of tenure, that is, the right of settlers over the house and land 
they occupy. The reason being that despite the fact that most shack dwellers would 
be eager to upgrade their houses, lack or uncertainty of tenure rights leave them 
unprepared to invest in something that might one day be demolished, to say nothing 
of the fact that governments offer housing subsidies only to applicants who meet 
qualifying criteria, one of which is usually the demonstration of the legal tenure of their 
plot. The major theoretical problem with the definition of the tenure status of informal 
settlers resides in the conflict of rights involved in the matter, namely the right of 
landowners to use their property versus the right of landless people to a piece of 
habitable land. Especially if enshrined in national legislation, what would then spark 
hot debate over the notion of tenure and thereby challenge the concept of squatting 
relates to the human right of every individual to gain access to an adequate living 
environment. In this respect, if a radical interpretation of those constitutional 
provisions that grant housing rights to all citizens (such as those entrenched in the 
South African Bill of Rights) was adopted and the right of landless people to adequate 
housing was emphasised rather than the right of landowners (whether state or private) 
to dispose of their property, it would then turn out to be difficult to attest with absolute 
confidence that unauthorized informal settlers cannot claim any legal right to the 
occupation of the land and can thus be labelled squatters. 
  
Additional debate over security of tenure or the lack thereof occurs in the event of 
traditional (communal) patterns of tenure and silent acceptance of occupation by the 
landowner. Traditional forms of occupation of land mostly occur in the rural areas of 
sub-Saharan Africa where traditional leaders (councils) allocate land to individuals 
and families in accordance with traditional land rights. Disputes over land that is 
traditionally occupied may arise especially when the legislation of the country 
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concerned does not make it clear what role, rights and responsibilities (most notably, 
in the area of land allocation and administration) are to be accorded to traditional 
leadership institutions within the national and local governance systems. As regards 
the silent acceptance of the landowner (usually the state) to the occupation of the 
land, a debate may develop over the terms and conditions for the acquisition of the 
legal right of the settlers to reside permanently in that particular place (usucaption). It 
is important to mention that tenure rights or the lack thereof not only affect shack 
owners but also, and sometimes more dramatically, shack tenants owing to the 
informal nature of most of the renting arrangements that may easily lead to abuses 
perpetrated by landlords against unprotected tenants. 
 
Because of the above controversy over the interpretation of the tenure status of 
informal settlers, the researcher believes that evictions should be kept to a minimum 
and always subject to a judicial review. Tenure regularization, instead, would not only 
ensure that anyone can exert the right to a secure place in which to live but, because 
the risk of eviction is removed, it would also encourage the mobilization of people’s 
resources for housing development that complies with minimum building standards. 
Obviously, tenure regularization must not necessarily come in the form of outright 
ownership of the plot of land if one is to avoid being in a situation where the poorest 
beneficiaries sell their newly granted freehold titles to higher income households and 
go squatting somewhere else. In these cases, it may be desirable to put in place 
some forms of conditional ownership that spell out what it is expected and not 
expected from the beneficiaries. Similarly, it is imperative to refrain from the 
theoretical ‘fear that granting any form of security of tenure . . . will be tantamount to 
legitimizing an illegal act and will encourage further squatting and continued migration 
to the cities’ (UN-Habitat, 1981:38) and focus instead on a thoughtful prevention of, 
and response to, further land invasion. Having said that, it is not a remote possibility 
that the granting of tenure rights with respect to a particular place that has been 
occupied may not be prudent (environmentally acceptable) or reasonable 
(economically acceptable). In this event, it would be important that governments set 
the criteria for eligibility to receive some relocation assistance prior to any eviction 
notice being served on a family. Finally, it has to be noted that prior to the granting of 
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any tenure, it is crucial from a practical standpoint that government officials engage in 
an official numbering of existing shacks followed by an orderly compilation and 
administration of a register of informally housed families entitled to remain where they 
are or be assisted in relocating their home, which needs to include all relevant 
information regarding the occupants. 
 
 
  
 
 45  
Infrastructure and Social Amenities 
 
 
The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (UNCHS) held in Istanbul, 
Turkey in 1996 adopted a document called the Habitat Agenda which, among other 
things, outlines a list of infrastructure and social amenities to which everyone, 
everywhere, should have access. The UNCHS guidelines can be grouped into five 
principal sections, which add to the needs for adequate housing and tenure security 
discussed in the previous paragraphs: clean water; waste management; energy, 
telecommunications and transportation; streets and open spaces; health-care centres, 
schools, police precincts and other social or recreational facilities. Sadly, each one of 
these desiderata is deficient or absent in informal settlements, thus causing 
tremendous problems to residents and, in same cases, to neighbouring areas. 
 
The first entry of the list concerns the provision of clean water, which is a basic right of 
every person in that it is essential to safeguard the health of the people. Although a 
good proportion of residents of informal settlements have access to potable water, 
there is usually no running water piped into their houses but for a minority of families: 
many people share a few public standpipes or road tankers for their daily cooking, 
cleaning and washing, which is likely to result in endless queues at public taps or 
residents being compelled to spend their meagre savings on buying water from street 
hawkers.  
 
The next entry relates to waste management, which consists of facilities and services 
for both liquid and solid waste management. The ideal processing of sewage should 
start with in-house flush toilets connected to sewers flowing to wastewater treatment 
plants. Storm drains are then needed to take away rainwater, which otherwise 
accumulates in stagnant pools turning into swampy places that are naturally attractive 
to insects likely to spread diseases to humans. Solid waste disposal, instead, involves 
regular and efficient collection of both organic and non-organic garbage—for example, 
food refuses, glass bottles, newspapers, aluminium cans or plastic bags—otherwise 
uncollected waste will clog drains and sewers. The reality of waste management in 
 46  
informal residential areas is generally deficient and sometimes dramatically so. To 
start with, only a small number of informally housed families have private toilet 
facilities: many residents use communal (pit) latrines that are not connected to city 
sewers, the consequence of which is that the stench of raw sewage permeates the 
houses near the public latrines and more often than not the entire neighbourhood. 
Even worse than the unpleasant smell is the fact that open drains running through 
several informal settlement facilitate the spread of diseases, especially in high-density 
areas. Garbage disposal is also irregular and inappropriately handled, thus resulting in 
solid waste being burnt, buried or piled up , causing serious health risks to the 
residents. 
 
The third entry refers to the provision of electric power, telephone services and 
transportation. In most informal settlements, access to electricity is minimal and often 
clandestine: as many residents cannot afford to pay for electricity, they install a pole of 
bamboo on which a metal hook is raised and attached to the electricity line—provided 
that the network is within reach. Not only makeshift electrification results in lower 
quality of electricity, which, in turn, results in feeble lighting and the imperfect working 
of electric appliances such as refrigerators but can also produce harmful 
consequences for the residents—sometimes even lethal as in the case of 
electrocution. Some families equip themselves with stand-alone power generators, 
which would enable them to watch television or listen to the radio. As for cooking and 
heating, most—if not almost all—families make use of paraffin or bottled gas heaters 
or employ traditional methods such as burning firewood and charcoal, which are 
linked to an increased risk of explosion, fire and respiratory problems. Access to 
telecommunications services tends, instead, to be modest: private telephones are a 
luxury for the majority of informal settlers, while public telephones (usually wireless) 
are generally a long walking distance away. As far as transportation is concerned, one 
cannot help noting that public transport services rarely reach peripheral informal 
settlements. As most informal settlers cannot afford their own vehicle, private minibus 
taxies, mototaxies, rickshaws and the like are there to help people get on with their 
daily lives—although for many it is much more common to walk long distances rather 
than spend the little money that they have on transport fares. 
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The fourth entry has to do with the circulation network and open spaces for which little 
or no room is usually left by the chaotic sprawl of shanties. Public ways within informal 
settlements are frequently no more than trails on which people can only walk or ride. 
The few streets are normally unpaved and without drains, lighting or safe walkways 
along the edge. As a result, residents get about with great discomfort, especially 
during or after rains, and access of emergency and service vehicles such as 
ambulances, fire trucks and patrol cars is prevented or quite difficult. Correspondingly, 
open spaces such as squares, green areas or parks are generally quite modest on 
account of the unplanned growth and congestion of houses, which, among other 
things, carries part of the responsibility for exacerbating the risk of ill-health for the 
residents through an increased chance of contracting hygiene-related and 
communicable diseases. 
 
The last entry has to do with various issues including health-care services, education, 
assistance to special interest groups, security, shopping and leisure opportunities. As 
regards the issue of health-care, it is fist of all worth recalling that informally housed 
communities have normally higher levels of ill-health and premature death compared 
to the general picture. While it is true that part of the poor level of health is connected 
with dire housing and living conditions—for example, scarce protection from the 
elements, overcrowding, filth around the house, malnutrition and limited access to 
safe water—whose improvement would require considerable capital investments, 
Cairncross et al. (1990:xxiii) maintain that a ‘substantial proportion of such ill-health 
and premature death can be prevented by relatively inexpensive healthcare services 
combined with other projects and programmes, whose initiation and running is not 
necessarily the responsibility of trained medical personnel’. The lack or limited 
availability of clinics and emergency services for informal settlers is even more 
distressing in the light of the HIV /AIDS pandemic, which not only is at its highest ever 
but also not expected to decrease among the poorest communities in the years 
ahead. In this respect, without playing down some social and medical victories as well 
as recent seemingly concrete political commitments in a few developing countries, it 
seems that the world is still a long way from holding back the problem of HIV /AIDS—
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especially as far as poor people are concerned. With regard to education, there is a 
good amount of documentation describing the levels of literacy among informal 
settlers as considerably lower than the general average. This is partly due to the lack 
of schools located in the proximity of informal settlements but also to the more 
decisive fact that many parents are compelled to stop or never start their children’s 
education, as they need their offspring at the workplace to do the chores or look after 
their younger siblings. Lack of formal education becomes a vicious circle that affects 
the chances of future generations of escaping from poverty. The fact that many 
children of educational age do not attend schools is also likely to lead to juvenile 
delinquency as street children have to develop survival strategies at an early age and 
one of the ways to survive is through crime. With regard to the issue of assistance to 
special-interest groups, it is worth first of all remembering that while life in informal 
settlements is generally hard for everyone, for some people it is harder than for 
others. Children and the elderly, for example, are among the most vulnerable sections 
of the population and run a constant risk of being left behind as crèches and centres 
for the elderly are frequently missing, unreachable or unaffordable. Notwithstanding 
the fact that at individual level there would on the whole be more dramatic problems 
for the aged than for the youth, at the level of society the future of the latter is always 
of greater concern because of the large numbers of infants and children living in 
informal settlements. As Jaeckel (2002:17) remembers, children’s life is habitually 
spent in non-stop danger as a consequence of the fact that when kinship networks are 
overloaded or non-existent and crèches are a long distance from parents’ house, 
‘children are often let alone to play in the streets or at home’ or parents ‘take their 
toddlers with them to their work in the informal market’—both cases posing accident 
hazards especially for the little ones. With regard to the issue of security, or the lack 
thereof, it usually falls into one of these three typologies: tenure, environmental or 
crime-related insecurity. Insecurity of tenure is connected to the risk of eviction, which 
may occur either in the form of mass eviction by local authorities or individual eviction 
by the landlord for not paying rent or other reasons. Environmental insecurity relates 
to the risk of living in places subject to heavy rains, river floods or landslides or being 
situated near decaying garbage dumps whose gas emissions become a serious fire 
hazards. Crime-related insecurity is associated with the risk of suffering from crime, 
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which is usually increased not only by the fact that the police are less capable of 
accomplishing their task of keeping up order because of access difficulties caused by 
poor road infrastructure but also by the fact that sometimes the police are just less 
interested in doing what they are supposed to do in order to prevent and respond to 
crime. As a result of insecure conditions, numerous informally housed communities 
live with immediate dangers, which sometimes results in death. While one may 
imagine the psychological stress of living under such conditions, hazardous situations 
alone are not sufficient to persuade informal settlers to move out, even if better 
alternatives are available, Fadare and Mills-Tettey (1992) suggest—sadly, it can be 
argued that among desperate people in need of a roof over their heads, the personal 
reasons and hopes that brought them to live in a particular informal settlement 
continue to prevail despite the awareness of living with the risks of natural disaster, 
health hazards and general conditions of insecurity that endanger their lives. As 
regards the issue of shopping and leisure opportunities, there is a shortage (if not 
compete absence) of market areas and playgrounds in almost all informal 
settlements. This is linked to the scarcity of available land that precludes their physical 
construction besides the relatively lower priority given to flea-market, sports and 
recreational areas by most of the residents. As a result, residents of informal 
settlements have developed a number of alternative ways for trading and amusement 
as witnessed in the number of small tuckshops, shebeens and street hawkers as well 
as the simple indoor and outdoor amusements of the children and less young people. 
 
As mentioned throughout the present paragraph, all the infrastructure and social 
amenities enumerated by the UNCHS generally fall short of demand and this is often 
true regardless of the tenure status of the settlement. Residents typically try to do 
something to make up for it by providing their own community facilities and services 
they lack. Initiative and tenacity of the inhabitants of slum and squatter settlements 
help improve the living conditions of the area and are evidence of the fertility of 
informally housed communities. In this respect, it is worth remembering that informal 
settlements are definitively deprived areas but also vibrant places where most people 
are anything but apathetic as they are seriously compelled to struggle for basic needs 
every day. But as it is quite difficult for the poor to manage to initiate and maintain a 
 50  
number of important housing-related infrastructure and social services all on their 
own, they are on the whole compelled to rely on the government for meeting their 
basic human needs. 
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Household Structure and Women’s Status 
 
 
Defining the word household in the context of informal settlements is a particularly 
tricky task as a result of its variability depending on factors such as socio-cultural 
traditions, economic possibilities and spatial restrictions of the people involved: some 
shacks are occupied by a couple or a single parent (usually a woman) with his or her 
children, whereas others accommodate three-generation households; sometimes two 
or more families share the same structure or a room can be rented out to strangers to 
help offset some of the costs of living; also bachelor men and women, widows and 
widowers live on their own in shanty-towns although it seems they are usually in the 
minority. Among the last-mentioned group, and in particular among men living on their 
own or sharing accommodation with friends or colleagues, it is worth noting that it is 
not unusual to find foreign immigrants who have left their blood relatives behind. 
These people normally come from the least developed countries desperately seeking 
for whatever job and a bit of security that was lacking in their lives. The presence of 
many foreign immigrants competing for scarce labour can sometimes be a serious 
problem, as it can easily create social tensions within the settlement that may 
degenerate into ethnic violence. Besides, some of these foreigners are legal and 
some illegal: bearing in mind the objectives of this thesis, it is relevant to point out how 
much more complex any attempt to start a process of co-operation between the local 
government and informally housed communities of foreigners would be —especially if 
they are without any official permit to reside in the country—also in view of the fact 
that the question of illegal immigration goes far beyond the power and responsibility of 
the local tier of government and requires the coordination and co-operation of national 
and international institutions and policies. Coming back to the analysis of the 
household structure, one can safely affirm that, on average, informally housed families 
are relatively large in size, thus resulting in many residents of informal settlements 
compelled to live life packed like sardines in a small shelter. As far as family ties are 
concerned, although it is not possible to generalize without the support of a 
comprehensive survey, it seems that they are still very much alive and valued among 
the poorest families, thus helping to ease the problems of cohabitation regarding large 
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and extended families. In these cases where the whole family cannot group together 
under the same roof, or perhaps decide not to, there is often confirmation that the 
family members carry on maintaining tight relations with one another. 
 
Numerous examples of bonding and caring within the family, however, do not 
preclude intra-family inequality and although life is usually hard for all members of the  
family, for some of them it is harder than others. In particular, it is recognized that 
women living in poor residential areas usually bear the brunt of a number of problems. 
This happens not only because more and more women living in informal settlements 
are single heads of households and therefore sole ly in charge of providing for their 
families but also because, in male-headed households, women are usually 
undemocratically assigned the full responsibility for most unpleasant chores such as 
fetching water when there is no tap in the house and maintaining the hygiene and 
health of the family environment. Warah (2002:16), for example, gives an account of 
women walking many hundreds of metres if not kilometres to a water tank everyday 
since no water tap is located in or near their houses. Besides, dealing with water and 
sanitation issues in the context of informal settlements results in increased exposure 
to ‘water-borne and sanitation-related diseases as well as less time for women for 
leisure, personal improvement or engagement in economic and political activities’, 
Seaforth (2002:3) argues. Even sadder, the poverty of women living in formal 
settlements seems trapped in a vicious circle: mothers often share their heavy 
domestic duties with their daughters, thus resulting in young girls who do not attend 
school which prejudices their chances of improving their lives. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that women are the majority of those living below the poverty line in the 
developing world and that their numbers generally exceed those of men in informal 
residential areas. 
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Community Organization 
 
 
Not only family but also community ties seem to be strong within most informal 
settlements. This can perhaps be ascribed to the fact that a life of hardships and 
privation is more often than not a vehicle of enhanced humanity and solidarity among 
those who experience it. Benefits resulting from tight family and community relations 
include the fact that more people are prone to care for their neighbours and to develop 
informal networks of mutual aid. Other benefits may come in the form of resident 
involvement in community action groups, especially in the presence of community 
activists within the settlement or community promoters who are capable of building on 
local knowledge and initiative from outside. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that a 
great number of informal settlements—especially that have been in existence for a 
long time—present representative structures that administer the settlement or a part 
of it, try to defend the settlement against the threats of eviction, lobby for common 
necessities and liaise with concerned outside parties. In most settlements, however, 
these structures are informal and it is not often that one finds councils, committees or 
other community-based organizations that decide to establish themselves formally as 
legal entities. Community leadership roles are generally filled by those who are heads 
of religious or kinship groups; by those who have some kind of backing from local 
authorities and development agencies; or by people who are able to mobilize the 
community and defend the common interests of the inhabitants. The leadership style 
adopted by the community representatives plays an important role in the involvement 
of the community in general: hierarchical leaderships tend to concentrate the decision-
making in the hands of a few leaders, whereas more inclusive styles of leadership 
have the power to encourage the community to act collectively for their mutual benefit. 
Community-based organizations and action groups look to the local authorities or 
private development agencies for questions of aid and development. As Hardoy and 
Satterthwaite (1989:169-70) put it, ‘joint programmes can be set up, for example to 
drain stagnant pools, to reblock existing settlements so pipes, drains and access 
roads can be installed and space made for schools and clinics, to locate and destroy 
disease vectors within homes and their surrounds, to design educational programmes 
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on health prevention and personal hygiene, to set up emergency life-saving systems 
through which first aid can be provided immediately in each neighbourhood and 
through which seriously ill or injured persons can be rapidly transported to a hospital’. 
While potential for co-operation between private or public development agencies and 
organizations representing informally housed communities exists, other outsiders 
such as the police or the judiciary are accepted with difficulty. Especially when it 
comes to solving conflict among members of the community, residents of informal 
settlements seem more inclined to develop and make use of their own mechanisms 
for settling disputes, which, to a certain extent, can be seen as another sign of the 
relatively high level of social cohesiveness pertaining to poor communities. 
 
Yet, the community living in informal settlements is rarely one: people of common 
background (e.g., those belonging to the same ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural 
groups) tend to cluster together and perhaps join some and not other community 
action groups so as to look after their particular interests. What is more, the long-term 
expectations of many or perhaps most informal settlers may be more individual or 
family-orientated than community-orientated. As maintained by Oldfield (2002), when 
the physical and socio-economic conditions within an informal settlement or a part 
thereof should improve, collective goals and the associated sense of community 
cohesiveness may fade, thus suggesting that it is important not to be too optimistic 
about the degree of intra-community harmony and community–government co-
operation achievable during the various stages of the upgrading process and that it is 
crucial to pay close attention at every stage not only to the interests of the community 
as a whole, but also, as far as it is practical, to those of specific groups, families and 
individuals. As a matter of fact, community concerns evolve over time according to the 
temporary priorities of the inhabitants. For example, security of tenure can initially be 
the key priority shared by the vast majority of, if not the whole, community. When the 
settlement becomes more secure, however, the residents turn to address other 
collective problems (e.g., running water, waste disposal, lighting, access to clinics and 
the betterment of their house) whose prioritization is a matter of individual preference. 
Later, the goals of the inhabitants tend to differentiate, and pressure groups are likely 
to appear in defence of the interests of specific subcommunities or groups that have 
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different values, priorities and their own trade-offs. Similarly, the relations between 
residents of informal settlements and local government authorities would evolve over 
time. Such relations, however, are often threatened by lack of communication 
between the two parties, thus leading to groundless fears, a sense of hopelessness 
and negative or even hostile attitudes from both sides. But if and when mutual 
understanding becomes clearer through the weapons of dialogue and co-operation, 
perceptions would then tend to improve from both sides, thus reducing the occurrence 
of destructive mistrust and conflicts. 
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Employment Situation 
 
 
It is claimed by Amis (1995:151) that ‘labour status is the single most important factor 
for explaining poverty’, thus implying that the higher the unemployment figures and 
the more unprofitable, irregular and unprotected the jobs available to the people, the 
higher the incidence of poverty. From this perspective, it is apparent that the dismal 
levels of poverty that plague the largest part of the developing world are above all 
linked to a sluggish employment situation which leaves much of the labour force 
unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed. One of the most common distinctions made 
in respect of types of employment is between formal and informal employment—the 
central difference between the two is that the latter escapes certain legislative 
requirements such as enterprise registration, trade licence, tax and social security 
payments or the observance of health, safety and environmental regulations, either 
partly or altogether. Referring to the preparatory documentation of the International 
labour Organization (ILO) for the 2002 International Labour Conference, Devey et al. 
(2004:46) point out that there are two kinds of informal employment: informal 
employment in informal enterprises and informal employment in formal enterprises 
and households. While the same authors (Devey et al., 2004:46) highlight that ‘some 
workers classified in the informal economy display characteristics of work which are 
considered to be formal, and large numbers of workers classified in the formal 
economy display characteristics of work commonly associated with informal work’—
which implies that informal activities disguise widely divergent levels of profitability 
ranging from that of survivalists to well-off entrepreneurs—it seems evident that ‘most 
of the individuals engaged in informal economic activities are poor, particularly in the 
Third World’, as Castells and Portes (1989:12) maintain, and are left with the only 
option of working unprofitably, precariously and more often than not irregularly if they 
want to avoid being unemployed for a long time or even forever. The informal 
economy (also known as shadow economy or underground market) plays a significant 
role in the economies of developing countries where it absorbs the greater part of 
informally housed people who manage to have a job. It represents a heterogeneous 
reality that encompasses different employment situations (i.e., the self-employed, 
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disguised employees and family workers) and different economic actors (e.g., 
hawkers, tailors, domestic workers, hairdressers, carpenters and motor mechanics). 
Although informal activities disobey legislative requirements and are therefore 
conducted illegally, it seems reasonable to claim that they exhibit a substantial degree 
of similarity with formal ones in terms of social utility as long as they do not have 
illegal ends, do not produce hazardous situations nor a deterioration in the social 
order as it happens, for example, with exploitation of prostitution, drug trafficking, 
manufacturing of fireworks in residential areas or child labour and other forms of 
labour exploitation—thus implying that the state should selectively uphold, and not 
punish, such activities on the assumption that informal employment is ‘a better 
alternative than total destitution’, as Portes et al. (1989:301) put it. In particular, 
informal entrepreneurship in the developing world is, for the most part, characterised 
by little or no access to business information, training programmes, marketing 
assistance and credit facilities. This calls for governments to be more responsive to 
the needs of millions of informal businessmen and businesswomen whose livelihood 
depends, not only on the existence of entrepreneurial spirit, but also on targeted 
assistance necessary to spark and fuel that spirit. 
 
It is also worth noting that, especially within the poorest households, many if not all 
family members are expected to participate in informal income-generation activities so 
as to help scrape together some money. While the head of the household contributes 
a large portion of the family’s income, his or her efforts may not be enough to fulfil the 
basic necessities of the family—thus resulting in the need for secondary incomes that 
may be generated either by the partner, children of almost every age, the elderly who 
can still make it, various uncles, aunts or cousins. In fact, although a good deal of the 
people working in the informal sector happen sometimes not to be reflected in the 
employment statistics, for some of them the problem is not unemployment nor 
underemployment but overemployment, which happens to be largely unprofitable or 
underpaid, as Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989:138) suggest. It is also important to 
mention that although the bulk of informally housed workers can only engage 
themselves in non-remunerative, insecure or sporadic occupations in the informal 
sector and some might now and again manage to be formally employed but receive 
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scanty remuneration for their labour, it would be a mistake to assume that all residents 
of informal settlements are on the bread line. At one extreme there are some of the 
poorest people who earn, at best, subsistence wages and, at worse, survive on 
charity and scavenging. At the other extreme, however, it is argued (Amis, 1984:93) 
that ‘there are some who hold down middle-ranking clerical jobs who may choose to 
live in such areas to minimize their expenditure on housing’, or (Asiama, 1985:357-61) 
that there are relatively better-off families who reside in shacks against their will 
because they lack access to land grants for a building plot or bank loans for the 
construction of a house. 
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Policy Options 
 
 
At the beginning of the third millennium, informal settlements are sprawling throughout 
the developing world and constitute the unpropitious setting that shackles the right of 
hundreds of millions of people to be free to live a dignified life. Informal settlements 
are one of the most serious policy concerns for many developing cities not only 
because they are a constant reminder of the fact that there is something very wrong 
with the way society is organized, but also because they frequently produce 
‘tremendous public costs [e.g., in the form of environmental damage, health-care 
spending or as shields protecting criminal enclaves], particularly once they make up a 
large part of the city’, Ferguson (1996:171) argues. In view of this, it is necessary to 
discuss the policy options that have been and  may be adopted to try to eradicate 
informal settlements once and for all. 
 
The story of the way in which governments in most developing countries have tried to 
deal with informal settlements can be made start in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
dominant policy was one of demolition of shacks and subsequent replacement with 
public housing programmes. These government-financed housing projects, which 
were all at government’s expense with almost no contribution on the part of the 
beneficiaries, turned out to be unsuccessful or at least unable to accommodate a 
large share of the target population as increasing rates of population growth and 
urbanization made the replication of the projects financially unsustainable. Actually, 
alongside this paternalistic role of the state, at its opposite extreme, very repressive 
policies consisting of eradicating squatter settlements through bulldozing without 
offering any housing alternative or compensation to the evacuees would also exist. In 
the 1970s the World Bank started to advocate two alternative options, namely, 
greenfield development (also known as site-and-service schemes) and brownfield 
redevelopment (also known as in situ upgrading). Contrary to what was happening in 
the case of all government-funded housing programmes, the World Bank-conceived 
housing schemes usually require receivers to contribute with labour or funds to the 
implementation and maintenance of the projects. As long as these programmes seek 
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to find ways and means of either putting emphasis on people’s self-help potential or of 
taking into account people’s needs and views, they seem to have greater chances of 
success than their predecessors. In fact, today, the international policy debate 
revolves around the two options initiated by the World Bank—although this does not 
imply that governments find it convenient at all times to refrain from self-defeating 
measures such as clearance or forced community resettlement to remote and 
unserviced lands, which inevitably result in ‘transferring the problem to another area’, 
as Mulwanda (1989:254) reminds us. 
 
What follows is a brief discussion what the two basic policy options , namely greenfield 
development and brownfield redevelopment. Greenfield development is the building of 
housing-related infrastructure and services on a piece of open land that has not been 
built on. Once the land has been serviced, the households who have previously been 
identified as eligible for housing assistance are granted a plot of land on which they 
have the right to build their shelter. Site-and-service projects could also involve the 
delivery of finished or partially finished houses (top structures) as well as subsidies or 
soft loans to support eligible families in making or completing the construction of their 
houses. Security of tenure is granted either in the form of rights of ownership (with or 
without prohibiting the beneficiaries from selling their house or plot for a few years, 
unless they sell it back to the state), tenancy (with or without ruling out the possibility 
of subrenting for a few years) or leasehold with an option to buy the lease after a few 
years (with or without the possibility of subleasing) depending on which would be most 
suitable to the beneficiaries. One of the main advantages associated with greenfield 
development is that it is more economical and less constrained than in situ upgrading. 
One of the main disadvantages is that it implies the relocation of households and 
communities to a more or less distant site, which may have negative consequences in 
terms of job opportunities besides being a traumatic experience. Another critical 
disadvantage occurs whenever the land (greenfields) on which housing development 
would take place is in the hands of private owners: in these circumstances, ‘when 
governments try to scale up site-and-service projects into a continuous programme, 
they run into problems in implementing and financing this because they cannot 
acquire the land they need and [although governments have the power to expropriate 
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land] they are not prepared to challenge the power of private land owners’, Hardoy 
and Satterthwaite (1989:129) maintain. Unlike greenfield development, in situ 
upgrading is the enhancement of a community’s living conditions on the site where it 
is settled. If substantial improvements are to be addressed, however, brownfield 
development can hardly avoid temporary relocation of at least some families—
especially in the case of high-population density. Once these families have been 
moved to temporary shelters, the settlement is supplied with housing-related 
infrastructure and services they lack before they are reinstated on their upgraded 
plots. In situ upgrading programmes could also make provision for finished or partially 
finished houses along with incentives such as conditional grants or soft loans to 
encourage housing-related investment on the part of the residents. The granting of 
tenure in one form or another is also an integral part of the process. Brownfield 
development has merit in that it makes people resettlement only temporary, if at all. It 
may, however, be open to abuse, as the upgrading leads to higher land and rent 
prices which would also benefit non-resident landlords who are not really people in 
need. It is also worth mentioning that because of the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with both site-and-service and in situ upgrading programmes, combined 
planning can be worked out with a view to delivering tailored solutions that are more 
likely to benefit the housing needs of the poorest communities and are sustainable in 
the long run—not to mention the fact that a combination of both policies may be 
required whenever dedensification is to be achieved. Comparison and choice among 
the alternatives presented represent the basic question in the policy-making aimed at 
improving an informally housed community’s living conditions which needs to be 
answered before other equally important, but logically subsequent, aspects regarding 
the quality and sustainability of housing development are examined. 
 
Having said that, it is also important to point out that no sustainable policy response to 
the right of informally housed communities to live more decorous lives would be found 
if policy-makers take their eyes away from the following three fundamental activities, 
as implied by a number of scholars including Amis (1995), Borgman and Wegelin 
(1995) and Moser (1995): first, undertaking of background studies; second, 
preparation of integrated (cross-sectoral) development plans; and third, involvement 
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of the affected population in the decision-making process. All of the aforementioned 
needs to be made first and foremost at settlement and ward level, and not only 
aggregated at the level of the city. Although these three themes are closely 
interrelated, it is worth outlining them one by one. The first key element of a policy 
aimed at improving the living conditions of an informally housed community should be 
undertaking all background studies that are needed to get the picture, not only of the 
spatial arrangements of the settlement, but also, and most importantly, of the social 
and economic conditions of the community, that is, what physical assets the place 
includes or lacks and how the residents live and work. Background studies are 
expected to add to the capacity of policy-makers and planners to design responsive 
and responsible solutions to area and community development. The second 
fundamental factor should be working out integrated development strategies not only 
to address the physical upgrading but also the social, economic and environmental 
uplifting of the conditions in which an informally housed community finds itself. 
Integrated development planning reflects the awareness that the simple provision of 
more decent housing opportunities and social amenities to informally housed 
communities would only make a partial contribution to the sustainable eradication of 
informal settlements. Accordingly, it is essential that ‘shelter policies’ be combined 
with ‘economic measures’ (e.g., creation of new and better job opportunities) and 
‘social initiatives’ (e.g., assistance in gaining access to clinics, schools and vocational 
training) for the target communities, and take into account the ‘ecological impact’ of 
the development strategy. It is also essential that integrated development planning 
does not fail to address the causes behind the formation and perpetuation of informal 
settlements (most notably, underdevelopment of rural areas, rapid population growth, 
gender discrimination and economic exploitation at all levels), which requires 
concerted efforts between all levels of government. In a nutshell, integrated 
development planning is expected to reach beyond planning for physical renewal of 
informal settlements to incorporate aspects of environmental responsibility and a 
courageous and multifaceted set of socio-economic measures, which is the extra-mile 
that will make all the difference for people living in abject poverty. The third building-
block of a policy aimed at enhancing the living conditions of an informally housed 
community should be to engage the affected population and its democratically 
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designated representatives in the decision-making process that affects their lives. The 
involvement of the community represents a crucial challenge to development projects 
that not only treat the people as passive recipients of externally defined interventions , 
but may also not be conceived as being in the interest of the residents: although 
participatory decision-making is likely to slow down the work of planners and policy-
makers in some way or another, precisely because it is concerned with the views and 
interests of the people, it is expected to be greatly relevant to the further enhancement 
of the quality and sustainability of the project over and above the professional value of 
background studies and integrated planning. 
 
Equivalent principles, norms and guidelines are also reflected in a number of 
international conferences and declarations committing governments and aid agencies 
to the eradication of informal settlements—most notably and in reversed chronological 
order, the Congress of United Cities and Local Governments of 2004, the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development of 2002, the United Nations Conference on 
Human Settlements of 1996 and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development of 1992. The funding congress of the largest international local 
government association named United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) took 
place from 2 to 5 May 2004 in Paris, France. The participants in the congress entitled 
Cities, Local Governments: The Future for Development released an official 
declaration which affirms, among other things, that the implementation of a 
multidimensional participatory approach embracing economic, social, political and 
cultural dimensions is one of the indispensable elements of the 21st century local 
democracy and forms the basis for fighting social discrimination and social exclusion. 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) took place in Johannesburg, 
South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002. The governments of the countries 
attending the WSSD agreed on two negotiated documents: the Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation. These 
papers reaffirm principles and action plans set out in the major United Nations 
conferences and international agreements since 1992 and discuss the conditions for 
sustainable development. Particular emphasis was placed on the urgent need to 
redress the bias in development strategies that inhibits balanced development of both 
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urban and rural areas if decent and sustainable livelihood is to be gained by hundreds 
of millions of people who are currently living in hundreds of thousands of urban and 
rural informal settlements across the developing world. The United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements (UNCHS) held in Istanbul, Turkey from 3 to 14 
June 1996 (also referred to as Habitat II) was the second United Nations conference 
purposely arranged to find answer to the question of human settlements in general 
and informal settlements in particular—the first took place in Vancouver, Canada in 
1976. The governments of the 180 countries that were present at the UNCHS adopted 
two negotiated documents: the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and the 
Habitat Agenda. These documents recognize the imperative need to improve the 
quality of cities, towns and villages worldwide and address, among others, three 
fundamental themes: adequate shelter for all; sustainable development of both urban 
and rural human settlements; and participation of all key actors in development. As to 
the first theme, the accent was put on the fact that people’s physical, psychological 
and economic well-being depends on their access to a safe and healthy shelter as 
well as on the fundamental role of local governments and local communities in the 
success or failure of development projects aimed at improving the living conditions of 
the poor. As to the second theme, it was recommended that policy-makers engage 
actively in the integration of shelter policies with social and economic measures 
responsive to the poorest sections of the population living in both urban and rural 
areas in the framework of environmentally friendly development practices. As regards 
the third theme, the signatories agreed on the importance of empowering all key 
actors in the public, private and civil society sectors to play an effective role in 
developing adequate human settlements for all and to institutionalize a purposeful 
political dialogue among all stakeholders involved in local development. The United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) took place in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992. The countries represented at UNCED agreed 
upon two far-reaching papers: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
and the well-known Agenda 21. As far as informal settlements are concerned, it is 
worth hinting at the principle set out in chapter 7 of Agenda 21, which confirms that 
meaningful involvement of the poor in the formulation of government agendas is to be 
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regarded as a crucial contributor to higher levels of programme and project 
sustainability. 
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Chapter 3 
South Africa’s 
Informal Settlements: 
A Hard Life for Almost 
One-Third of the Population 
 
 
Motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe’ 
 
A person is a person through other people or, in 
other words, one’s humanity is tied up with the 
humanity of all others. 
 
Tswana Proverb 
 
 
The previous chapter tells of the hard life of hundreds of millions of informally-housed 
people predominantly living in the developing world. The present chapter concentrates 
on the distinctiveness of informal housing in South Africa which, like most developing 
countries, has witnessed the mushrooming of informal settlements all over the 
country. According to the latest nationwide census conducted by Statistics South 
Africa in 2001, the number of urban or rural informally housed families amounts to 
almost 3,5 million or more than 31% of all households living in South Africa. In view of 
other census data disaggregated by family size, population group and income, it can 
be said that more than 14,3 million people out of a total population of 44,8 million 
spend their lives in informal dwellings in South Africa. This figure is almost evenly 
distributed between urban and rural areas: the number of families living in either free-
standing informal settlements, backyard shacks or similar structures in urban areas 
amounts to more than 1,8 millions (an estimated 7,5 million people) or more than 16% 
of all South African families; the number of those residing in traditional dwellings or 
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huts situated in rural areas amounts to more than 1,6 million (an estimated 6,8 million 
people) or almost 15% of all South African families. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of South Africa’s informal settlements by focusing 
on three main issues: first, their origins, which, to a large extent, can be traced back to 
the apartheid and pre-apartheid rule; second, their distribution around the country with 
regard to both urban and rural areas; and third, the set of government policies 
specifically targeted at trying, with limited success despite the good intention of the 
housing policy, to reach out to the needs of the informally housed population. Besides, 
in order to enhance the understanding of the context in which the field surveys are 
conducted, some of the matters covered in this chapter are not only discussed with a 
national perspective but also with reference to the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) 
Metropolitan Municipality. This chapter and the previous one provide background 
information to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of having the 
poorest segments of the population involved in shaping government policies, which 
are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chronicles 
 
 
The history of informal settlements in South Africa has been particularly bitter 
compared with that of other developing countries, as it was also the result of 
systematic racialism, segregation and repressive law enforcements spanning over 
three-and-a-half centuries and culminating in the advent of the apartheid regime, 
which despotically ruled the country from 1948 to the beginning of the 1990s. While 
the current situation of South Africa’s poverty-stricken and informally housed millions 
has surely been brought about by the same processes that have played an important 
role in today’s poverty levels in most of the developing world—which include 
exploitative colonial rule, demographic explosion, rural underdevelopment and global 
relations between the North and the South—it has also been the inevitable 
consequence of the notorious apartheid policies, which were aimed at consolidating 
racially discriminated communities and separated residential areas. For about four 
decades in the second half of the last century, the apartheid government kept on 
perpetrating racial restrictions on where African people could live and work, thus 
broadening long-standing inequalities based on race and contributing significantly to 
present-day South Africa’s situation as regards poverty and informal settlements, 
which affects so many families in the country today. That is why Abbott et al. 
(2001:75) maintain that informal houses, and above, all large-scale informal 
settlements surrounding the major cities of South Africa have normally ‘strong 
negative connotations, with echoes of apartheid’—although, especially in the light of 
the international scenario which is characterized by spreading slums and 
homelessness affecting about one billion people around the world, this perception can 
only partly be shared, as remembered by the same scholars. 
 
The role played by the apartheid state in contributing to the large number of informal 
dwellings found in rural and urban South Africa today is considered in the light of the 
works done by Pillay (1995), Mabin (1992), Lemon (1991) and Mashabela (1990), 
among others. History relates that the idea of apartheid (Afrikaans for ‘the state of 
being apart’) was the leading principle of the National Party, which came to power in 
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the all-white election of 1948 with Daniel Malan as prime minister. Shortly after the 
establishment of the apartheid government, the legal apparatus that had discriminated 
especially against blacks but also against coloureds and Indians for centuries was 
reinforced and enforced rapidly and with greater heartlessness across the country. 
The regime began with the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the 
Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, which outlawed marriage and sexual relations 
between whites and members of other population groups so as to preserve the 
supposed racial purity of the white people. In compliance with the Population 
Registration Act of 1950, every individual was in effect classified by race, that is, 
‘white’, ‘black’ or ‘coloured’ and further subdivisions—paving the way for making race 
a decisive criterion in every possible sphere. Complementarily, the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950 was intended to ban any opposition party or protest that the 
regime chose to brand as communist. Profound effects on the day-to-day lives of the  
people were further created by the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, 
which allocated different hospitals, schools, parks, hotels, buses, beaches, sports 
grounds, benches, lifts, toilets and counters, among other things, to the two principal 
groups that counted for the apartheid regime, that is, whites and non-whites, with the 
by-product of the notorious ‘Whites Only’ signs emerging in every imaginable place. In 
the same year, the Bantu Education Act was passed to make the apartheid 
government taking over most of the private schools that had remained outside the 
control of the state, thus securing that education remained separated and specific to 
the supposedly different needs of whites, blacks and other population groups. ‘[U]nder 
the new government Blacks were not to aspire to certain positions in society and so 
education for such positions was not deemed necessary,’ Christopher (1994:150) 
comments. But perhaps the most important measures to preserve a state of 
apartheid, not counting the continued ban of the right to democratic political 
representation, consisted in the promulgation of the Group Areas Act of 1950 and 
subsequent laws such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, the Natives 
Laws Amendment Act of 1952, the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of 
Documents) Act of 1952, the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954, the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 
1970, which, by some means or other, were aimed at consolidating earlier regulations 
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on spatial separation and influx control of the various population groups. Much of this 
legislation was specifically intended to affect the black population by giving white 
authorities extensive powers: first, to expropriate black-owned property, especially 
land and livestock (so-called black spots), which were located in white -designated 
areas in both urban and rural South Africa; second, to confine a great share of the 
urban black workforce, who was serving the needs of the white economic apparatus , 
in ethnic locations (so-called townships) built on the peripheries of cities or adjacent to 
industrial sites and provided with minimal housing, infrastructure and social amenities 
by the apartheid government; and third, to top it all, to displace the remainder of the 
urban black labour force that could not be accommodated in the townships, along with 
the black population living in both urban and rural areas who were considered surplus 
to the economic welfare of the white community, in the Bantustans (so-called native 
reserves or homelands). These reserves, for the most part located in economically 
depressed rural areas, were cunningly claimed to permit Africans to preserve their 
traditional cultures and lifestyles but were actually meant deliberately to fragment the 
black population into linguistically defined territories that would finally have to become 
African independent statelets whose citizens would be deprived of their South African 
nationality and be prohibited from entering South Africa, if not commuting workers of 
the industries of the white state. 
 
At the expense of unspeakable suffering by millions of people—predominantly blacks 
and to a lesser extent coloureds and Indians—who were ruthlessly dispossessed and 
resettled in sprawling townships or dumped in impoverished homelands through either 
individual or large-scale displacements, the apartheid regime was devoted to 
engineering  and executing a programme of brutal social control across South Africa. 
As Christopher (1994:105) puts it, ‘the result was to be total segregation (apartheid), 
not the piecemeal results of colonial and Union segregationism’. It thus comes as no 
surprise that in the context of this programme of total segregation and social control, 
informal settlements were perceived (Harrison, 1992:16) ‘as a visible manifestation of 
a lack of such control’. As a result, at the same time as minimal housing units were 
being constructed by the apartheid government for those who were to be resettled in 
townships like Soweto (Johannesburg), Gugulethu (Cape Town), Mamelodi (Pretoria) 
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or Umlazi (Durban) and nothing more than ‘tents or other improvised shelters 
[frequently] awaited those displaced [to the homelands]’ (Christopher, 1994:81), inner-
city ethnic ghettos and slums, which had emerged in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as a result of expanding mining and manufacturing industries, 
were virtually wiped from white South Africa’s cities, whereas peripheral informal 
settlements were razed or minimized and on the whole limited to those stretching 
along the frontiers with the Bantustans in just about two decades of apartheid rule, 
that is, by the mid-1960s. Later on, just before the end of the 1960s, with a view to 
sharpening the ‘whitening’ of the country’s population, the apartheid government 
policies on low-income housing construction took a sharp turn towards redirecting all 
black township development within the boundaries of the Bantustans. But the new 
stubbornness of the apartheid regime was destined to be remarkably ineffective: 
throughout the 1970s, as a result of the combination of heavy pressure from urban 
overspill, relentless migration from the reserves in the face of the harsh imposition of 
influx-control legislations and growing resistance to removals, the arrest of township 
construction caused hundreds of thousands of black people to re-establish free-
standing informal settlements on vacant land adjacent to formal townships or on 
unsupervised farmlands. Acknowledging that the existing policies for black housing 
had clearly failed in their objectives, the apartheid regime shifted its strategy again in 
the early 1980s: even though the government continued to take no further 
responsibility for the construction of houses for the African population within white 
South Africa, it started to embark on site-and-service schemes that provided serviced 
land on which informal housing could be built conditional on certain minimum 
standards. As Harrison (1992:16) comments, this more pragmatic approach to 
informal settlements was also the result of the influential views of liberal academics 
and development professionals expressed in works such as Turner (1976), who 
started to challenge the mainstream perceptions on informal settlements by arguing 
that they were ‘not part of the problem but . . . part of the solution to the housing crisis 
and that . . . represent[ed] the creativity and energy of the poor’. By the end of the 
1980s, major adjustments to the apartheid design in general and black urbanization 
policies in particular became conspicuous: not only was the freezing of black township 
development relaxed but, more importantly, racial zoning and influx-control laws were 
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eventually repealed through new legislative measures such as the Abolition of Influx 
Control Act of 1986, the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act of 1986 and the 
Free Settlement Areas Act of 1988. That being so, larger numbers of mainly unskilled 
and poor people started to pour, above all from the marginalized countryside, into the 
cities and towns of a changing South Africa with hopes and dreams of a better 
tomorrow. As Parnell and Pirie (1991:145) put it, these new greater tides of 
urbanization were to bring ‘to the cities much of the poverty that [had] hitherto been 
hidden in the Bantustans’—a phenomenon that exploded at the beginning of the 
1990s when apartheid was completely dismantled through additional legislative 
actions such as the [Interim] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993, 
which paved the way to the South Africa’s first non-racial election in 1994. During and 
after the transition to the long-awaited freedom, waves of previously disadvantaged 
South Africans living in miserable conditions in former Bantustans, former townships 
or in white-owned farmlands—as well as immigrants from neighbouring states 
attracted by the real and perceived opportunities of a more prosperous economy—did 
not have to be asked twice to move to unlikeable urban hostels or put up their 
makeshift shelters of hopes and dreams on whatever piece of land they could find, 
especially on the outskirts of previously white -only cities or former townships. As a 
result of the accelerated migration of poor people to the urban areas, unprotected 
unemployment affecting large portions of a naturally expanding population and  the 
chronic shortage of housing, lots of free-standing informal settlements mushroomed 
on various state-owned or privately owned land or farmland. At the same time, a 
sprawl of new shack structures arose in the backyards of formal houses. 
 
That having been said about the apartheid legacy on informal housing, it must be also 
remembered that racialism and segregation in South Africa did not start in 1948 with 
the official advent of the apartheid regime. As the former South African President 
Nelson Mandela (1994:104) puts it, ‘apartheid was a new term but an old idea . . . it 
represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations 
that had kept Africans in an inferior position to whites for centuries’. In fact, the 
removal of Natives and seizure of land occupied by the African population in favour of 
European settlers started as soon as the Dutch East Indian Company, led by the 
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merchant Jan van Riebeeck, landed at Table Bay at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 
and set up the first permanent, non-native settlement in what is now South Africa. The 
land acquisition strategy adopted by the Dutch company settlers and later on by the 
European freeholders (the early Trekboers, or travelling farmers, the ancestry of 
present-day Afrikaners or Boers) as well as relations in general with the Africans they 
bumped into were in the main antagonistic, and irrespective of the interests of the 
earlier indigenous African settlers—thus laying the basis for centuries of servitude, 
displacement and segregation, not only experienced by the black population, but also, 
though to a lesser extent, by generations of people of Indian, Malaysian and 
Indonesian descent who were originally imported to work in the sugar plantations. An 
even more vicious story was indeed to continue about 150 years after the arrival of 
the first Dutch settlers, when the British seized the Cape in 1806 signing the beginning 
of nearly one century of British colonization of what is now South Africa. Despite some 
positive changes to institutionalized racialism of the Boers (e.g., slavery was 
abolished by the British Parliament across the empire in 1833) white control of the 
region was strengthened by two new, complementary and far-reaching reforms: the 
demarcation of the boundaries of the first native reserves and the introduction of the 
pass laws. The establishment of the reserves was the measure that heralded the 
‘repatriation’ of large numbers of supposedly unproductive or economically redundant 
Africans, such as the sick and the elderly, whereas the promulgation of the noto rious 
pass laws made it no longer possible for the African population to travel throughout 
South Africa without a permit. The advent of the British also revealed a clash of 
cultures between the cattle-grazing Boers and the urbanized British settlers: the 
inevitable confrontations between the two peoples resulted in an attempt by the rulers 
to unfold a comprehensive assimilation programme on the Boers. This caused the 
earlier settlers to embark on the Great Trek (1835-1843) and establish a few Boer 
republics in the mid-nineteenth century—most notably the South African Republic of 
Transvaal (established in 1852) and the Orange Free State (created in 1854). The 
republics marked out the spirit of fierce independence of the Boers but were also 
grounded on racist precepts that excluded Africans from the principle of equality 
before the law and the right to vote or own land. A further exacerbation of interracial 
relations came from the discovery of vast mineral riches in the late nineteenth century, 
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which initiated a process of industrialization and fast urbanization. From that moment, 
the supply of cheap labour became essential to suit the needs, and most of all the 
ravenous appetite for profit, of the emerging white mines—and after World War I also 
of the rising manufacturing industry—besides remaining one of the economic pillars of 
the largely Boer-owned farms. As a result, migrant workers began to overflow 
especially into the Witwatersrand, that is, Johannesburg and the surrounding gold-
mining areas, to become earners of meagre wages and inhabitants of the first large-
scale urban ghettos. 
 
The discovery of gold and diamonds was also central to the outburst of the Anglo-
Boer War of 1899-1902 further to which the Boer republics became temporary British 
colonies before regaining the status of semi-independent states within the newly 
established Union of South Africa in 1910. While it remained under the formal rule of 
the British Crown, the self-governed Union of South Africa was to mark the beginning 
of the end of British imperialism and the rise of Afrikaner domination in the country. 
The semi-independent government of the union rapidly passed a series of repressive, 
apartheid-like legislations based on the principles of racial discrimination and 
segregation, which were in part an elaboration of earlier ordinances passed by the 
British administration against ‘non-Europeans’, and especially against Africans , and in 
part were evidence of rise in racialism. Among the most important of these 
instruments was the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and the Native Labour Regulation 
Act of the same year, which relegated non-white workers to a cheap and powerless 
workforce whose right to strike was considered illegal. Shortly after, a further 
worsening of interracial relations was reached through the introduction of the Natives 
Land Act of 1913: as argued by Christopher (1983:374), while ‘racially restrictive 
clauses in title deeds and statutes [had become more and] more common [under 
British rule] and Africans [had already been] effectively restrained from acquiring land 
outside the native reserves before legislative barriers were erected in South Africa in 
1913’, the new law was specially designed to prohibit Africans totally from owning or 
hiring additional land outside the boundaries of the reservations of British imprint, 
which at that moment constituted about 7% of South Africa’s landmass (extended to 
13% with the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936)—primarily in present-day Limpopo, 
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Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape. Although it did not immediately 
transform the countryside, it is argued (Beinart et al. 1986:15) that the new land 
legislation played a decisive role in ‘ending both rent tenancy and sharecropping and 
installing labour tenancy as the dominant relationship of exploitation of the land’. Even 
more bitterly, it should also be remembered that one of the by-products of the law was 
that thousands of rural Africans who did not find employment as farmworkers or 
labour tenants in the white farms were evicted from their homes, deprived of the cattle 
and, if not absorbed by the urban labour market, sent off to their so-called homelands. 
In perfect unison with what was being done in rural South Africa, physical separation 
of black and white residential quarters in urban areas was feverishly worked out: as a 
result of the long-standing idea (Dubow, 1995:155) that ‘presented white supremacy 
as part of the natural order of things’ combined with increasingly chaotic societal life, 
obsession with miscegenation and the popular (Swanson, 1995:26) ‘imagery of 
infectious disease’, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the subsequent Slums 
Act of 1934 were promulgated to provide local authorities with the power to clear 
inner-city slums and establish (Parnell, 1993:479) ‘supervised municipal locations’. 
This opened the way to the distinctive city–township relations of the apartheid era in 
which the locations served for the residential segregation of urban blacks as well as 
creating a ‘fish pond’ of near and cheap workforce for the white industry, commerce 
and households. At a later stage the Representation of Natives Act of 1936 was 
promulgated to deprive Africans of any residual chance of no-nonsense political 
representation: African voters had to sign on separate electoral rolls with the right to 
elect representatives of European ancestry in the Union Parliament or Africans 
delegates in a Native Representative Council which could only have advisory powers. 
Finally, in the 1948 general elections, the Afrikaner nationalist political movement 
called the National Party, whose popularity had grown considerably in the previous 30 
years, came to power capitalizing on the mounting resentment felt by a large portion 
of Afrikaans-speaking people against the blacks who represented nearly 70% of the 
population and the British business class who kept a hold over most of South Africa’s 
economy. As solemnly promised during the election campaign, the new government 
quickly imposed a system of complete segregation (apartheid) that went on refining 
and expanding previous racial laws right up until President Frederik de Klerk came 
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into office in 1989. The new president providentially declared that apartheid had failed, 
re-legalized the African National Congress (ANC), which had played a central role in 
four decades of liberation struggle, and the other banned opposition parties, released 
the leader of the ANC and future President Nelson Mandela (after 27 years of prison) 
and started a course of action that would reverse the political blueprint of the previous 
three-and-a-half centuries of South African history. After about five years of tormented 
discussions and high levels of violence—it is reported (Beinart, 2001:277) that 
‘between 1990 and 1994, about 14,000 died in political violence within South Africa’—
South Africa’s first democratic elections were finally held in April 1994 and assigned to 
the ANC the majority of the parliamentary seats and thereby the leading role in the 
Government of National Unity of a re-united, non-racial ‘rainbow nation’ under an 
interim constitution with Nelson Mandela as President. 
 
However, while it was soon possible to entrench one of the most progressive 
constitutions of the world and bed ‘it down through . . . national, provincial and local 
elections which have been manifestly peaceful and fair’ (Sparks, 2003:3), the legacy 
of a long-standing racial divide created by apartheid and pre-apartheid administrations 
could not be prevented nor it would be easily overcome for years to come. At the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, South Africa is in fact one of the most unequal 
countries in the world where striking inequalities based on socio-economic status—
which are above all reflected in an estimated 7,5 million people who, for the most part, 
live in corrugated iron shacks on the fringes of urban nodes and an additional 6,8 
million people who, for the most part, live in mud and thatched huts in the rural 
areas—have replaced a long-lasting racial gulf to which, however, they remain 
extensively linked. 
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Mapping 
 
 
As explained in the previous paragraph, informal housing—in all its various outward 
appearances—has become, especially since the mid-1980s, a major element of South 
Africa’s landscape. Mainly drawing on the national Census conducted by Statistics 
South Africa in 2001, this chapter provides some information on the location and scale 
of the phenomenon with reference to informal dwellings located in both urban and 
rural South Africa. 
 
As regards cities, it is first of all important to point out that the process of urbanization 
that is currently under-way in South Africa is expected to continue to exert formidable 
pressure on the containment and management of informal settlements and 
homelessness in several years to come. This prediction can be worked out from the 
2001 Census data that show that South Africa’s population living in urban areas 
amounts to only 58% of the total, which, on the basis of international urbanization 
trends, would suggest that the relentless expansion experienced in particular by the 
largest cities of the country would carry on for the next 15 years at least. With all the 
limits of international comparisons and generalizations, it would therefore not be 
unsafe to assert that informal settlements—as a product of rapid and concentrated 
urbanization—are expected to continue to exist and perhaps expand especially 
around the largest cities of South Africa into the foreseeable future unless substantial 
measures are prescribed and implemented. As set out in Table 3.1, the present state 
of affairs of urban informal housing is already lamentable: the Census shows that over 
1,8 million urban families reside in informal dwellings—almost 35% of which are found 
in or in the proximity of the four largest cities of the country (i.e., Johannesburg, 
Durban, Cape Town and Pretoria). To understand the proportion of the number of 
informally housed families in urban South Africa better, it is important to realize that it 
exceeds 16% (slightly more than one out of six) of all families living in the country. 
Besides, taking into account other Census data on average family size and 
distribution of families by population group and province, it can also be inferred that 
 78  
more than 7,5 million people out of the total South African population of 44,8 million 
are currently believed to spend their lives in urban informal dwellings. 
 
Table 3.1  Informal Housing in Urban South Africa  
 
   
Province/ 
Municipality 
Informally Housed 
Families 
(000) 
As a % of 
All Families 
(in the Same Area) 
     
     
 Gauteng  634 23,9  
  Johannesburg 212 21,1  
  Tshwane (Pretoria) 130 23,0  
 KwaZulu-Natal 226 10,8  
  EThekwini (Durban) 150 19,1  
 North-West 207 22,3  
 Free State  191 26,1  
  Mangaung (Bloemfontein)  44 23,7  
 Western Cape 190 16,2  
  Cape Town  143 18,8  
 Eastern Cape 167 11,0  
  Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth)  60 22,9  
  Buffalo City (East London)  55 28,6  
 Mpumalanga 117 16,0  
 Limpopo 78 6,6  
 Northern Cape 26 12,5  
     
 SOUTH AFRICA  1.836 16,4  
   Backyard shacks 459 4,1  
   Free-Standing Informal 
  Settlements 
 
1.377 
 
12,3 
 
     
     
 Source:  Census 2001, Statistics South Africa  
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Perhaps the only positive thing that can be said about this unacceptable situation is 
that in spite of a population growing at a rate of almost 2% annually and continued 
migration from the countryside, it seems that the number of informal dwellers in urban 
South Africa has stabilized since 1990 when the Urban Foundation (1991:4) estimated 
that ‘over 7 million people live[d] in urban informal housing’—thus implying that the 
relative scale of the problem is moderately declining. As one could assume by the 
previous paragraph on the origins of informal settlements in South Africa, the 
overwhelming majority (almost 96%) of the households living in urban informal 
housing are classified by the Census as ‘black African’ whose population group is 
instead estimated to amount to a relatively lower 77% of all South African families. 
Almost all of the remaining part (about 3,5%) is classified as ‘coloured’, while fewer 
than ten thousand families (about 0,5%) are labelled as ‘white’ or ‘Indian or Asian’. As 
mentioned in chapter one, informal dwellings occur in different forms. On this point, 
the Census provides an interesting breakdown by dwelling type, which reveals the 
predominance of free-standing informal settlements as opposed to backyard shacks 
and other inadequate outhouses. For the most part located on the periphery of ex-
townships, free-standing informal areas account for 75% of the informally housed 
families in urban South Africa, that is, nearly 1,4 million families or more than 5,6 
million people—although this number includes people who experience diverse living 
conditions in that they reside in such different places as serviced (or semi-serviced) 
land or land devoid of any significant housing-related infrastructure. Backyard shacks, 
on the contrary, accommodate one-fourth of the urban families without adequate 
housing, that is, more than some 0,4 million families or almost 1,9 people. This 
information by dwelling type is quite relevant to this research on account of the fact 
that free-standing informal settlements may by their nature encourage the building of 
a greater sense of community and unity of purpose among settlers, which is 
considered crucial in the process of public participation in government decision-
making. 
 
Regrettably, these data on urban informal housing show but one side of the problem 
that stands in the way of ‘everyone[’s] . . . right to have access to adequate housing’, 
which happens to be one of the fundamental claims of the South African Constitution 
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(Bill of Rights, section 26(1)). Rural informal housing is the other side of the problem, 
which, quantitatively speaking, is just a little less remarkable—as shown in Table 3.2. 
  
Table 3.2  Informal Housing in Rural South Africa  
 
   
Province/ 
Municipality 
Informally Housed 
Families 
(000) 
As a % of 
All Families 
(in the Same Area) 
     
     
 Gauteng  35 1,3  
    Johannesburg 12 1,2  
    Tshwane (Pretoria) 8 1,5  
 KwaZulu-Natal 581 27,9  
    Ethekwini (Durban) 60 7,6  
 North-West 49 5,3  
 Free State  53 7,2  
    Mangaung (Bloemfontein)  8 4,3  
 Western Cape 26 2,2  
    Cape Town  15 1,9  
 Eastern Cape 577 38,1  
    Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth) 4 1,6  
    Buffalo City (East London)  15 8,1  
 Mpumalanga 95 12,9  
 Limpopo 232 19,7  
 Northern Cape 7 3,5  
     
 SOUTH AFRICA  1.655 14,8  
     
     
 Source:  Census 2001, Statistics South Africa  
     
 
In this respect, the 2001 Census reveals that more than 1,6 million families live in rural 
informal dwellings (i.e., huts and other traditional dwellings mostly made of clay, mud 
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and thatch) facing a number of difficulties similar to those being encountered by urban 
informal settlers. In proportional terms, this number amounts to almost 15% (slightly 
less than one out of seven) of all South African families. Again, taking into account 
other Census data, it can be also inferred that almost 6,8 million people are currently 
believed to live in informal dwellings found as single units or in clusters (villages) in 
rural South Africa—for the most part situated in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Eastern Cape and Limpopo. As already seen with regard to urban South Africa, 
almost all families living in rural informal housing (over 97%) are classified by the  
Census as ‘black African’. If these figures regarding informal dwellings situated in rural 
South Africa are added to those concerning urban informal dwellings, the total 
informally housed population of South Africa would amount to almost 3,5 million 
families (an estimated more than 14,3 million people) or more than 31% of all South 
Africa’s families! 
 
It is relevant to the present study to provide some details of the scale of the problem 
of informal housing within the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality 
(CTMM), which is where the field surveys took place. In this respect, it is worth noting 
that the CTMM not only comprises the city of Pretoria but also several former 
townships that are spatially aloof from the capital city of the country. The geographical 
area of the CTMM therefore stretches over 2 200 square kilometres and has a 
population of nearly 2 million people or slightly more than 560 thousand families 
(Census 2001)—a great deal of whom are living in former townships that were 
established to accommodate those who were forcibly removed during the apartheid 
era. As far as informal housing is concerned, the Census data show that 138 
thousand families live in informal dwellings within the boundaries of the CTMM, over 
three-quarters of whom reside in about 80 free-standing areas ranging in size from a 
few hundred to several thousand families, for the most part located on the peripheries 
of former townships such as Temba, Hammanskraal, Soshanguve, Mabopane, Ga-
Rankuwa, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi—the first five located within the boundaries or 
very close to the border of the former Bantustan of Bophuthatswana. Proportionally, 
almost one out of four families of the CTMM is informally housed but this fraction 
would be much higher if the proportion had to exclude the population of Pretoria (only 
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a negligible number of whom are estimated to live in informal dwellings) and consider 
only the population of the former townships. Again, taking into account other Census 
data, the derived number of people who are believed to live in informal houses within 
the CTMM should not be less than 500 thousand—the overwhelming majority of 
whom are classified as ‘black African’. 
 
Table 3.3  Informal Housing in the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) 
Metropolitan Municipality  
 
   
Dwelling 
Type 
Informally Housed 
Families (000) 
As a % of 
All Families 
     
     
 Metropolitan area  138 24,5  
    Free-standing informal 
   Settlements 
 
106 
 
18,8 
 
    Backyard shacks 24 4,2  
    Rural informal dwellings 8 1,5  
     
     
 Source:  Census 2001, Statistics South Africa  
     
 
Regrettably, the most recent count (April 2005) of the CTMM, which is based on the 
official marking of shacks, aerial photographs and some estimations on those informal 
dwellings that have not yet been numbered or counted in precisely, does not reveal a 
substantially better picture. Notwithstanding more or less serous problems in the 
identification, counting and recording of shacks and other informal dwellings (a few 
regional government officials are not even familiar with the use of computers!) and 
despite local differences among the various municipal regions (and wards) in the way 
things have been handled in the last years, it is possible to affirm that the total number 
of informally housed families has hardly decreased since 2001. This unexciting result 
has mainly been determined by the balance of two contrasting factors: the building of 
about 5 000 houses a year to accommodate informally housed families whose 
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housing subsidy was finally approved by the provincial government (Gauteng) and a 
handful of massive land invasions, which curiously all took place in the span of a few 
weeks between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 during a delay in the 
renewal of the contract with the private security company (Joint Venture Security) 
responsible for patrolling and safeguarding all areas at risk of squatting—land 
invasions that allegedly occurred with the approval and encouragement of interested 
ward councillors in search of new votes. Having said that, it is also worth noting that 
the CTMM has a good, although far from excellent, record in the creation of so-called 
‘housing opportunities’ (i.e., serviced or semi-serviced plots equipped with a few basic 
utilities such as water supply, sewers and drains on which informally housed families 
are entitled to set up their informal dwelling), which is reported to be about 15 000 a 
year and have improved the residential conditions of the people who were used to 
residing on land devoid of any significant public utility—despite the fact that they are 
still living in a shack. Besides, in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour that would 
be detrimental to the efforts of the CTMM to eradicate informal settlements, various 
private security companies have been appointed with the mandate to put a stop to 
further shack construction on both serviced and non-serviced settlements—it seems 
that the move has so far gone pretty well, not only because no further substantial land 
invasion has been registered since those that occurred between the end of 2003 and 
the beginning of 2004, but also because most of the people living in informal 
settlements appear, in principle, to welcome something that is perceived as protecting 
their own interests. 
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Government Policies 
 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa was officially ushered in by the first all-race elections held 
in the country from 26 to 29 April 1994, which permitted the convening of the first 
democratically elected Parliament on 5 May 1994, followed by the appointment of the 
new President of the Republic (Nelson Mandela) and the transitional Government of 
National Unity on 10 May 1994. Since the new South Africa came into being, the 
African National Congress (ANC)-led government, which is a coalition between the 
ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), has piloted an ambitious plan to seek to redress the 
imbalances of the past. Especially in an effort to achieve basic levels of social justice 
for all, a new trend in the treatment of socio-economic rights was entrenched in the 
supreme law of the country—the South African Constitution of 1996—which 
‘encapsulates an entirely new set of rights not foreshadowed in the interim 
Constitution’ of 1993, Devenish (1999:357) remarks. These relate to the right to health 
care services, food and water, social security and social assistance contained in 
section 27, the right to education set out in section 29 as well as housing rights. In 
respect of the last-mentioned, section 26(1) of the South Africa’s Constitution provides 
everyone with the ‘right to have access to adequate housing’ and section 26(2) casts 
upon the state the obligation to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right’. 
Furthermore, section 26(3) establishes that ‘no one may be evicted from their home, 
or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all 
the relevant circumstances’. The duty of the state to fulfil people’s right to have access 
to adequate shelter applies to national, provincial and local tiers of government: in 
terms of schedule 4A of the Constitution, national and provincial legislatives are 
concurrently charged with the responsibility for housing the nation, whereas, in terms 
of schedule 4B, municipalities are instructed to see to building regulations, electricity 
and gas reticulation, storm water management, and water and sanitation services. 
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Appropriate common law and public-policy developments were also required to serve 
the national housing vision enshrined in the new charter of ‘We, the people of South 
Africa’. In this regard, the newly installed National Department of Housing soon 
proposed a completely new housing policy in the White Paper on Housing of 1994; a 
few years later, in 1997, Parliament passed the Housing Act and, in 2000, the 
National Department of Housing published a recapitulatory document called the 
National Housing Code, which is due to be revised promptly in case of policy or 
legislative amendments—all of the above with the intention of providing a framework 
within which the constitutional right to housing is to be realized. Without doubt, the 
South African framework for housing development has been able to set an 
international precedent to the extent that it ‘led to the delivery of more subsidised 
houses than in any other country in the world’, Rust (2003:7) observes; by June 2004, 
the number of subsidized houses completed or under way amounted to more than 1,6 
million (GCIS, 2005:369). Besides the fact that there are still millions of informally 
housed people living in urban and rural South Africa, it seems only fair to express 
some reservations about the government’s efforts to house the nation so far—
reservations that are not only based on a variety of critical appraisals made by Rust 
(2004), Baumann (2003a), Hassen (2003), Khan (2003), Khan and Ambert (2003), 
Marx (2003), Napier (2003), Porteous and Naicker (2003), Royston (2003), Todes et 
al. (2003), Zack and Charlton (2003), Diamond (2002), Huchzermeyer (1999), Jenkins 
(1999) and Lalloo (1999) but also on the persisting criticism coming from inside the 
Tripartite Alliance itself (especially from COSATU and the SACP) as well as on 
anecdotal evidence from informally housed respondents living in the City of Tshwane 
(Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) who were invited by the researcher to 
convey their impressions on government-funded housing projects, if any, being 
delivered to their community. Major concerns relate to the following long-term self-
defeating trends: first, insistence on placing disproportionate stress on quantitative 
rather than qualitative housing outputs; second, relatively little emphasis placed on the 
mobilization of resources from non-state players to improve the size and quality of 
subsidized housing—above all, savings or voluntary labour from housing beneficiaries 
and flexible soft-loan finance from housing lenders; third, minimal attention given to 
the development of holistic and integrated living environments that go beyond mere 
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housing provision; fourth, resistance to the meaningful (not token) involvement of all 
interested parties—first and foremost, informally housed communities—in the 
definition of goals and strategies to address local housing shortages; and fifth, more 
disturbingly, the apparent failure to properly fight a range of alleged corrupt dealings 
involving public officials at different levels and contractors responsible for the 
execution of housing and housing-related projects. All of the above result in a less 
enjoyable picture of the housing being supplied as evidenced by several state-funded 
houses (also referred to as ‘RDP’ houses because of the ANC’s pledge to ‘build over 
one million houses’ for low-income families contained in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme—the electoral manifesto of the ANC and its allies for the 
elections that brought Nelson Mandela to the presidency of the country), which, by 
being faulty in one way or another, extremely standardized, virtually devoid of market 
value and a long way away from social and economic amenities, are said (Rust, 
2003:7) to shape ‘images of dormitory suburbs in peri-urban wastelands’. 
 
In the last few years, government’s attempts to house the nation have gingerly begun 
to take steps that would promise to accelerate the ability of the state to serve larger 
numbers of informally housed people in a shorter period of time without placing 
additional burdens on the state budget—needless to say, provided that the new 
course is mainstreamed into the national housing strategy and all the aforementioned 
concerns are adequately addressed. As per the new approach, housing development 
is meant to occur in phases: in the first phase, the state devotes resources to service 
a suitable portion of land with housing-related infrastructure—land which can be either 
unoccupied (greenfield development) or already occupied by the target community 
(brownfield development); in the next phase, informally housed families, and 
whenever possible an entire community,  are entitled either to relocate their informal 
dwelling to their new serviced-and-secured plots (site -and-service project) or keep it 
where it is, or maybe nearby to allow for a better layout or densification of the site, and 
benefit from the infrastructural improvements and security of tenure provided to their 
settlement (in situ upgrading); in the third and last phase (also known as 
consolidation), subsidized houses are finally put up to replace the informal top 
structures of those families who are eligible for housing subsidies while non-qualifiers 
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(i.e., applicants who do not comply with the following criteria: being a South African 
citizen or in possession of a permanent residence permit; having a monthly household 
income not in excess of R3 500; being married, living with a long-term partner or 
single with dependants; being 21 years of age or older; being first-time property 
owner; and, either the applicant or anyone else in the household, not having received 
previous housing assistance from the government) will have to wait until they are 
eligible for a housing subsidy or build their house out of their own resources. On top of 
that, in order to preclude opportunistic actions that are prejudicial to the gradual efforts 
of the government to house the nation, it is becoming increasingly common among 
municipalities to employ private security companies that are given the official mandate 
to prevent further construction of shacks either within the settlements to be upgraded 
or, and most importantly, on the land made vacant by the relocation of the community 
to a new site. Despite its merits and increasing use and despite a series of studies 
demonstrating that, ‘for many communities, the provision of a house is not an 
immediate priority’ and may thus be considered at a later time (Engelbrecht, 
2003:276), the phased housing programme is still not mainstreamed into standard 
practice, most notably because of the following: first, enervating disputes between 
various levels of government and some informally housed communities over the basic 
route to be followed in housing development—namely, community relocation to more 
or less distant serviced sites, which is normally favoured by the government because 
of its different plans for the use of the occupied land or the excessive cost to upgrade 
geologically sensitive areas, versus the community’s usually preferred option of in situ 
upgrading of well-located settlements; second, political disinterest or even fear in 
taking any steps in favour of those informal settlements where the local leadership 
(rather than the ward councillor) is expected to take credit for the project’s eventual 
success and thus grow as a potentially threatening political contender for the following 
elections; third, considerable incidence, in a few informal areas, of illegal immigrants 
(especially from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Nigeria), which implies that delicate 
foreign policy stands and law enforcement coordination between all levels of 
government would be needed prior to any housing development taking place; and  
fourth, in some particular cases, delay imposed on the symbolic handing-over 
ceremonies of new houses, which is interpreted by some politicians as politically 
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disadvantageous. All of the above is suggested by the field surveys undertaken in the 
CTMM. 
 
Another potentially-significant shift in housing policy that is worth mentioning relates to 
the People’s Housing Process (PHP)—a legislative provision contained in chapter 8 of 
part 3 of the National Housing Code which would allow the beneficiaries to assume 
part of the responsibility for the design and implementation of their subsidized houses 
as well as for the planning of housing-related infrastructure and social amenities. In 
order to take part in the PHP, a support organization must be established or 
contracted: beneficiaries may either form themselves into legal entities such as 
companies incorporated in terms of section 21 of the Companies Act of 1973, trusts, 
voluntary associations or co-operatives under the Cooperatives Act of 1981 or enter 
into a contract with an existing organization such as an NGO, a private sector 
organization, a parastatal or the municipality. Once established, the support 
organization is to perform a variety of technical and administrative duties on behalf of, 
and at no cost to , the beneficiaries—most notably, to draw up a project proposal that 
would include the layout of the settlement and the design of the houses, housing-
related services and social amenities to be built; to apply to the Provincial Housing 
Development Board (PHDP) for the approval of the project proposal; to establish a 
Housing Support Centre (HSC) for training the beneficiaries on how to help build their 
houses and monitor the building work they do; to certify the progress the beneficiaries 
make in constructing their houses (this is to be done through an independent certifier); 
and to operate a trust bank account into which subsidies are to be paid (this is to be 
done through an independent account administrator). Funding for all the above 
activities is made available to the support organization by the provincial government 
on application to the PHDP over and above the subsidies awarded to individual 
households for the building of the top structures—namely, a facilitation grant for 
covering the costs of preparing a detailed project proposal would be made available 
on the basis of the merits and resource needs of the project application and an 
establishment grant for covering the costs of setting up and running an HSP and all 
the other functions carried out by the support organization would be made available in 
an amount not to exceed R570 per beneficiary. Despite the potency of the PHP in 
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speeding up the housing delivery and better its outcomes, which is associated with 
the involvement of the beneficiary communities in the government-funded housing 
projects, only a minute percentage of subsidised houses built to date have been 
delivered via the PHP. While it is true that the PHP policy framework is, to some 
extent, unclear and incongruous and gives rise to practical problems at the 
implementation stage (e.g., the heavy burden cast on the beneficiaries to find some 
way to bridge-finance government subsidies, which would be only released on 
application of the project proposal, and bear the risk of the application being rejected 
or delayed for a long time), it is the lack of political will at national and local level that 
seems to constitute the greatest stumbling block to the PHP mainstreaming. In this 
respect, it is worth pointing out that not only ‘the institutional home of the PHP in 
government, the People’s Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT) is underresourced and 
politically marginalised’ but also, and more distressingly, it is not rare to find municipal 
councillors who are inclined to regard the PHP as a ‘threat to their political role of 
‘delivering’ housing’, Baumann (2003b:7,34) argues. The CTMM is no exception in 
this regard: first, the number of PHP projects can currently be counted on the fingers 
of one hand—the biggest being run by a Support Organization called Benevolence 
Project Trust in Block TT, Soshanguve (Ward 39)—and would jointly benefit just a few 
thousand informally housed families; second, and more importantly, no one is 
currently making use of the PHP to support the various communities that face the 
most severe living conditions as a result of the fact that the support organizations 
operating within the CTMM have so far been given no actual chance to assist 
informally housed communities in any aspect other than house construction, which, 
where not even essential services are installed, is unlikely to be placed by the 
residents at the top of their priority list. 
 
Speaking of the housing policies of the CTMM, it is important to mention that it has 
recently drafted, but not yet enacted, By-Laws Relating to the Management and 
Control of Informal Settlements within its geographical boundaries. These draft by-
laws can conceptually be divided in two major parts: one dealing with the upgrading of 
informal settlements acknowledged as authorized; the other with the termination of 
those labelled as unauthorized. As stated under the chapter headed ‘Definitions’, any 
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informal settlement which is authorized by the municipality ‘will be legalized and 
upgraded as a formal township’, while those that are unauthorized ‘will, on the 
contrary, be demolished and removed’ with no resettlement option or whatsoever 
being contemplated. The basic problem with this otherwise reasonable classification 
between authorized and unauthorized informal settlements is that the draft by-laws do 
not set out the criteria which should be used to determine it, which would leave 
discretionary power to the municipality to determine the status of an informal 
settlement. When the researcher raised this issue during one of the public meetings 
held to discuss the contents of these draft by-laws—for the record, that meeting was 
assembled in Atteridgeville on 14 October 2004—he was supplied with a list of criteria 
that included the age of the settlement, reasons for occupation (e.g., if it happened as 
a result of flooding or other natural disasters, the settlers and their problems would be 
treated with particular sensitivity) and alternative uses of the occupied land, which all 
sounded fair enough. One is left to wonder why the draft text of the by-laws 
reproduced none of these criteria! Another issue that was raised during the public 
debate was about the role of the informal settlement manager (ISM) to be appointed 
by the CTMM to manage and control all informal settlements within the municipal 
boundaries. In this regard, it is prescribed by the draft by-laws that the ISM must 
perform all necessary steps to ensure that further incidents of land invasion will not 
occur or be promptly terminated, which certainly sounds like a logical way to go. 
However, while these policing-type responsibilities are plainly asserted in the draft by-
laws, the role of the ISM as development manager is marginal at best. From the 
provisions stated under the chapter ‘Duties of the Informal Settlement Manager’, it is 
clear that the ISM has not been provided with the critical responsibility to come up 
with proposals for upgrading an informal settlement (brownfield development) or for 
relocating an informally housed community (greenfield development) nor has 
provision been made in the text for liaising with those who have to perform these 
duties within the municipal and provincial administrations. Besides taking all 
necessary steps to prevent land invasion, the responsibilities of the ISM are in 
essence limited to the following: ‘conduct regular surveys to determine the location, 
origin, extent and conditions prevailing in each informal settlement’; ‘undertake and 
promote liaison and communication with local communities’; allocate to each stand ‘a 
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unique number as its temporary address’; ‘keep a register of all residents’; and ensure 
they ‘are registered in the Municipality’s Housing Waiting List’. When the researcher 
raised the issue of a limited developmental role assigned by the draft by-laws to the 
ISM, the municipal representatives responded with an epigrammatic ‘point taken’. A 
final issue raised by the researcher was about the liaison process between the 
municipality and residents of informal settlements. With regard to this, it is stated 
under the chapter entitled ‘Residents’ Committee’ that the ISM ‘shall meet on a 
regular monthly basis . . . and consult the said Committee on all matters . . . of general 
concern to the residents’. It would have been very important, however, to explain in a 
detailed way what the municipality means by the term consult, with a particular view to 
removing doubts on the exact role of the community and their committees in the 
design of the upgrading of project proposals or alternative plans, whatever the case 
may be, and in the prevention of fur ther land invasion. With respect to the vague 
provisions regarding the liaison process between the ISM and informally housed 
communities, the representatives of the municipality (a few officials and a ward 
councillor) presiding at the meeting limited themselves to nodding emphatically!  
 
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the government’s housing policies. 
Housing, however, cannot be seen in isolation but rather as part of a much broader 
and integrated policy effort towards the constitutional vision of a country without 
people living in shacks, huts or other inadequate accommodation—lack of adequate 
housing is in effect just the tip of an iceberg called ‘poverty’, which implies that holistic 
and integrated development planning over and above national, provincial and local 
housing projects will be required over many years to realize the government’s promise 
to establish habitable and sustainable residential environments for all South Africans. 
In fact, chapter 4 of part 1 of the National Housing Code establishes that ‘housing 
cannot operate [but] within an institutional, macro-economic, and broad social 
framework’. As regards the ‘institutional framework’, reference is made to the intent to 
put governments at all levels, the private sector and civil society all in a position to 
play a positive role in national development; as regards the ‘macro-economic 
framework’, attention is drawn to the goal of growing the economy, employing the 
nation and redistributing the benefits of economic growth more equitably; and as 
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regards the ‘social framework’, emphasis is placed on the double need to enhance the 
role of women at all levels and in all aspects of national development, and decelerate 
the population growth trends if sustainable solutions towards the alleviation and 
ultimately eradication of poverty in the country are to be found. Regrettably, despite a 
seemingly sound awareness of its integrated responsibilities, which is not only 
revealed in the National Housing Code but also in numerous other policy and 
legislative measures such as the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000: 
section 25) which expects local governments to prepare, implement and revise 
annually ‘a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality’ 
(alias Integrated Development Plan—IDP), government’s attempts to bring integrated 
development to the poor are not going well so far: ‘the creation of sterile housing 
environments attests to a failure to implement the stated intentions of housing policy 
to promote integrated development and co-ordinate state investment to achieve 
holistic living environments’, Zack and Charlton (2003:61) lament. This is largely 
confirmed by the officials working for the IDP Office of the CTMM who spoke to the 
researcher during the field surveys undertaken for this study. 
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Chapter 4 
Arguments and Experiences 
regarding the Involvement of 
Informally Housed Communities  
 
 
Be not arrogant because of your knowledge. Take 
counsel with the unlearned as well as with the wise. 
For the limits of knowledge have never been set and 
no one has ever reached them. Wisdom is rarer 
than emeralds and yet it is found among the women 
who gather at the grindstone. 
 
Ptah-hotep 
Ancient Egyptian Sage  
Moral Teachings, XXIV Century BC 
 
 
The essential idea underlying the concept of democracy is that ‘political power comes 
from the people and . . . government is legal only when the governed consent’ 
(Baradat, 2000:64). If this is so, engaging the people in shaping government policies 
relevant to their collective life would be the cornerstone of the democratization of 
politics. And for the full legality of governments, it is important that all interested 
citizens, regardless of their socio-economic status, should be given a chance to 
express their consent not only through elections held every four or five years but also 
in such a way that their voices are heard and reflected in government agenda. 
Besides being needed for democratic legitimization of government action, it seems 
that the involvement of the poor in government policy-making would also be beneficial 
to social and economic development, as succinctly pointed out by the old saying: ‘two 
heads think better than one!’ For a number of experts, however, engaging the poor in 
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the formulation of government policies is not all positive as it is expected to slow down 
the process of governance and downgrade its outcome, to name a few drawbacks. 
 
Considering that there are different viewpoints on the issue of popular participation, 
this chapter first of all deals with the objections to, and appeals for, the involvement of 
the poor in shaping government policies relevant to their community. It then presents 
a short history of the principal trends with regard to popular participation from ancient 
Greece to modern times before giving a brief account of three contemporary 
experiences in engaging the poorest of the poor in the developing world. It should be 
noted that the present chapter serves as a complementary work to the achievement of 
the research objectives stated in the introduction. While this thesis focuses on 
discussing enabling conditions (Chapter 5) and practical issues (Chapter 6) that would 
ensure that the engagement of the poor is a feasible option and would work in 
practice, it would, in fact, be logically unsound to ignore the arguments that have been 
raised for and against it as well as some historical and contemporary practices 
regarding popular participation. 
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Risks to Development 
 
 
The purpose of this paragraph is to examine the negative side or possible 
disadvantages of having the poorest segments of the population involved in shaping 
government policies that affect their lives. The various analyses made by Yahie 
(1996), Clayton (1995), Leftwich (1993), Conyers (1982), Banovetz (1972) and others 
quoted in the course of the paragraph are used to summarize the main arguments 
against the participation of the poor before the researcher’s own point of view on the 
subject is explained. The following paragraph looks at the positive side or possible 
benefits of engaging the poor in the government decision-making.  
 
The main reasons against engaging people living in poverty, or risks to development, 
revolve around three main groups: 
(1) The risk of slowing down the decision-making process along with the dangers of 
downgrading its outcome and wasting money that could be more fruitfully spent by 
the government on service delivery to the poor. Because of the complexity of 
public management, ‘lay citizens may not possess the competence required to 
judge adequately the technical aspects of plans and programs, and major delays 
may result from attempts by government officials to explain subtle nuances,’ 
Zimmerman (1986:4) argues. 
 
(2) The risk of overrepresentation of the interests of active and insistent minorities 
over those of the quiescent majority, which might result in corruption, nepotism 
and the politics of privilege. As Brynard (1996:47) puts it, ‘participation may evolve 
into a situation where public dictation of policy that enhances the vested interests 
of pressure groups may occur’. 
 
(3) The risk of frustration and disillusionment for citizen participants whose 
expectations for change remain unfulfilled by the participation process, which 
might foster mistrust towards government institutions and lead to further alienation 
of the poor. This is linked to inexperience in participative management on the part 
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of government officials who are ‘not able to create the necessary forums to resolve 
conflicts, nor are they able to discover and take into account the needs of diffuse 
communities of interest’ and to the even more serious fact that government 
bureaucrats ‘do not want to relinquish what little authority they happen to have and 
fear that their professional autonomy will be challenged,’ Benveniste (1989:47) 
maintains. 
 
As far as I am concerned, I have no problem acknowledging that all the above pitfalls 
cast some serious doubt on the reliability of the outcome of the participation process. 
Yet, it is my opinion that they are not inevitable and it is my intention to encourage 
anyone to see that they could be remedied if sufficient efforts are expended by those 
who retain the greatest degree of responsibility for ensuring that poor communities are 
cost-efficiently and effectively involved in the government planning process relevant to 
them, namely, government decision-makers and community leaders. My view seems 
in principle to be shared by the majority of government officials of the City of Tshwane 
(Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality who were interviewed for the present study: while 
they conceded that liaising with informally housed communities on all aspects of 
settlement upgrading, relocation and land invasion would be liable to have negative 
side-effects on the efficiency of the service delivery because of the time spent on 
trying to accommodate different viewpoints, and may sometimes cause frustration to 
all who embark on the process, they claimed that they had rarely experienced or 
heard of a situation in which community participants had colluded with government 
officials or unfairly benefited otherwise from their involvement in the process. Most of 
them also shared the principle that it is the responsibility of both government officials 
and community representatives to minimize risks and prevent problems that may 
come out of the participation process. However, three out of four ward councillors and 
a few other respondents were rather explicit in raising strong concerns that an 
extensive involvement of informally housed communities would result in an 
unacceptable diminution and delay of the planning process. To them, the downsides 
associated with the engagement of the poor are not simply regarded as an eye-
opener to the risks of participation but as the basis to belittle the involvement of poor 
individuals and communities as disproportionately burdensome if not totally ineffectual 
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or even harmful. According to this standpoint, the poor would thus be expected to play 
the part of the silent and grateful beneficiaries of the fruits of the work of those 
‘experts’ who, among other things, would not quite see how less-fortunate people—
who are not as well-off and perhaps educated as they are—can wisely help the 
government solve intricate problems of social and economic development. 
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Opportunities for Development 
 
 
As a complement to the previous paragraph, the present one examines the positive 
side or possible benefits of involving the poor in the formulation of government 
policies that impact on their lives. A variety of studies made by Brynard (1996), Yahie 
(1996), Clayton (1995), Stiefel and Wolfe (1994), Bauzon (1992), Conyers (1982), 
Davidhoff (1965) and others are quoted to recap the main reasons put forward by 
scholars to justify the engagement of the poor, before conveying the researcher’s 
viewpoint on the matter. 
 
There is, first of all, a matter of principle, which relates to the concept of democracy. 
According to this principle, if democracy is to be the instrument towards greater 
equality and integration of the people in society, every citizen should not only have an 
equal right to vote but also an equal right to be considered by their governments. Put 
differently, it is fundamental to democratic development that everyone, regardless of 
his or her status or background, be endowed with the right to voice his or her needs 
and priorities, and seek to influence what the policy-makers decide—unless an 
unequal distribution of such a right would benefit the whole community and in 
particular the poor. This principle is connected to the idea of popular sovereignty, 
which ‘denotes that government is a creation of the citizenry rather than a separate 
entity standing about it,’ Rosenbaum (1978:46) maintains. There are then practical 
reasons, or questions of efficiency, in support of the participation of the poor in the 
planning process, which ultimately arise from respect for the human dignity of all 
people and the belief in the capacity of all citizens—as individuals and, in particular, 
as groups or communities—to contribute to the public good regardless of how much 
they have in financial resources. In this regard, the main stances, or opportunities for 
development, which are associated with the participation of the have-nots in public 
management revolve around four significant groups: 
(1) The opportunity to ensure government responsiveness to all citizens: participation 
as a means to awake the government to the local conditions and priorities of the 
people in need and appreciate their perspectives on how to remedy the situation. 
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Reawakening of governments to their responsibilities towards the less fortunate 
represents an important opportunity for executive and legislative authorities ‘to 
achieve informed and implementable decisions,’ Bryson (1993:3) maintains. 
(2) The opportunity to reduce social exclusion and dependency: participation as a 
means to reinforce a sense of community among the poor and change their status 
from passive receivers of government services to active agents of physical, social, 
economic and environmental development of the area in which they live. This 
change of status enhances the quality of citizenship in that the citizen becomes 
‘well able to perform is democratic role in society: exercising judgement, 
contributing to debate about policy, being aware both of societal problems and of 
the difficulties of finding solutions to them’, Boaden et al. (1982:167) argue. 
(3) The opportunity to secure community support for government policies: participation 
as a means to educate the people on and make them more concerned with and 
committed to government projects. This is based on the fact that ‘citizens sharing 
with elected officers the responsibility for decision making may have the third 
advantage of facilitating the implementation of plans and programs as residents 
will be more willing to accept and work for the successful completion of projects if 
they helped to plan the projects since they will understand better the reasons for 
the projects’, Zimmerman (1986:3) contends. 
(4) The opportunity to create a corruption-free government: participation as a means 
to foster transparency and accountability in the exercise of power and thus prevent 
corrupt dealings, cronyism, nepotism and other abusive utilization of power and 
public funds on the part of government officials. As Benveniste (1989:43) points 
out, ‘openness and participation tend to reduce corruption and help maintain high 
standard of behaviour’.  
 
The above arguments for the participation of the poor in the making of government 
policies indicate a variety of reasons for which their involvement would be important. It 
is on the basis of these opportunities for development that methods and procedures 
for the engagement of poor communities in policy-making should be properly devised 
so as to set limits on the liberty of government officials and assisting professionals 
such as architects, engineers and lawyers in making decisions without bothering to 
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liaise with the affected communities. However, it is quite important to weight potential 
benefits against potential harms in a real-world situation before a final assessment 
can be made. In view of that, it would be quite unsafe to contend that the participation 
of the poor would by itself and at all times create room for the birth of real democracy, 
that is, for a situation in which government agendas are set from below by people who 
have the power and capacity of making decisions about their collective life on behalf 
of the whole community—or, if it does do so, it remains to be seen if and where 
participative planning involving the poor can really be a way to help generate positive 
development effects. The consequence of this is that the soundness of the idea of 
popular participation would stand or fall on its contribution to achieving development in 
a specific context. Put differently, without a discussion on the enabling conditions that 
need to be met and on the various ways in which participation can be implemented in 
a specific environment, which is conducted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 with particular 
reference to the South African context, it is quite hard to put forward sound arguments 
for one or the other side of the dispute. Based on intuition more than argument, the 
researcher nonetheless would like to suggest in this paragraph that ruling out the 
possibility of engaging poor people and communities in the shaping of government 
policies without a serious and sustained attempt to investigate and reflect upon the 
circumstances that affect its practicability and performance is always a missed 
opportunity. Although it is not possible to determine unequivocally whether or not the 
arguments in favour of the participation of the poor may outweigh those against it 
without the support of accurate field surveys, the researcher subscribes to the general 
principle that all citizens and communities can contribute to a better world and that 
governments should accordingly be challenged to do their best to draw on the wisdom 
inherent in all humans regardless of their economic and social means. 
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A Concise History 
 
 
As an addendum to the previous discussion on the merits and pitfalls of engaging the 
poor, it is worth remembering that centuries of history have produced an alternation of 
affection and rejection to popular participation, which weights heavily in the present-
day debate over the involvement of the poor in the governing process. The work of 
Baradat (2000), Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) and Bauzon (1992) are used in an attempt to 
draw a concise history of the major trends related to popular participation, especially 
as they developed in the Western world. 
 
To start with, the ancient Greeks regarded public participation as a valuable method of 
governance and allowed thousands of citizens to attend the meetings of their polis, 
that is, the city-state in ancient Greece. Although only men were considered citizens 
and had the right to vote, women and slaves could sometimes be granted special 
permission to participate in the assemblies and voice their concerns and opinions. 
These protodemocratic tendencies, however, did not occur unopposed: some 
illustrious Greeks welcomed popular participation as snow on the harvest—or, at 
least, they were not really overjoyed with such a form of governance. To the 
philosopher Plato (427-347 BC), democracy was nothing but mob rule, that is, the 
tyranny of the angry majority that called for the death of his beloved teacher Socrates 
(469-399 BC). To Plato’s disciple, Aristotle (384-322 BC), both monarchy and 
aristocracy appeared preferable to democracy: while acknowledging that the first 
political constitution may deviate into tyranny and the second into oligarchy, he 
deemed monarchy and aristocracy to be more capable of looking after the interests of 
all citizens. Quite contrary to the governance rules of the Greek polis, during the 
Middle Ages, it was largely seen as an aberration of politics that public policy was to 
be democratized. As Baradat (2000:2) puts it, ordinary people ‘were expected to do 
what they were told by their spiritual and temporal superiors [and] were not allowed to 
participate in the political system [as] politics was reserved for kings heading a small 
ruling class’. Out of the Medieval Ages, the scientific discoveries that challenged 
religious doctrines stimulated an inquiring spirit and inspired new confidence in the 
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ability of the people in general to make use of their reason to solve problems. The 
new cultural platform led to the Age of Enlightenment, which created the conditions for 
a democratic renaissance. For that matter, the Age of Reason gave birth to the 
doctrine of the social contract and political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes 
(England, 1588-1679), John Locke (England, 1632-1704) and Jean Jacque Rousseau 
(Switzerland, 1712-1778) started to reveal how the democratic principles of popular 
sovereignty could take place in practice. Since the time of the groundbreaking social 
contract thinkers, most of the emphasis has been put on the extension of the vote to 
traditionally disfranchised groups such as women or native people—especially ever 
since the time of the resistance movements to the oppressive and exploitative colonial 
rule of the European powers, which made democratization ‘highly appealing and, as a 
process, . . . difficult to reverse,’ Bauzon (1992:xvi) maintains. Following World War II, 
and in particular starting from the 1960s, various development circles have begun to 
recognize that something was still lacking, which resulted in a growing call for a 
ground-up approach to public policies or, in other words, for the involvement of the 
people—regardless of their means or background—in shaping government decisions 
relevant to their collective life. Nowadays, even though terms such as popular 
participation, community involvement and participative governance form an essential 
part of the vocabulary of many activists, politicians, development professionals and 
educators, and are enshrined in numerous United Nations declarations and 
covenants, they continue to prove to be extremely sensitive issues, especially in 
developing nations. In fact, it seems that virtually any call for greater public 
involvement in government decision-making—and in particular for a greater 
involvement of communities living in poverty—would be likely to be somehow resisted 
by defenders of different views. 
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Contemporary Practices  
 
 
Over the past 20 years, opportunities for broader public participation in the shaping of 
government policies have by and large improved in many developing countries at both 
national and local level—partly on account of a more pervasive belief in the values of 
democracy, which tends to impact on the styles of governance propounded by the 
political leaderships and partly as a reflection of an increasing loss of faith in the 
institutions of government, which tends to impact on the methods of governance 
expected by larger sections of the population. It is maintained (Seaforth, 2002:1) that 
although the ‘situation is by no means perfect, it is now quite normal to talk about such 
concepts as participatory governance, participatory budgeting, planning with the 
communities . . . ’. When it comes to involving the poorest sections of the population, 
however, the picture turns out to be quite different—partly because of a lingering 
ideological reluctance to involve the less fortunate segments of society in government 
decision-making and partly as a result of a shortage of organized interests that would 
gain access to power on behalf of the poorest. This notwithstanding, there is evidence 
of an increasing number of cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America that are busy 
regenerating particularly deprived areas such as informal settlements via the 
participation of the affected communities in the selection, design and implementation 
of projects. Relying on Paixo Bretas (1996), Hardoy et al. (1991) and Silas (1992:37), 
it is hoped that the following account of three examples of participation in practice can 
be of use to the objectives of this study. Reference is made to the experience of Brazil 
(Belo Horizonte), Argentina (Buenos Aires) and Indonesia (Surabaya) in involving 
residents of informal settlements in the decisions and activities for a government-
funded upgrading of the area in which they live. Before proceeding with the account, it 
is worth anticipating that from the reported cases emerge that both the appointment of 
a residents’ committee through which the community can represent its needs and 
priorities to the municipality and the fact tha t the latter has set up an agency or 
management unit responsible for a comprehensive range of services and solutions for 
informal settlements within its municipal boundaries have turned out to be decisive 
catalysts in the success experienced by the projects. As regards the chances for 
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replication of these successes elsewhere, it is, however, worth being prudent as 
results would vary with local conditions and practices. While these successful 
experiences can constitute a template and source of inspiration, the question of 
whether they are transferable to South Africa cannot then be answered without 
examining circumstances and practices that would come into play in the South African 
context, which are discussed under Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively. 
 
The Brazilian Experience: 
Alvorada Programme, Belo Horizonte 
  
Belo Horizonte is the third largest city in Brazil after Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. 
The metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte comprises 20 local municipalities. The most 
important is the City of Belo Horizonte, which has a population of about 2,1 million 
people and houses about 160 favelas (informal settlements). The informally housed 
population amounts to more than 500 000—almost 25% of the population—but 
occupy less than 3% of the municipal area. The city is administratively divided into 
nine regions, so as to form a decentralized structure for the provision of services. Half 
of the city’s annual budget is allocated through a participative process, which enables 
the residents to claim their rights and influence decisions over intervention priorities 
during meetings held in each of the nine regions between May and September. As 
stated by Paixo Bretas (1996:214), ‘Belo Horizonte is one among a number of 
Brazilian cities in which participative budgeting is under-way, a practice which began 
in Porto Alegre during the administration of Mayor Olivio Dutra (1989-1992)’. Within 
this favourable climate for democratic participation, residents of informal settlements 
also get their chance to voice their priorities and take part in the decision-making. In 
this respect, one of the most interesting programmes for improving favelas in 
metropolitan Belo Horizonte is the Alvorada Programme which started in 1994. 
Alvorada’s goal is to integrate inner-city favelas with the surrounding formal city 
through a combination of physical and socio-economic interventions. The cornerstone 
of the programme is the 1983 municipal law for the regulation of favelas (Programa 
Municipal de Regularisacao de Favelas), which was the first law in Brazil that 
recognized the legal right of informal settlers to ownership of the land on which they 
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live. A direct consequence of the law is the removal of the risk of eviction, thus leading 
to the mobilization of the community’s self-help potential along with improved mutual 
confidence between informal settlers and the municipal government. The programme 
is managed by URBEL (Companhia urbanizatora de Belo Horizonte), which is a 
municipal non-profit company whose staffs include an interdisciplinary team of about 
26 professionals working only on the Alvorada Programme. The basic strategy of the 
programme is to involve the community in all stages of the process from pre-feasibility 
studies to maintenance of the projects. Community participation primarily takes place 
through resident social workers and community leaders who are respected and 
trusted by the community. They have permanent access to municipal offices, act as 
community representatives and are accountable to the whole community. Besides, the 
community is also involved in the programme through home visits, individual 
consultations, neighbourhood meetings, meetings with specific groups on demand, 
capacity-building workshops for selected groups of people and meetings and 
seminars open to all residents. One of the most important results of the ongoing 
Alvorada Programme, along with the betterment of the living conditions and the 
creation of economic opportunities for the residents, is the significant increase in the 
level of community participation and credibility of the local authorities. These factors 
are expected to facilitate the replication of the programme in other areas of Belo 
Horizonte.  
 
The Argentinean Experience: 
Barrio San Jorge, Buenos Aires 
 
Buenos Aires is the capital and largest city of Argentina. The metropolitan area has a 
population of about 11 million inhabitants and is divided into a number of local 
municipalities. One of the municipalities on the periphery of Buenos Aires is San 
Fernando—about 150 000 inhabitants—where the depressed suburb of Barrio San 
Jorge is located. The political history of Argentina in the last decades of the twentieth 
century has been anything but stable: military coups have afflicted the country and 
slow down the process of social development. As far as the engagement of the poor is 
concerned, it is maintained (Hardoy et al., 1991:105) that ‘local and provincial 
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governments mistrust community organizations and the non-governmental 
organizations’, with the result that paternalistic, top-down programmes with no or little 
consultation with the community have been predominating. Despite this adverse 
climate for popular participation, it is possible to give account of a change in attitude 
that took place in the upgrading process of the Barrio San Jorge. Barrio San Jorge 
covers less than ten hectares and houses about 3 000 people according to a 1990 
survey undertaken by an NGO named IIED-America Latina. The location of the Barrio 
is unhappy: it was built on a piece of land prone to flooding. Housing conditions are 
very poor also due to insecurity of land tenure which has disheartened residents and 
prevents them from investing in home improvements. The quality of infrastructure and 
community services is very meagre resulting, among other things, in a poor state of 
health among the residents. In the early 1990s, a participative programme for the 
integrated development of the Barrio (Programa de Mejoramiento Integral del Barrio 
San Jorge) was initiated. The programme was backed by a quadripartite working 
group composed of representatives of the Province of Buenos Aires, Municipality of 
San Fernando, IIED-America Latina and a commission made up of 16 democratically 
elected spokespersons acting on behalf of the Barrio’s community. The start-up of the 
participative process was quite difficult mostly because people in general and the 
Barrio’s commission in particular felt intimidated by government representatives and 
inhibited from doing their duty. A series of workshops and continuous discussions was 
therefore required to gain people’s confidence and make participation meaningful. 
Eventually, the commission of the Barrio was able to make itself heard and direct the 
programme towards the stated community’s priorities: emphasis was placed on 
obtaining security of tenure for the residents and providing all houses with such basic 
infrastructure and services as potable water, household sanitation, link to public 
sewers and regular garbage collection. The major lesson taught by the programme 
was that ‘time, patience and continuity [are needed] to allow the inhabitants to develop 
and express their thoughts’, Hardoy et al. (1991:119) comment. 
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The Indonesian Experience: 
Kampung Improvement Programme, Surabaya 
 
Surabaya is the second-largest city in Indonesia—the first being Jakarta—with about 
4 million inhabitants, a considerable portion of whom are living in informal settlements 
called kampungs. One of the characteristics of Indonesian informal settlements is that 
quite a few of them are erected on land which is very poorly suited to residential 
settling, including cemeteries. High residential densities are also a major concern 
because of increased health hazards and greater difficulty in providing improvements. 
The Kampung Improvement Programme is a national development strategy, funded 
by local, provincial and central governments, which concerns cities throughout 
Indonesia. It started in 1969 and has gradually reached a fair percentage of 
kampungs also thanks to external assistance received from the World Bank since 
1979. Most of the poor-quality settlements not yet reached by the programme are, in 
fact, either newly erected areas or are located on the very outskirts of the city where 
the programme implementation that is moving from inner city areas to the urban fringe 
has not yet started. The programme in Surabaya is managed by a government 
agency named Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kampung Improvement 
Programme (BAPPEM KIP). The agency is responsible for drafting project proposals 
on the basis of feasibility studies that collect data and provide analyses of problems 
and opportunities,and take into account community’s specifications of their own needs 
and priorities. Given the fact that residents are required to contribute resources in the 
form of labour or funds, project drafts are then examined and subject to change and 
integration by the affected community. The consent seeking process goes so far that 
‘only when the residents of a particular kampung agree on how to share the costs of 
improving their own living environment will the proposal for kampung improvement be 
finalized and implementation begin’, Silas (1992:37) remarks. This mutual 
commitment to regular consultations between local authorities and representative 
groups of kampong residents have enabled the mobilization of people’s own 
resources, which is has been one of the key determinants of the success of the 
programme. 
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Chapter 5 
Conditions for Involving 
Informally Housed Communities 
 
 
Ma intanto corre corre corre la locomotiva e sibila il 
vapore, sembra quasi cosa viva e sembra dire ai 
contadini curvi quel fischio che si spande in aria: 
Fratello, non temere, che corro al mio dovere! 
Trionfi la giustizia proletaria! 
 
Meanwhile the locomotive runs runs runs and the 
steam whistles, it looks like a living being and that 
whistle spreading in the air seems to tell to the 
stooping peasants: Brother, do not be afraid, as I’m 
running to my duty! May the proletarian justice 
triumph! 
 
Francesco Guccini 
Italian Poet and Singer 
La Locomotiva, 1972      
 
 
What if governments faced sweeping hostility from large sections of the population 
over the fundamental values and institutions that sustain the social and economic 
fabric of society and anyone who disagreed with the ruling power were stripped of free 
speech, freedom of assembly or other civil liberties? Would that be a favourable 
political setting for public participation? Needless to say, the answer to this question 
is: no. And what if all civil liberties were granted and a basic consensus on the 
foundations of society were in place instead? Would that be a political environment 
capable of ensuring popular participation and, in particular, the involvement of 
underprivileged communities such as those living in informal settlements? Needless to 
say, the answer to this other question can only be: maybe. The thing is that if a 
constructive dialogue between government and informally housed communities is to 
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be opened and maintained, not only is it important that non-racist, non-oppressive, 
non-military regimes be present but certain critical factors or conditions of feasibility 
and efficacy also need to be in place. These enabling conditions for the involvement 
of the poor can be grouped into two categories. The first category relates to certain 
characteristics of governments (political context), which would make a difference in 
their willingness, capacity and obligation to hear out and consider the views of 
informally housed communities. The logical relation the researcher tries to develop 
here can be simplified as follows: if policy-makers and government officials at any 
relevant level were willing and able to , and responsible for, working in partnership with 
the poorest segments of the population, then the involvement of communities living in 
informal settlements in shaping government policies would be politically feasible and 
likely to be implemented effectively. The second category is related to certain 
characteristics of the communities living in poverty (social context), which would have 
a bearing on their motivation, ability and power to be an active part of the governing 
process. The second logical relation the researcher attempts to elaborate in this 
chapter can be simplified as follows: if informally housed communities were willing , 
and possessed the ability and organizational force to  assure their involvement in 
government policy-making, then not only would they be more easily induced to 
participate but their participation would likely be beneficial. Of course, the dividing line 
between these two sets of conditions for the involvement of the poor may be very thin, 
especially considering that governments can play an important role in easing, 
encouraging and capacitating poor communities to get involved in public affairs and 
that the poor, particularly if well organized, can transform the  attitudes of policy-
makers and government officials as regards assigning the people a meaningful role in 
the decision-making process that affects their lives. 
 
In detail, this investigation into the political and social context in which the participation 
of poor communities would take place is carried out by placing particular emphasis on 
the following set of issues. As regards the political context, this chapter first discusses 
the value of leftist ideologies in boosting government’s willingness to be open to the 
challenges posed by the direct participation of communities living in poverty; second, 
it examines the importance of decentralization in improving government’s capacity to 
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arrange for the involvement of informally housed communities; and, third, it reflects on 
the role of open-government laws in ensuring that policy-makers and government 
officials would be responsible for promoting the engagement of the poorest of the poor 
in shaping the policies that affect their lives. As regards the social context, the chapter 
addresses what would prompt people living in informal settlements to play an active 
role in shaping government policies before dealing with individual abilities and 
organizational effectiveness required on the part of informal settlers to ensure that the 
potential benefits of the participation process accrue to their community. 
 
It should finally be noted that in compliance with the efforts to achieve the first 
objective of the present thesis, the analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the 
South African context. In view of this, the present chapter draws on the viewpoints of 
a sample of respondents—both government officials and informal settlers working for 
or living within the boundaries of the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan 
Municipality—who were asked to tell whether or not and why they would feel 
motivated to establish liaison with each other and whether or not and what they think  
they should have, or lack, in resources such as skills, time, organization or finances, 
which would be advantageous to the participation process. In a nutshell, the outcome 
of the present chapter is the identification of a six-factor framework representing the 
critical conditions that would benefit the democratic participation of South Africa’s 
informally-housed communities in the policy-making of their local government. This 
important outcome is supplemented by an examination of the practical steps (forms of 
participation) necessary to proceed with the involvement of the poor, which is carried 
out in the following chapter. 
 
 111  
Local Government’s Willpower:  
Ideological Resources 
 
 
Without claiming to give a full account of the root causes of politics, it is possible to 
state that the political ends and means chosen by autonomous governments at every 
level could ultimately be traced back to the tenets that form the basis of their art of 
governing or, in other words, to the government’s ideology. A variety of ideologies 
have been or are in existence, and the terms indicating these different ways of looking 
at domestic and international issues are usually formed by the suffix ‘–ism’: from left to 
right of the political spectrum, the following are included: communism, socialism, 
liberalism, moderatism, conservatism, nationalism, localism, fascism and nazism 
together with anarchism, ethnic separatism, racism, religious fundamentalism, 
environmentalism and feminism. A broad literature is available on ideologies and their 
political implications but it is beyond the scope of this study to recount them all. 
Instead, the focus is on a pair of ideological values that are thought to be the most 
powerful yet produced when it comes to championing the cause of the poor—and that 
I happen to share: the first is the belief in the principle of proletarian justice alias social 
justice or distributive justice; the second is the belief in the principle that all people 
count regardless of their financial means and should therefore be seen as the sole 
legitimate source of political power. While examining these two beliefs one by one, the 
key point made in this paragraph is that local governments—if guided by both beliefs 
(or ideological resources)—would not only more consistently realize a course of action 
aimed at combating poverty (within the limits of their responsibilities and budget) but, 
in so doing, would also be more prone to liaise with the poorest section of the 
population and involve them in the relevant decision-making processes—ideological 
resources that with regard to the supposedly leftist ANC-led government of South 
Africa too often seem to be honoured more in rhetoric than in reality. 
 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the principle of proletarian justice, seeing that 
the feeling and sometimes the steadfast belief to be right and therefore in conformity 
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with some principles of justice is one of the places where supporters of most 
ideologies regularly converge, let me first of all attempt to shed some light on the 
meaning of the term justice as regards the political arena. In this regard, let me start 
by saying that the word justice is commonly associated with two general concepts, 
namely legality (or observance of the law) and equality (or treating like as like and 
unlike as unlike). But while adherence to the law should normally be seen as a just 
endeavour, what is the righteousness in continuing to obey faulty laws that do little but 
promote the reverse of justice? And while treating like as like and unlike as unlike 
seems an indisputable principle, how does one actually define likeness and 
unlikeness and ‘render to each one his [or her] own’, as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
puts it in the Summa Theologica (Westphal, 1996:112)? Given the dubiousness 
surrounding the sense of the word justice, it is not surprising that different societies 
and political systems have emerged on the basis of their own prevailing ideas of right 
and wrong, and perceptions of good and evil, which are ultimately related to the 
perpetual search for some state of happiness for the self and the collectivity. It could 
hardly be otherwise, if one also considers that the political implementation of certain 
ideas of justice is likely to diminish, if not rule out, the possibility of realizing certain 
others: for example, the accomplishment of important political goals such as individual 
prosperity, perpetuation of tradition and maintenance of social order can in the main 
be achieved at the partial expense of other equally important goals such as social 
equity, innovation and freedom of expression and association. Considering all of the 
above, it seems as if there is a strong case for bearing in mind that the only sense of 
justice is probably the justice that one senses: one’s preference for a certain ideology 
has, in fact, essentially emotive roots grounded on one’s materialistic, humanistic or 
spiritual basis, which arises within the particular context of relationships, family, 
culture and society. While I make no secret of my political passion, I thus have no 
problem in acknowledging that no political belief would prove to be a product of 
unchallengeable superiority and that different ideologies would in principle make 
equivalent sense insofar as their aims and tactics are not too imaginary, foolish or 
ignoble fascinations. Besides, even though people might consider themselves 
generally linked to a certain view of the desired society, they may sometimes find 
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themselves also embracing other perspectives in relation to particular issues, 
particular contexts or particular times. 
 
Within the need to prioritise or balance competing political values, governments at any 
level are particularly faced with the challenge of determining a just distribution of 
resources and opportunities among the members of the society. Again, given the 
variety of political ideas, feelings or interests on the present state and future of the 
society or, in other words, different ideologies, a just distribution of wealth, income and 
power will mean different things to different governments. A similar proposition on the 
differences in what political rulers would call a just distribution of resources and 
opportunities was made by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (422–384 BC) in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (Westphal, 1996:78) who pointed out that ‘everyone agrees that 
what is just in distribution must fit some sort of worth, but what they call worth is not 
the same’. Given different meanings and nuances of what should constitute a just 
distribution of resources and opportunities in society, the researcher does not expect 
that everyone agrees with my opinion on the matter of distributive justice, which, 
influenced among many others by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Bobbio (1996), is 
that of a political system committed to , and actively involved in, the welfare of all 
without exception—succinctly referred to as a system derived from, and guided by, 
the idea of proletarian justice. For the avoidance of possible confusion, let me firstly 
point out that the use of the term proletarian is meant here to transcend the Marxist 
notion of ‘proletariat’, which refers to the oppressed workers of the world. According to 
its etymology (the term proletarian derives from the Latin word proletarius, which 
meant member of the lowest class of citizens in ancient Rome, as distinct from 
plebeian who was a member of the common people and patrician who was a member 
of the ruling class). The word proletarian is used to refer to anyone who is living below 
acceptable standards or, in other words, to the world’s poor who are compelled to 
struggle just to survive. Besides, it is perhaps worth making it clear that this notion of 
proletarian justice is not intended to suggest perfect equality of economic conditions 
among the members of the society. Actually, a certain level of economic inequality is 
not only tolerable but may be seen as positive when it creates the conditions for the 
necessary concentration of money needed to foster private capital investments, which 
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may then translate into increased productivity, employment and development of the 
society as a whole. Some of the differences in material status among individuals can 
also be worthy insofar as they reflect the inalienable right of each person to fulfil his or 
her individual nature, his or her particular humanity. But people are unlike and alike at 
the same time: unlike in relation to physical and intellectual characteristics (e.g., some 
are more hard-working or gifted than others) and alike in relation to inalienable rights, 
which include that of living a dignified life without being poor. It is maintained (Bobbio, 
1996:66) that the ‘apparent contradiction between the two postulates ‘All men [and 
women] are equal’ and ‘All men [and women] are unequal’ depends exclusively on the 
fact that . . . we put the accent on either what they have in common or what makes 
them different’. The consequence is that valuing the ideology of social justice above 
all others is ultimately a reflection of the belief that what people have in common ‘has 
greater value in the formation of a good community’ than their differences, as argued 
by the Italian political philosopher Bobbio (1996:66). It is also worth explaining that the 
notion of proletarian justice I have in mind does not represent an argument in favour 
of the dissolution of the capitalist systems and the advent of Marxism–Leninism and 
other forms of radical socialism that cherish, among other things, state ownership of 
the major means of production, distribution and finance along with centrally planned 
economy and political domination of one party. Instead, it is my intention to use the 
term proletarian justice to describe the political call for poverty eradication, and for 
reasonably narrowing the gaps between the haves and have-nots, in the context of 
more equitable, democratic and humane patterns of reformed capitalism. It is, in other 
words, the endorsement of the principles of progressive, not revolutionary, leftist 
ethics and democratic political reform so as to work towards what Terreblanche 
(2002:419) calls ‘a social democratic version of democratic capitalism’. Indeed, it may 
be argued that centre-left rather than centre-right governments would be more 
committed to act upon the principle of proletarian justice—at least on paper. The 
reason being that governing on the basis of the values of social justice implies a 
reorganization of the structures and processes of the society in such a way that the 
protection of the weak, which is in principle on top of a leftist rather than rightist 
agenda, is ensured. Rightists, on the other hand, would be more apt to stand up for 
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liberal systems regulated by market forces under limited government inte rference in 
the economy. 
 
Some scholars have endeavoured to give a rationale for demanding a society based 
on, and guided by, the principle of proletarian justice. For instance, the British 
philosopher and socio-political theorist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) affirmed in 
Utilitarianism that ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’ (Westphal, 1996:157). Mill’s 
proposition suggests that people’s happiness ought to be the ultimate goal of any 
polity that claims to be just and that giving all people the economic freedom to make 
basic choices, or, in other words, allow everyone to be free from poverty, is perhaps 
the most sensible way not to be prejudicial to people’s happiness. Mill’s theory’s 
greatest merit is therefore that of siding in a logical way with the political struggle 
against patterns of human conduct that lead to unfair accumulation of wealth into the 
hands of some of the more fortunate while forcing many others to very unhappy 
existences. Further rational support for the idea of proletarian justice is provided by 
the Harvard political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) whose conception of justice 
expressed in A theory of justice is that ‘all social values [including income and wealth] 
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these 
values is to everyone’s advantage’ (Westphal, 1996:33). The rationale behind this 
proposition arises from a purely hypothetical initial agreement that would be entered 
into, before any social order, by rational persons who do not know, and therefore are 
not biased by, their actual social position, wealth, class, abilities, psychological 
inclinations, religious or political beliefs and the like. That being assumed, the 
argument goes that if one does not know, say, whether they are a penniless squatter 
or an affluent industrialist, it is reasonable to believe that they would choose a social 
order that would regulate the relations among people in such a way that no one 
should be forced to, or have little opportunity to free oneself from, a life full of 
hardships. All in all, while it is important to bear in mind at all times what has been 
mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph with regard to the questionability 
surrounding the meaning of the word ‘justice’, it seems as if the logic of the arguments 
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used by Mill and Rawls would make the aspirations of a society firmly grounded in the 
principle of proletarian justice rationally defensible. 
 
Having so far suggested that the ethics of proletarian justice would act as an impetus 
for political action towards redressing social inequities, let me now turn attention to 
whether or not it would also play a role in motivating governments at any level to liaise 
with the poorest sections of the population and consent to their participation in the 
decision-making process that affects their lives. In this respect, it is first of all worth 
noting that while it is true that if there was no political interest to do anything fo r the 
poor but close one’s eyes, there would be no decision to make on how to alleviate 
poverty and therefore no need to involve the community in any decision-making 
regarding the matter, it is also true that even sincere political commitment to poverty 
alleviation programmes does not automatically imply government’s willingness to 
engage the poor in the resulting decision-making process—let alone building on their 
participation. Assuming, then, that the central place on the value ladder of national 
and local governments belongs to the principle of proletarian justice, what additional 
political values, or ideological resources, would be necessary to foster a shift from 
genuine but top-down poverty alleviation programmes to development strategies 
formulated by the government with—and not only for—the poor? I attempt to answer 
this question by pointing to the need for a spirit of openness to, and acceptance of, 
the opinions of others, irrespective of their financial means or, in other words, to the 
need for cherishing the principle that all people count regardless of their economic 
status. Let me explain without delay what I mean by the expression all people count 
before tracing back the importance of this value in the context of governance. A belief 
in the principle that all people count is the reflection of a sincere respect and 
anticipation for the knowledge and human resources existing in people of all classes, 
genders and races. It is, in other words, the consideration and appreciation of 
alternative or complementary ways of interpreting and proposing development, which 
should translate in all interested voices being heard and brought to the decision-
making table. Its significance can be traced back to both ancient and more recent 
philosophies: in particular, it can be traced back to the age-old African philosophy of 
ubuntu—a Xhosa term which means that ‘a person only becomes a person through 
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other people’, as the Anglican Archbishop Emeritus of South Africa, Desmond M. 
Tutu, puts it (Burger, 1996: preface)—which proclaims the values of human dignity, 
solidarity, interdependence and respect for the wisdom and sensitivity of all; and to 
the twentieth-century philosophy of postmodernism—whose exponents include the 
world-renowned French philosophers Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) and Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984)—which, while laying emphasis on the permanent partiality of 
knowledge, it urges everyone, especially political leaders, to treasure the values of 
plurality and diversity, as discussed, among others, by Thiele (1997). When one looks 
at the political spectrum, it may once again be said that centre-left rather than centre-
right governments would be more dedicated to act upon the principle that all people 
count and therefore do their best to involve the poor in the decision-making process 
that impacts on their lives—at least in principle. Governing in accordance with this 
belief presupposes, in fact, a good deal of optimism about the nature and potential of 
people generally, which is more of leftist than rightist political leaders. Rightists, on the 
other hand, would theoretically be inclined to advocate more elitist forms of 
government and hierarchical societies in which ‘superiors command and subordinates 
obey’, as Baradat (2000:33) puts it. 
 
That being said, let me now focus on the South Africa’s political context so as to 
gauge the degree to which the supposedly centre-left ANC-led government coalition, 
which at present administers the country, all provinces and all major municipalities, 
appears to be prepared to act upon both the principle of proletarian justice and the 
principle that all people count for the benefit of the millions of poor that are still living 
throughout South Africa more than a decade into democracy. To start with, it has to 
be acknowledged without equivocation that the moving away from apartheid to 
democracy is not only South Africa’s most precious political event of the twentieth 
century but also an irreversible process, worthy of celebratory accounts in more than 
one respect, for which the African National Congress (ANC) and its political allies 
must take most of the credit. Among other things, the country can now pride itself on 
one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, which, besides providing 
everyone with a broad set of socio-economic rights such as the right to housing 
(section 26), the right to health-care, nutrition, social security and social assistance 
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(section 27) and the right to education (section 29), enshrines in section 195(1)(e) the 
idea of a public policy-making process that has to be participatory in character. A 
forward-thinking Constitution which, combined with the earlier, progressively grounded 
official policy and electoral manifesto of the ANC and its alliance partners for the 1994 
elections—the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)—the fundamental 
objective of which was to reorient government resources towards, inter alia, ‘meeting 
the basic needs’ of all South Africans (chapter 2) and ‘democratizing the state and 
society’ (chapter 5)—‘held the promise of a relatively rapid structural transformation of 
the post-apartheid economy and society, at least for some time’, Hendricks (2003:5) 
maintains. In fact, the optimism generated around the RDP lasted only for some time 
before turning to disappointment and scepticism as a result of the fact that ‘its 
progressive sections simply were not adopted as government policy and, indeed, 
were actually contradicted in large measure, beginning with the RDP White Paper and 
continuing through all the major intersectoral policy documents, as well as through 
most of the new government’s social policies’, Bond (2000a:89) claims. It may even 
be argued (Hendricks, 2003:8) that ‘as much as South Africa has changed politically, 
it has remained virtually the same economically’—a statement that is most poignantly 
evidenced by the fact that almost one-third of the population are still spending their 
lives in unpleasant or downright miserable informal dwellings in both urban and rural 
South Africa, as reported in Chapter 3. Certainly, there are some practical 
justifications for this state of affairs. For example, it must be acknowledged that the 
legacy of about three-and-a-half centuries of apartheid, colonialism and slavery is a 
deep one and that there is then no way that it can disappear in the span of one 
decade or so. Besides, it is possible to argue (Macozoma, 2003:14) that today’s 
globalization processes reduce ‘the policy options available to a state that wanted to 
adopt a development agenda’ a lot. On top of that, one should not overlook all the 
technical complexities involved in poverty reduction efforts. Yet, it must also be 
stressed with some vigour that the generally non-insubstantial achievements 
registered so far by the new government in the provision of houses, education, health 
care and other services to the poorest of the poor seem to ‘dwarf the monumental 
problems of unemployment, illiteracy, ill-health and homelessness which together 
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embrace the grinding poverty of the mass of the population’, Hendricks (2003:13) 
contends. 
 
From this perspective, post-apartheid transition is, to say the least, an unfinished 
process that needs a serious makeover. If democracy is to mean something more 
than making rhetorical speeches, it has to make the mass of the people materially 
better off. At present, this is happening on a very limited scale and often 
controversially. What do the numbers on the status of poverty, unemployment and 
inequality reveal? The Department of Social Development (2002:59) reckons that just 
about half of the South African population falls below the poverty line (about 22 million 
people)—an impressive figure with definite racial, gender and spatial dimensions (the 
worst affected by poverty being blacks, women and rural communities) that is 
nonetheless regarded as ‘somewhat optimistic’, tough it reflects the ‘full take-up of all 
social security programmes’. And according to the national Census conducted by 
Statistics South Africa in 2001, there are an estimated 28,4 million people of working 
age (15-65 years) out of which 16,4 millions are classified as economically active. 
Applying the official or strict definition of unemployment (Statistics South Africa’s 
official definition is that the unemployed are those within the economically active 
population who (a) did not work in the seven days prior to census night, (b) wanted to 
work and were available to start work within a week of census night, and (c) had taken 
active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in the four 
weeks prior to census night), South Africa’s rate of unemployment is 41.6% (about 6,8 
millions of unemployed)—an already dismal number that would be even worse if the 
expanded definition of unemployment, which excludes the last criterion (c), were 
adopted. What is more, South Africa is among the most unequal societies on earth 
and things are not getting any better. As reported by Everatt (2003:79), ‘[i]nequalities 
in income distribution saw the Gini coefficient [a measure of income inequality ranging 
from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality where everyone has the same 
income and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality where one person has all the 
income and everyone else has no income at all] continue to rise in the 1990s despite 
the ANC’s avowed commitment to redistribution’. The level of inequality is also 
sharpening amongst blacks as a consequence of the emergence of a rich black elite 
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whereas ‘the vast majority of blacks remain excluded from the benefits of black 
[economic] empowerment, and marginalized in the ownership structure of the society’, 
Hendricks (2003:12) contends. As a matter of fact, the Gini coefficient for ‘African 
households is not much lower’ than it is for all South African households—the latter 
varying according to different estimates ‘from about 0,58 to 0,68’, Simkins (1998:2) 
informs. Altogether, it seems as though an extreme class-based inequality has come 
to take the place of the extreme race-based inequality of apartheid as a new defining 
characteristic of the democratic South Africa—although the lowest class in the South 
Africa economy continues to be composed almost exclusively of black citizens, with 
‘just the odd pinched face of a poor white here and there’, Sparks (2003:333) notes. 
 
In the eyes of numerous critics who align themselves with the political left as well as 
left-leaning ANC members and political allies—most notably the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions  (COSATU)—
the government’s adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution: a 
Macroeconomic Strategy (GEAR), which was published by the then Department of 
Finance (now National Treasury) in 1996, is the emblem of the market-driven neo-
liberal shift in government policy on poverty alleviation. As maintained by Everatt 
(2003:83), GEAR is ‘a classic neo-liberal formulation, reflecting the assumption that 
market forces freed of external restraint would maximise not merely growth but also 
the welfare of citizens’. To begin with the title itself, GEAR spells out that economic 
growth (and fiscal stringency) must come first and other considerations such as 
redistribution (and poverty alleviation) are subordinate and incidental, which is the 
classic neo-liberal ‘trickle-down’ economic theory to lift nations out of poverty. This 
represented nothing less than a volte face from the original RDP document, which 
prided itself on ‘breaking decisively’ with an approach that regards economic ‘growth 
as the priority that must precede development’ as stated in section 1.3.6. Of course, it 
is not desirable to downplay the importance of economic growth: as it represents an 
increase in the output of a national economy and therefore a rise in the total national 
income, economic growth must clearly be an objective of government action. But 
growth by itself is not an automatic panacea for poverty because a higher average 
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income ‘could be associated with myriad disaggregated patterns of distributional and 
poverty change’, Kanbur (2004:25) argues, and ‘may well occur at the same time as 
large groups of people are being increasingly impoverished’, Heltberg (2004:81) 
points up. Put another way, it is essential to reflect carefully on the pattern of 
distribution of any given growth of the economy (as well as on the time frame required 
for this distribution) because economic growth will only result in a reduction in poverty 
levels if the poor share in it. Furthermore, it can be held that South Africa’s persistent 
dual economy that is both highly developed and underdeveloped cannot be effectively 
handled by the neo-liberal economic paradigm alone. While it may, to some extent, be 
good for the skilled sector of the economy, ‘the unskilled sector, which is far larger, 
needs a different set of strategies, not only for humanitarian reasons, though those 
are important enough, but to draw [the poor] into the economy from which they are 
now excluded so that they can begin to contribute their huge numbers to its growth’, 
Sparks (2003:333) maintains—a perspective that points to the virtue of a ‘trickle -up’ 
(as opposed to ‘trickle-down’) approach to development in which a stronger 
developmental role for the state is required to redirect development investments to 
produce what can be referred to as ‘redistribution for growth’ (or ‘growth through 
redistribution’) rather than ‘growth for redistribution’. In any case, GEAR has failed to 
trigger either redistribution or as much growth as expected: not only poverty, 
unemployment and inequality, as noted earlier, continue to be extremely severe but 
instead of ‘a growth rate of 6 per cent per annum . . . by the year 2000’, which was 
confidently predicted by GEAR (1996:1), ‘South Africa’s gross national income in real 
(1995) terms rose every year at an average of 2.5 per cent between 1993 and 2000’, 
Davis (2003:48) informs. 
 
Yet, it is noted (Everatt, 2003:84) that growth ‘remains a holy grail for which the ANC 
government searches far and wide’, as evidenced most recently by President Thabo 
Mbeki’s announcement of the ‘formation of a new government task force to ramp up 
SA’s growth rate above 6%, in a new bid to create jobs and boost investment’, Mde 
and Brown (2005:1) write in the Business Day. But as noted above, even though a 
higher economic growth rate could be attained, there is no guarantee that it would 
benefit the millions of poor people living in urban and rural South Africa because it is 
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still to be proven that the ANC-led government is disposed to doing something about it 
besides the proclamation, repeated in various ways, that ‘attacking poverty and 
deprivation’ is ‘the first priority of the democratic government’ (National Executive 
Committee of the ANC, 2002). In this regard, Terreblanche (2002:436) seems to have 
little doubt and goes so far as to claim that ‘a new “distributive coalition” has been 
forged over the past decade between the old white elite and the new black elite’ in 
order to make sure that ‘a comprehensive redistribution programme on behalf of the 
poor is not possible’. Perhaps less arguably, it may be claimed that the ANC’s neo-
liberal wing has so far exercised a position of high authority and influence within both 
the party and the Tripartite Alliance, which can ultimately be traced back to the 
persistent—although internally controversial and criticized—decision of the trade 
union and communist allies of the ANC not to run on their own in the elections and the 
resulting missed opportunity to have an official representation under their own name 
in Parliament, in the Cabinet, as well as in provincial and municipal legislatures and 
executives. Consequently, millions of South African poor have hardly any other 
electoral choice today but to vote for a party that, considering the aforesaid levels of 
poverty, unemployment and inequality, has not yet done enough (despite a lot of 
political rhetoric to the contrary, which is portrayed by Bond (2000a:195) as the 
‘tendency to “talk left, act right”’) to escape the impression of serving national and 
local interests of new and old business elites and corruption-prone cronies a lot more 
than the needs and aspirations of the masses of the underprivileged—an absence of 
intra-alliance electoral competition that is also lamented by several informally housed 
respondents interviewed by the researcher during the field surveys undertaken for this 
study. In fact, following the recent ANC’s decision to call on the members of the 
disbanded New National Party (NNP) led by Marthinus van Schalkwyk to join the 
ruling party and the government, which took place in the immediate aftermath of the 
2004 national and provincial elections which virtually wiped out the NNP, one is left to 
wonder how a variegated coalition of government that comprises such divergent 
political forces as conservatives, liberals, trade unionists and communists can 
manage to work together without radically compromising their respective ideological 
beliefs and political agendas. In view of that, it seems pertinent to ask whether the 
Tripartite Alliance should split anytime in the future to lay the foundation for a more 
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vibrant political competition and an electorally imposed alternation of power between a 
centre-left and a centre-right coalition in the new South Africa—a democratic 
alternation of power that from the perspective of the South African left would not only 
be worthwhile at national level but also at provincial and municipal level, given that a 
substantial degree of convergence between national and local politics seems 
inevitable due to the ANC’s doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’ (National Executive 
Committee of the ANC, 2000), which not only binds lower party structures but also 
lower tiers of government under the control of the party to do as they are told by their 
national party leadership. Of course, the electoral potential of a new centre-left 
coalition in South Africa depends to a great extent on the positive reception of its 
programme among black African voters who comprise some 70% of the electorate. In 
this respect, based on a nation-wide study on the political and policy choices of the 
black electorate, ‘there would appear to be ample scope in the African electorate for 
appeals by parties both to the “right” and to the “left” of the ANC’, Schlemmer 
(1999:284) informs. By the way, it can also be observed that a shift in South Africa’s 
politics from a dominant-party system to a balanced two-coalition system would not 
only create a political opportunity for the progressive wing of the Alliance and other 
centre-left-leaning political organizations to form a labour-backed mass party that can 
enthuse lower-income working- and middle-class, poor rural and unemployed voters 
but also for the neo-liberal wing of the Alliance and other centre-right leaning parties 
to put up a united electoral front to oppose, inter alia, anything that is perceived 
(Innes, 2004:11) as a ‘shift away from Gear’s emphasis on the need to privatise state 
assets, including the parastatals, in order to promote economic efficiency and market-
driven economy’. 
 
For the time being, the electoral success of the ANC is not only very robust but it has 
also increased inexorably since 1994. In the 1994 national and provincial elections 
nearly 63% of the electorate voted for the ANC. Five years later this figure rose to 
66% and in 2004 it grew again to almost 70%, which has resulted in the ruling party 
winning more than the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to adjust the 
Constitution unilaterally. The ANC has also won the majority of the popular vote in the 
2000 local elections but this result (nearly 60%) seems to represent a partial setback 
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for the governing party. As far as the future is concerned, it seems unlikely that the 
ANC’s electoral supremacy may soon be challenged without a radical transformation 
of today’s political landscape in terms of party alliances and government coalitions. A 
complete recomposition of the South Africa’s party system is therefore a central 
challenge in creating a mature democracy that would make possible an alternation in 
government between competing coalitions, which is generally regarded as healthier 
than dominant-party rule, especially to rein in the corruption and mismanagement that 
are supposed to accompany long periods of electorally unchallenged power both in 
central, provincial and municipal government—whatever the dominant party in office 
may be as implied by the historian Lord Acton’s (1834-1902) frequently quoted 
warning that ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. The 
same view is echoed by Friedman (1999:104) who holds that ‘[d]ominant parties may 
be more prone to corruption and maladministration, since they are partly insulated 
from voter rejection’. Certainly, the switch from a dominant to a competitive party 
system cannot be expected, by itself, to liberate the country from corruption and 
mismanagement but it may discourage such behaviours or make them easier to 
detect. In fact, the prospect that an elected politician could more easily be defeated in 
the next elections by the opposition’s candidate (referred to by Giliomee et al. 
(2001:161) as the ‘uncertainty of electoral outcomes’) may reasonably be regarded as 
one effective deterrent for him or her to engage in corrupt practices or other conduct 
contrary to public expectations. From this viewpoint, it comes as little surprise that the 
electoral success of the new South Africa’s dominant party has so far increased 
steadily at the same time as public perception of government corruption (commonly 
understood as the abuse of public resources for private gain by politicians and civil 
servants) is reported to be on the rise. In line with the findings of other independent 
surveys conducted on the subject of corruption in government, the annual Public 
Opinion Surveys of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) ‘indicate that 
perceptions that government corruption is widespread have increased among all 
races groups’, Lodge (2002:138) reports. And in a recent telephone study conducted 
by Research Surveys for Dennis Davis’s weekly discussion programme on e-tv called 
‘Judge for Yourself’ in June 2005, it was found that 83% (blacks 81%, whites 87%, 
Indians and coloureds 86%) of those polled felt that corruption was becoming a way of 
 125  
life in South Africa. Even more disturbingly, the feeling that there is corruption in 
senior levels of government was given by 86% of the interviewees (blacks 82%, 
whites 90%, Indians and coloureds 90%)—though this figure may have partly been 
boosted by the still-fresh memory of President Thabo Mbkei’s sacking of Vice 
President Jacob Zuma for alleged corruption. 
 
The fact that there is little prospect of the ANC losing political power is also expected 
to lower the motivation of its elected officials at all levels to be accountable to the 
voters and involve the public in government decision-making. The argument goes that 
since a good majority of the electorate can be taken for granted, incumbent elected 
representatives of the dominant party may actually decide to disregard accountability 
to, and participation from, their constituencies without the risk of not being re-elected. 
This point seems to have particular validity with respect to ward representation in 
municipal councils in poor areas, as suggested, though with different nuances, by 50 
out of 52 informally housed respondents who were interviewed by the researcher 
during the field surveys conducted for this thesis. It was, in fact, observed with a 
sense of frustration, especially by informally housed community leaders, that it is so 
arduous even to arrange a briefing with their ward councillor and that the sporadic 
meetings that eventually happen to take place end up being substantially fruitless. But 
riding on the wave of its electoral success, the ruling party, beginning with its 
President Thabo Mbeki, not only rejects any accusation of having ‘lost contact with the 
people’ (Guy, 2004:1) but also ‘prides itself in being the standard bearer of 
democracy’ (Giliomee et al., 2001:161)—a claim that is uncritically echoed by the 
great majority of elected and non-elected government officials of the City of Tshwane 
(Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality who were interviewed for this study. In the words 
of one respondent (a ward councillor), the ANC is nothing less than ‘the best 
government party in the world because it has created an extraordinary level of 
democracy higher than in Europe or the United States’. Not a few critics, however, 
express concern about what bears a resemblance to Joseph’s (1999:61) ‘virtual’, 
rather than ‘real’, democracy, which has a ‘formal basis in citizen rule, but with key 
decision-making (especially economic) insulated from popular involvement’. Lodge 
(2002:167), for example, cites a specialised study of public participation in policy-
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making that suggests that ‘too often the opportunities for “stakeholder inputs” are 
organized with the chief intention of “affirming existing policy directions”, or to provide 
legitimisation for already fixed decisions’. A similar stance is taken by Southall 
(2003:74-5) who argues that ‘South Africa’s dominant party system seems embarked 
on the road to ‘low intensity’ democracy, [which] implies that the formal requirements 
of democracy are met, yet under conditions of decreasing competition and declining 
popular participation’. The government's well-advertised Imbizo programme seems to 
be a case in point of ‘virtual democracy’, particularly when it comes to involving 
destitute communities. Whereas described by the large majority of government 
respondents as a praiseworthy initiative that provides space for unmediated public 
participation in all spheres of government (i.e., national, provincial and local), 45 out of 
52 informally housed interviewees referred more or less explicitly to the Imbizo  
process as a ‘political game’ orchestrated to serve the electoral interests of those who 
hold it but with little or no impact on the decisions (made elsewhere) that affect their 
community. In this respect, it turns out to be particularly unfortunate the reportedly 
widespread practice among government-elected and non-elected officials at various 
levels who come to meet with ordinary people to reply politely: ‘point taken’ to different 
community concerns but then forget to follow up with the community about it as if it 
had never been raised—a situation that is particularly disturbing because it affects 
people living in abject poverty. If this trend is not reversed—which seems unlikely until 
the majority of the incumbent members of the ruling party (especially local councillors 
who are elected in the poorest constituencies) remain electorally unchallenged and 
therefore with little or no electoral incentive to ensure that the community is 
meaningfully involved in the relevant decision-making—the overall effect is destined to 
be a purely symbolic realization of the democratic ideals on which the new South 
Africa was founded, which would hardly leave any choice for informally housed 
communities but ‘to be at the receiving end of government delivery of a standardized 
product’, as argued by Huchzermeyer (1999:220). 
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Local Government’s Capacity: 
Decentralization of Powers and Functions 
 
 
Even if it could be assumed that there is political willingness to some type of 
participatory-governance arrangement involving the poorest section of the population, 
it still needs to be seen whether or not the local government has the capacity to set it 
up and manage it. As a result, in addition to considering the motivational context that 
would emerge from the ideological proximity of the political leaders and government 
officials to the values of the left, which has been done in the previous paragraph, it is 
necessary to draw attention to the organizational capacity of local governments, which 
entails an examination of what decentralized structure of both the national state and 
local administration is in place and whether or not it would operate effectively with 
regard to the involvement of the poor in local governance matters. Drawing on Olowu 
and Wunsch (2003), de Valk (1990), Pitt and Smith (1981) and other studies that are 
quoted in the course of the paragraph, the key point made here is that it is through the 
reinforcement of democratic local administrations in terms of powers and functions 
that it would be possible to enhance the prospects of engaging residents of informal 
settlements in a meaningful and constructive dialogue with their local government—a 
condition that, for historical and political reasons that are examined below, is scarcely 
noticeable in South Africa despite a new municipal government system with powers 
and functions entrenched in the Constitution of the country. 
 
Generally speaking, I am aware of no country in the world that operates in the logic of 
complete state centralization, that is, the practice of retaining legislative and executive 
control over political, economic and social affairs of the state under central institutions. 
The need for some degree of decentralization seems to be universal and not 
questionable in itself: ‘whatever its ideological foundation or level of intervention, the 
contemporary state must localize its governmental apparatus . . . [a] . . . necessary 
condition for social, economic and political development’, Smith (1985:3) argues. As a 
matter of fact, despite different political ideologies, types of regime and levels of state 
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control over the economy and society, every nation of the world has found it 
necessary to institute some territorial distribution of power, which entails ‘the 
subdivision of the state’s territory into smaller areas and the creation of political and 
administrative institutions in those areas’, as Smith puts it (1985:1). But while it is 
largely agreed that the decentralization of government is a global necessity and it is 
expected by some (Castells, 1989:352) that local administrations may be moving 
towards a new renaissance in the face of ‘the current process of total 
internationalization of the economy’, there are considerable discrepancies between 
the modes and degrees of decentralization that have so far been developed around 
the world. Building on Smith (1985), Manor (1999) and Baradat (2000), let me run 
through the main differences in decentralization patterns—starting by referring to the 
issue of the number of tiers of government. In this respect, there are countries—
mostly the small ones—that have opted for a single-tier of subnational government, 
which is made up of municipalities or local units of government that are responsible 
for the provision of a large range of public services to the community living in their 
jurisdiction and that co-operate with each other to organize the delivery of cross-
boundary services and capital projects. Other countries—actually the great majority—
have instead opted for a multi-tier system of governance, which divides and then 
further divides and perhaps subdivides again and again the national territory into 
smaller areas so as to create upper, intermediate and lower tiers of government each 
one responsible for the delivery of a definite range of services and capital projects to 
the community within their boundaries. Besides the number of tiers of government, 
another important distinction in decentralization practices relates to the methods for 
recruiting local legislative and executive leaders, which, for example, may be directly 
elected by the voters in the respective local constituencies or appointed by higher-
level government authorities. The recruitment process of local legislatures and 
executive authorities is very much connected to another important difference in 
decentralization patterns, which relates to the level of power and functions vested in 
subnational government bodies in relation to such issues as finance, appointment of 
staff, terms and conditions of employment, range of duties and intergovernmental 
relationships. In relation to the above, the most decentralized system of governance 
would be the one that ensures maximum, although never complete, political, 
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operational and fiscal autonomy to the various tiers of subnational government—this 
is usually referred to as federalism. The least decentralized system of governance 
would instead be the one that enables central government authorities to distribute 
their officers over different zones within the national territory, thus reducing 
subnational institutions, or prefectures, to field administrations, which can only act 
along with the stipulations of the central government bureaucrats—this can be 
referred to as the prefectural model. In between these two limits would lie a system of 
governance that results in some form of local democratization and in the bestowal of 
some local autonomy in terms of powers and functions to, say, provincial, district and 
municipal government authorities and that therefore entails elements of both the 
federal and prefectural models (autonomy and dependency) in various 
combinations—this is generally referred to as devolution. Having said that, it is also 
worth pointing out that this succinct outline of different practices of decentralization 
serves as nothing but a small clue to the broad variety of models of decentralization 
found worldwide. It is just a sketch intended to suggest that while decentralization 
principles have universal appeal, patterns of decentralization may differ considerably 
in practice, thus making each version of local government a little distinctive and 
therefore deserving of being understood in its own right and context.  
 
In all nations of the world, the level of powers and functions granted to the local tier of 
government is ultimately the result of a political process in which actors with different 
ideologies and interests at both national and local level seek to impose their particular 
values or to maximize their profit. Bearing in mind local circumstances, advantages 
and disadvantages need to be weighted against each other in order to see whether 
decentralization is worth minimizing or maximizing. For example, the mere existence 
of local authorities does not imply by itself the realization of development and 
democracy for all since local government are, generally speaking, as much at risk of 
corruption, nepotism and mismanagement as national institutions. Actually, it is 
maintained (Smith, 1985:6-7) that the proliferation of territorial subdivisions of the 
state ‘can bring about a deterioration in the quality of administration as larger numbers 
of officials with less education, narrower outlooks and hardly any experience are 
employed’, especially where social and political forces such as the press, trade 
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unions, civil society organizations, religious leaders and political opposition groups are 
unable to exert sufficient control over government power. Additionally, inconsiderate 
decentralization can be criticized for its propensity to be ‘anti-egalitarian through its 
support for regional variation in the provision of public goods’, as Smith (1985:5) 
observes. In contrast, decentralization is, at the least, viewed as a way to lessen 
congestion at the central level of government, thereby securing greater speed and 
flexibility in the decision-making process otherwise smothered by over-centralization. 
Besides, decentralization is seen as an indispensable means towards the 
achievement of both government’s transparency in the use of public funds, 
government’s responsiveness in meeting local needs and government’s responsibility 
in the case of wrongdoing. 
 
More relevant to the scope of this study, decentralization is regarded as a necessary 
condition to further opportunities for public participation. Bringing governments closer 
to the people would reinvigorate democratic practices for two principal reasons: one 
has to do with the population and territorial size of local administrations; the other with 
the empowerment of local authorities. As far as population and territorial size are 
concerned, it does make sense to maintain that the smaller the political subdivision of 
the territory of the state and the community living in it, the higher in theory the 
proportion of individuals, community organizations and interest groups that would 
have a chance to liaise with the government and take part in the decision-making 
process. As far as local government empowerment is concerned, it seems right to 
argue that the more the powers and functions vested in local government authorities, 
the more meaningful and productive in principle the opportunities for local 
communities to be drawn into consultations and decisions about development. All in 
all, while it is worth bearing in mind that democracy and development for all are not 
secured by the mere existence of decentralized institutions whose powers and 
functions may simply benefit already powerful and wealthy members of the local 
community, it is also important to point out that it would be quite hard to seek to build 
meaningful citizen participation—especially if aimed at involving the lower strata of the 
society—lacking local governing bodies provided with a consistent level of powers and 
functions within their territorial boundaries. With particular reference to Sub-Saharan 
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Africa, the link between decentralization and participation may reveal particularly tight 
as it is maintained (World Bank, 1989:79) that community spirit and community 
participation are usually ‘traditional legacies which decentralization schemes should 
uphold and reactivate’.  
 
Turning to the specific patterns of decentralization in the developing world, it is 
important to bear in mind three critical factors that have made and regrettably 
continue to make the preparation and implementation of democratic decentralization 
of powers and functions a much harder and longer process, however largely 
incomplete. The first critical factor has to do with colonial rule: having been left the 
combined legacy of a centralized political administration, which did as it liked with the 
rights of indigenous peoples, and a system of indirect rule or ‘decentralized 
despotism’, which ‘was meant to hitch compliant sections of the traditional leadership . 
. . to the colonial wagon’, as Mamdani (1996:102) puts it, many post-independence 
governments are expected to keep their head down for more decades to come if they 
want to reverse the modes of political organization that were in force under the 
colonial past and complete the transition to inclusive and effective forms of 
decentralized democracy. This point can be restated as the challenge of overturning 
the relative lack of experience in democratic self-governance, which is liable to bring 
about misfortunes such as nepotism, clientelism, corruption and mismanagement at 
the level of both national and local government. The second critical factor relates to 
social divisions: ‘being divided along tribal, cultural, religious and ethnic lines, many 
newly independent states have adopted an exaggerated or even statist posture in 
attempts to unify the diverse elements within their society’, as Baradat (2000:273) 
maintains. This point can be restated as the challenge of reconciling different social 
interests and values on the way to multiculturalism and harmonious societies at both 
national and local level, while being concerned to avoid any temptation to detract from 
the inalienable right to self-determination of peoples. The third critical factor relates to 
traditional forms of governance: although it is important to remember that quite a few 
ethnically based traditional authorities are unquestionably democratic and socially 
progressive institutions of governance, and should therefore be drawn on to shape 
modern modes of governance, as suggested by Davidson (1992:224) and Nabudere 
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(2003:18), it may be the case that uncompromising traditionalism would negatively 
affect the prospects of consolidating democratic and decentralized systems of 
governance, especially when it relegates women and minorities to a lower social 
standing. This point can be rephrased as the challenge of coming up with a mutually 
acceptable and socially beneficial governance framework that sets clear and 
consistent boundaries to the role and powers of traditional leadership (including the 
powers over the use of land) at both national and local level. 
 
Under apartheid, South Africa developed one of the most highly centralized political 
and administrative systems in the world. Although it would be erroneous to contend 
that centralization of governance commenced in 1948, ‘the apartheid policies 
perpetuated by the National Party government significantly influenced the 
developmental patterns of local authorities throughout the country’, Ismail et al. 
(1997:45) maintain. Apartheid local government was the inevitable by-product of the 
compartmentalization of the various race groups into specific areas: local government 
structures were shaped along racial lines (there were white, black, coloured and 
Indian local authorities), each one ‘with their own fiscal, administrative, legal and 
representative systems’, as Ismail et al. (1997:46) put it. Unlike today, the powers and 
functions of apartheid local governments had no constitutional protection, thus 
engendering ‘an exclusively top-down relationship between the levels of government. 
Parliament decided on the powers of the provincial councils, and provincial 
ordinances created local authorities and defined their rights and powers. Furthermore, 
the doctrine of ultra vires [Latin for ‘beyond the powers’] applied, which is to say that 
local authorities could make laws only if they were specifically authorised to do so by 
a higher tier of government’, Kendall (1991:29) explains. The restrictions placed on 
the transfer of powers and functions to the local tier of government during the 
apartheid era have resulted in local authorities being reduced to field administrations 
or, as Ismail et al. (1997:56) point out, ‘being generally unable to be creative, 
innovative and respond appropriately to changes in the environment’. This accounts 
for the greatest part of today’s shortage of political and administrati ve management 
capacity of several municipalities to run their own affairs effectively in South Africa, 
which manifests either in the calibre of municipal councillors from all parts of the 
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political spectrum, which is generally regarded as ‘very weak’, or in the lack of 
financial management skills, which is viewed by the Municipal Demarcation Board of 
South Africa as the ‘biggest capacity problem facing municipalities’, Cameron 
(2001:114) reports—a dearth of political and administrative management capacity 
inherited from the past regime that, with particular reference to previously 
disadvantaged municipal areas in urban and rural South Africa, adds to the legacy of 
insufficient income-generating capacity to support the provision of municipal services.   
  
In post-apartheid South Africa, the Constitution provides for a new non-racial system 
of local government, which breaks decisively with the past, not only in terms of 
enhanced powers and functions (a new constitutionally defined developmental role for 
municipalities is set out in chapter 7), but also in relation to an upgraded position 
within the overall framework of the state (a new constitutionally mandated cooperation 
between all spheres of government is laid out in chapter 3). As per its new 
developmental duties, it is the constitutional responsibility of local government to 
develop and promote the well-being of its inhabitants (by performing a number of 
direct delivery and regulatory functions that are set out in schedule 4-B and schedule 
5-B) and encourage the involvement of communities in matters of local concern. As 
per the new intergovernmental relations, the highest law in the country prescribes that 
national, provincial and local spheres of government update and consult one another 
on matters of common interest, coordinate their policies and legislation, and assist 
and support one another in mutual trust and good faith. Yet, local governments are 
constitutionally entrenched as an autonomous sphere of government in that 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures ‘cannot exercise control according to their 
own discretion [but] [t]hey must specifically act in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution’, Rautenbach and Malherbe (2004:278) remark—although it also 
appears in section 156(3) of the Constitution that a municipality remains subject to the 
other spheres of government in that a ‘by-law that conflicts with national or provincial 
legislation is invalid’. As a result of this autonomy, local government authorities must 
not only participate in national and provincial development programmes but also 
structure and manage their administrations to do their utmost to promote the social 
and economic development of their local communities independently—this is also 
 134  
done in consideration of the constitutional obligation placed on the national and 
provincial governments under section 151(4) not to ‘compromise or impede a 
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions’, which 
‘guarantees local governments a significant measure of administrative autonomy’, 
Devenish (2005:303) contends. Local governments are accorded legislative and 
executive authority, which is vested in their municipal councils—though a council may, 
and usually does, choose to delegate its executive power or a part thereof to a 
council-elected governing body, which may be established in the form of an executive 
committee, an executive mayor assisted by a mayoral committee or subcouncils and 
whose term of office corresponds to that of the council, as well as to ward committees 
established for each ward in the municipality. This is a distinctive trait of the local 
sphere of government in that municipal councils are charged by the Constitution (and 
by later Acts of Parliament such as the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 
1998 and Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000) with an executive 
authority that at the other two levels of government is not retained by the legislative 
body—whether it is Parliament or provincial legislatures—but, in observance of the 
principle of separation of powers, is invested in the President of the Republic and 
premiers of the provinces. To the contrary, one critical aspect that needs to be 
stressed is that individual councillors do not possess, by themselves, any legislative or 
executive powers—the implication being that a ‘council always acts as a council when 
governing’, Thornhill (1995:19) remarks. That makes a mockery of those council 
employees who believe  that ward councillors are righteous in their acting as a sort of 
‘ward mayor’ (i.e., giving instructions and orders to any municipal official) and 
reverently refer to them as ‘my employer’, as stated by various local government 
respondents, especially those employed in regional offices, who were interviewed by 
the researcher during the field surveys conducted for this study. 
 
Another relevant legislation in regard to South African local government is the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998, which provides for the goals and 
criteria for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independent authority—
the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB)—which is accountable only to Parliament. 
Following a resolute process of boundary redetermination that resulted in a drastic 
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reduction in the number of local governments across the country, a total of merely 284 
municipalities (compared to 843 in 1995 and about 1260 prior to that year) have been 
demarcated by the MDB for the 2000 local elections. This number consists of six 
metropolitan (category A) municipalities that have exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in their area, 231 local (category B) municipalities that share 
municipal executive and legislative authority in their area with a district municipality 
within whose area they fall, and 47 district (category C) municipalities that have 
municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one 
municipality and may include district management areas (25 of which have been 
established by the MDB around the country), which are extended rural or desert areas 
with a very small population. Although the demarcation process should technically be 
seen as ongoing in that the MDB continues to be involved in requests for boundary 
redetermination, it is maintained (CDE, 2000:2) that it ‘has raised some new issues 
and problems that will have to be addressed’ if the new, uplifted status of local 
government is to succeed in all its objectives. Two major concerns are discussed 
below. The first is that local government reorganization with fewer and geographically 
larger municipalities (most notably, megacities or single-tier government structures in 
metropolitan areas) may contribute to its aloofness from the communities it serves—
although it may be justified on the grounds of administrative cost-efficiency. As 
Cameron (2000:163) contends, ‘[t]here is a general concern in some circles that 
metropolitan authorities will be run in a highly centralized fashion’, no matter what 
variant of decentralization they may choose to establish, that is, ward committees 
and/or metropolitan subcouncils covering an area consisting of a cluster of adjoining 
wards that are accorded such powers and functions as the metro council may 
delegate to them in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
(section 32). In Bond’s words (2000b:372), ‘[p]eople who once had access to close-by 
councillors in small towns will find their local councils many dozens of kilometres 
distant following amalgamation’. Besides, it is argued (Cameron, 2000:164) that ‘there 
is no conclusive local or international evidence to suggest that either the unitary- or 
two-tier model is a better system for dealing with metropolitan problems’, a view that is 
curiously at odds with the confidence with which the national government affirms in 
section D(2.2)(a) of the White Paper on Local Government of 1998 that ‘in the 
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absence of metropolitan government . . . the urban poor would be pushed to the 
metropolitan peripheries or into spatial “pockets of poverty”’. Indeed, the opportunity to 
reverse gradually the amalgamation process that has integrated South Africa’s major 
cities with secondary cities and/or large and small towns should not be thrust aside by 
the ruling ANC on the sole basis of the party’s passion for holding on to power in 
virtually any municipality of the country. Without doubt, the establishment of 
megacities has so far limited to a minimum the number of municipalities opposition 
parties could govern ‘given that their support in most metropolitan areas is in 
geographically located pockets rather than city-wide support’, as Cameron (2001:106) 
recalls. A more proper balance should instead be sought between ‘statesmanlike 
considerations seeking the genuine empowerment of groups at lower levels and . . . 
hard-nosed calculations of self-interest’, as Manor (1999:37) puts it. Of course, the 
possibility of reverting the process of combining cities and towns into single 
municipalities, which has been used by the MDB to construct both metropolitan and 
local municipalities, depends on the fact that such cities and towns have the political, 
administrative and revenue-generation capacity to run their own affairs effectively by 
themselves—a condition that, in turn, can be met only when a progressive deepening 
of democracy by means of according representative government to at least all 
secondary and large cities of South Africa may fit the political agenda of the national 
government. Besides megacities, there is a second problem that affects the new 
South African local government system, which resides in the division of powers and 
functions between district councils and their constituent local municipalities. Criticism 
of the provision made by the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 for 
a two-tier municipal government system in all non-metropolitan areas has two different 
nuances. First, the Act does not make clear which functions and powers are reserved 
to district councils and which to local councils in that a local municipality is not 
prevented ‘from performing functions in its area and exercising powers in its area of 
the nature’ of those accorded to a district municipality, as stated in section 84(3). The 
implication is that the risk of intergovernmental disputes is expected to be higher than 
it would otherwise have been or, putting it differently, ‘every municipality in the country 
will test its own powers and functions, which will be an enormously costly and wasteful 
exercise’, CDE (2000:8) argues. Second, and more to the point, district councils have 
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been devolved a measure of government authority that appears not only above what 
is usual (especially compared to the fact that ‘[i]n the past district councils had virtually 
no jurisdiction in larger urban towns, Cameron (2001:106) recalls) but also 
disproportionate to the objective of a district municipality to ‘seek to achieve the 
integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic development of its area as 
a whole’, as defined in section 83(3) of the Act—a record that looks like another sign 
of the current amount of centralization in the new local government system of South 
Africa. This sentiment is echoed by CDE (2000:10), which looks at the sharing of 
executive and legislative authority between local and district councils as ‘a way of 
saying that certain of the city’s powers and functions have been transferred to the 
district council’. In fact, functions and powers that can be expected to be of exclusive 
competence of local municipalities, and that may entail district assistance and 
coordination of capital projects and service delivery only if necessary to achieve its 
statutory objective could be all those contained in section 84 of the Act, which deals 
with the functions and powers of a district municipality, with the most notable 
exception of the responsibility for integrated development planning for the district 
municipality as a whole, which is set forth in section 84(1)(a). 
 
That being said, it is also worth mentioning that one of the key prerequisites for viable 
local government capable of delivering services that meet the needs of the local poor 
is the availability of sufficient financial resources. With regard to finance, section 
227(1) of the Constitution entitles a municipality, just like a province, to ‘an equitable 
share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform 
the functions allocated to it’. Besides, as per section 229 of the Constitution, ‘a 
municipality may impose rates on property and surcharges on fees for services [most 
notably, electricity, water, garbage collection and transport fares]; and if authorised by 
national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties’. This power to levy local taxes and 
duties, however, includes no right to ‘impose income tax, value-added tax, general 
sales tax or customs duty’ and ‘may not be exercised in a way that materially and 
unreasonably prejudices national economic policies, economic activities across 
municipal boundaries, or the national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour’. 
What is more, a municipality, just like a province, has the power to ‘raise loans for 
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capital or current expenditure in accordance with reasonable conditions determined by 
national legislation’, as indicated in section 230(1) of the Constitution, though the 
private banking sector does and will not lend heavily to municipalities ‘until the banks 
have more confidence in local government as a profitable sphere of investment’, CDE 
(2000:8) remarks. Complementarily, it is also important to call attention to the fact that 
local governments must have a sound knowledge of local financial management 
principles and practices so that to optimize their finances or else financial resources, 
no matter how large they might be, will be wasted and municipalities will be forced to 
curtail or discontinue their operations. In this regard, CDE (2000:4) notes ‘the absence 
of business principles in running many local councils, which impact[s] negatively on 
their ability to provide and fund services, stimulate local economic development, and 
attract new investments’—concerns that were the driving force behind the 
establishment of the framework of treasury norms and standards for the local sphere 
of government that appears on the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 2003, which was passed to attempt to secure sound and 
sustainable management of the financial affairs of municipalities. 
 
So far, the issue of decentralization has been addressed by focusing on the modes 
and processes that entail the devolution of powers and functions from the central to 
the local tier of government. It is now worth adding a complementary issue, which 
concerns the decentralization of powers and functions within the local administration 
itself. How do local governments decentralize themselves? Two major, non-exclusive 
options are invo lved in making local municipalities closer to the people they serve. 
The first option entails the establishment of area-based or functional committees 
consisting of, or chaired by, councillors with advisory and/or decision-making powers 
and accountable to the local legislature. In this regard, the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act of 1998 makes provision for the establishment of three types 
of committees, or internal structures, by a municipal council that chooses to opt for 
them: metropolitan subcouncils (sections 61-71), which are solely composed of a 
specified number of councillors, cover an area consisting of a cluster of neighbouring 
wards and may only be established, as the name suggests, by metropolitan 
municipalities; ward committees (sections 72-78), which consist of a chairperson, who 
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is the councillor representing that ward, and no more than other ten persons who are 
expected to represent a diversity of interests in the ward and include an equitable 
number of women; and other committees (section 79), which are functional or ad hoc 
committees solely consisting of members appointed from among the council. 
Metropolitan subcouncils and the other theme-based committees that are made up 
exclusively of ward or proportional municipal councillors are meant to be decentralized 
governance structures to which the council may delegate the responsibility for both 
advising and making decisions on matters relating to their area or functions. In 
contrast, ward committees ‘are clearly intended to be a vehicle to promote local 
democracy and participation . . . [but] . . . are not meant to be bodies which take major 
administrative decisions’, Cameron (2000:163) explains. 
 
The second option is the departmentalization of the municipal executive, that is, the 
organization into departments, divisions, companies, agencies, boards or 
commissions usually on the basis of the service provided, geographic segmentation 
and/or type of citizen served by the specific organizational unit. An example in this 
respect, which is relevant to this thesis, would be the establishment of a specific unit 
or agency vested with a sufficient budget and clearly defined areas of responsibility on 
the question of informal settlements, which would be particularly worthwhile for all 
cities of the developing world that face the challenges posed by a large informally 
housed population. This special-purpose unit or informal settlement management unit 
(ISMU)—whose responsibilities should be broad enough to address integrated 
solutions to the physical, social, economic and environmental degradation of informal 
settlements—may be in a position to add value to the governance process in at least 
three ways: first, by improving the coordination, cooperation and establishment of 
priorities between local and non-local government departments on the matter of 
informal settlements; second, by becoming a repository of critical expertise to handle 
all issues associated with the design and delivery of development programmes to the 
poorest of the poor within the municipal jurisdiction; and third, by organizing and 
simplifying the liaison process with residents of informal settlements. In respect of the  
last-mentioned point, it may also be said that the ISMU could be in the position to be 
the developer and custodian of the communication and organizational skills that are 
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required to enable government officials to work with, and not only for, the communities 
living in poverty. This argument can be made on the basis of the claim that awareness 
building and training aimed at emphasizing principles and methodologies of effective 
community participation featuring the involvement of the poor could be better brought 
to fruition by a team of people who have a specific mandate to serve them and 
therefore to apply what they are learning. As regards the establishment of an ISMU, it 
is relevant to this thesis to make specific reference to the fact that the City of Tshwane 
(Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) has recently drafted, but not yet passed, 
By-Laws Relating to the Management and Control of Informal Settlements within its 
jurisdiction. The ISMU envisaged by the CTMM, however, can hardly be welcomed as 
a reliable tool for development—let alone integrated development. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 3 in the paragraph entitled ‘Government Policies’, the 
developmental role of the ISMU of the CTMM is trivial in that it has not been assigned 
the responsibility to formulate or implement development programmes aimed at 
improving the living conditions of the people residing in informal settlements nor 
specific guidelines have been released on how to liaise with the municipal and higher-
level departments that are supposed to perform these duties. Similarly, little effort has 
been devoted to give details on how the ISMU of the CTMM is expected to go about 
consulting with the communities living in informal settlements and their committees in 
decisions affecting their lives, which paves the way for discretionary enforcement of 
the law. 
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Local Government’s Obligation: 
Legislative Requirements 
 
 
The first two paragraphs of this chapter discuss why leftist ideology and state 
decentralization are expected to be central factors in boosting government’s 
willingness and capacity to bring to fruition a process of public participation that 
involves the poorest section of the population. Taking some cues from Levendosky 
(2002), Robertson (1999), Magee (1999), Nelson (1996) and others quoted below, 
this paragraph deals instead with what may be required by national and municipal 
laws in respect of open government and public participation, which is seen as an 
additional factor in securing greater involvement of all citizens irrespective of their 
economic conditions. It is, however, worth pointing out from the beginning that any 
legislative provisions that enforce free flow of government information to the people or 
public debate and consultation with the citizenry in general, which all happen to be 
explicitly entrenched in the South African Constitution, and in various laws and policy 
documents of the country at all tiers of government, are regarded as complementary 
to, and not a substitute for, the shortage of willingness and capacity on the part of 
government officials to embrace the challenges and opportunities that come with the 
full adoption of a participative and inclusive system of governance (especially of local 
governance), as discussed in the two preceding paragraphs. 
 
The promotion of transparency and accountability in government and public 
involvement in the decision-making that affects their collective life should first of all be 
enshrined in the constitution of a country. As argued by Lewis (1999:30), ‘it does not 
seem logically possible to deny arguments in favour of autonomy and, therefore, of 
participation. They lie at the core of human personality and, as such, lay special claim 
to constitutional status’. Yet, the creation of constitutional opportunities to increase the 
level of democratic participation in government decision-making requires, first and 
foremost, that the dominant political culture does not stand in opposition to the 
principles of participative governance. As argued by Perri 6 (1999:78), entrenching 
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citizen participation in the constitutional order is not ‘principally a question for the legal 
designers of formal constitutional rules. It is also, and arguably crucially, a question 
about culture’. When this culture happens to be the one prevailing nationally, ‘a 
commitment to broad participative rights could well be reflected in the “directive 
principles” of constitutions, their preambles, and perhaps, to some extent, in Bill of 
Rights, which would leave it to successive governments to work out, with judicial 
assistance, the most appropriate way to secure those rights,’ as Lewis (1999:26) puts 
it. Obviously, it is not only a question of whether or not to include participative rights in 
the constitution of a country but it is also a matter of which rights should be 
constitutionalized. In this respect, it would be desirable that the supreme law of a 
country not only confer upon its citizens the right to know about what their government 
at any level does or does not do but also bestow the public with the right to express 
their views and participate in the political decision-making that affects their lives 
virtually anytime, especially at the level of local government, except where disclosure 
or public discussion would not be in the interest of the citizens. 
 
Similarly, it is necessary that national and municipal legislation is enacted to provide 
for practical measures to give effect to these constitutional rights. In particular, 
national laws pertaining to local government and municipal by-laws on open 
government and citizen participation would serve to secure and regulate what is 
provided for by the constitution within the boundaries of a municipality. This type of 
legislation is essentially meant to keep local government’s records open for public 
inspection (public records laws), deal with public complaints (ombudsman laws) or 
allow the people to attend and be heard at hearings and meetings of local 
government’s bodies with a chance to influence the decisions that affect their lives 
(public hearings and meetings laws). Besides, these laws are expected to make 
provision for suitable penalties in the event that municipal officials fail to comply with 
their requirements. As a result, open government and participative government 
legislation would give local government officials a sanctionable obligation to ensure 
availability of information to the public, respond to people’s inquiries and complaints 
and involve the community in matters of local governance. Lack of laws and by-laws 
adopting the constitutional provisions regarding local government’s transparency, 
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accountability and participative decision-making would possibly result in the public 
knowing what the municipality is doing only when decisions have already been made, 
and the potential of the community to provide good advice and influence policy-
making would perhaps go missing. With the enactment of these laws and by-laws, 
instead, citizens would have opportunities to exert the right to find out what their local 
government is doing as well as contribute to making their neighbourhoods and cites a 
better place in which to live and work. Of course, the characteristics of a system of 
legally mandated openness and public participation may vary a lot from one country to 
another and, to some extent, from a municipality to another within the same country, 
not only in terms of requirements to be fulfilled (what information is to be disclosed or 
how and when to involve the public), but also in terms of their capacity to compel local 
government officials to do so. As a result, the actual impact of such legislation will 
depend on what obligations are stated or implied, and what penalties are imposed as 
punishment for violations or, in other words, on its scope and severity. As far as the 
scope of the law is concerned, it should be as broad as possible: openness in public 
administration should then be the rule and closure justified only by the confidentiality 
of the information to be disclosed or secrecy of the subject matter to be discussed. 
With the corollaries that individual government officials should not be given the 
discretionary power to decide on their own whether or not government’s records or 
meetings should be open and that exemptions to the principle of general disclosure 
must be made clear and public. At the same time, it is important that participative 
processes do not become a stumbling block to the delivery process, which implies 
that municipalities have to find ways of organizing public participation so as to 
improve, rather than degrade, the level of service to the public. As far as the severity 
of the law is concerned, it is not only important that sanctions be clearly defined but 
also enforced reactively by appropriate systems of internal control or by courts of law 
so as to reduce the non-compliance rate that would otherwise undermine the right of 
the public to access government’s records and meetings. 
 
It is broadly recognized that the Constitution of South Africa sets a very good example 
of what can be done to attempt to institutionalize transparency in government and 
citizen involvement in policy-making. First, ‘the right of access to any information held 
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by the state’ is provided for by section 31(1)(a). Second, it is stated in section 
195(1)(e) that ‘the pubic must be encouraged to participate in policy-making’. Third, 
and most relevant to this thesis, it is set out in section 152(1)(e) that one of the 
fundamental objectives of local government is ‘to encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organizations in the matters of local government’. It 
would then be constitutionally ‘insufficient in such a democracy simply to defer to the 
will of the majority elected every five years. The broad policies expressed in election 
manifestos require further democratic debate in translating them into specific policies, 
laws and programmes. In this, all voices should be free to engage the majority at all 
levels of government’, Albertyn (2002:52) suggests. What is more, it is constitutionally 
required that development be democratized both nationally and locally, which would  
allow one to assume that ‘regular democratic local government elections are an 
insufficient democratizing mechanism for developmental local government [and that] 
what is required is a continual process of dialogue between municipalities and their 
communities, as well as community participation in all aspects of council activities’, 
Pycroft (2000:150) contends.  
 
These constitutional rights find direct expression in a number of legislation and policy 
documents. To begin with, the Development Facilitation Act of 1995 stipulates in 
section 3(1)(d) that ‘members of communities affected by land development should 
actively participate in the process of land development’. More specifically, section 
3(1)(e) points out that the ‘skills and capacities of disadvantaged persons involved in 
land development should be developed’. This is echoed by the Housing Act of 1997, 
which establishes in section 2(1)(b) that all spheres of government ‘must consult 
meaningfully with individuals and communities affected by housing development’. 
Furthermore, section B(1.3) of the White Paper on Local Government of 1998 
instructs that ‘municipal councillors should promote the involvement of citizens and 
community groups in the design and delivery of municipal programmes’. In particular, 
it is spelt out that ‘[m]unicipalities must adopt inclusive approaches to fostering 
community participation, including strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and 
actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in the local community’. 
Accordingly, section 19(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
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determines that a ‘municipal council must develop mechanisms to consult the 
community and community organisations in performing its functions and exercising its 
powers’. Section 16(1)(a) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000 
stipulates that ‘a municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that 
complements formal representative government with a system of participatory 
governance, and must for this purpose encourage, and create conditions for, the local 
community to participate in the affairs of the municipality, including in the preparation, 
implementation and review of its integrated development plan [IDP]’. 
 
The single most important instrument to enhancing participative democracy in South 
African local government and ensuring that IDPs are generated in a participative way 
with the affected communities regardless of their economic wealth is referred to as 
ward committee by the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998. In this 
respect, it is stipulated (section 73(1)) that a municipal council that ‘decides to have 
ward committees, it must establish a ward committee for each ward in the 
municipality’. Besides, the election of the members of a ward committee—which must 
consist of the ward councillor representing the ward in the council, ‘who must also be 
the chairperson of the committee’ as per section 73(2)(a), and ‘not more than 10 other 
persons’ as per section 73(2)(b)—must allow for ‘a diversity of interests in the ward to 
be represented’, as stated in section 73(3)(a)(ii). What is more, a ward committee is 
provided with wide-ranging power to ‘make recommendations [to or through the ward 
councillor] on any matter affecting its ward’, as set out in section 74(a), and ‘has such 
duties and powers as the metro or local council may delegate to it’, as defined in 
section 74(b). In respect of the latter, it is for example established in section 4.1 of the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality’s (CTMM) policy document referred to as 
Establishment of Ward Committees, which was adopted by the council in 2001 and is 
currently in the process of being upgraded into by-laws, that a number of important 
functions are to be delegated to the ward committees, including the participation in the 
formulation of the ‘IDP’, ‘council’s budget’ and ‘strategic decisions relating to the 
provision of municipal services’. As per funding and administrative arrangements to 
enable the ward committees to perform their functions effectively, it is stipulated in 
section 9 of the same policy document that while there will be no remuneration for the 
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members of the committee, ‘travel and other costs incurred within the scope of Ward 
Committees duties [will] be reimbursed to the committee members’. The same section 
also makes clear that the CTMM ‘shall make available its staff members as well as 
Council resources, such as offices, computers, faxes, copying facilities and other 
related facilities, to the Ward Committees for administrative back-up’. Moreover, as it 
is expected that disputes may arise as regards the composition and functioning of 
ward committees, it is resolved that ‘the elections of Ward Committees [shall] be 
overseen by the Speaker’s Office’ (section 6.1(b)) and that matters that fail to be 
resolved internally within the ward committee or that embroil the ward councillor ‘shall 
be taken to Council, through the Office of the Speaker (section 7.8(d))—thus making 
the Speaker responsible for watching over the process of public participation within 
the municipality and ensure that it is carried out correctly and efficiently. The CTMM 
has also drafted, but not yet adopted, By-Laws Relating to the Management and 
Control of Informal Settlements, which provide in section 7(1) for the election of a 
Residents’ committee ‘to represent the views and interests of the residents of the 
settlement in all consultative processes between the Municipality and the residents of 
the settlement’. It is also established (section 7(2)) that ‘the Municipality shall consult 
the said Committee on all matters relating to the . . . informal settlement and 
communicate matters of general concern to the residents on a collective basis’—thus 
implying that each informally housed community within the CTMM will perhaps have 
an opportunity to voice their concerns and make recommendations to the municipal 
council, not only through the ward committee under which their settlement falls, but 
also through their own community committee.  
 
From what is stated above, it is clear that South African local government is under 
constitutional and legal obligations to involve the public in the affairs of the 
municipality. That notwithstanding, the actual opportunities of the people (especially of 
the people living in poverty) to have a say and influence government decisions that 
affect their lives have so far failed to materialize or have been reduced to meaningless 
exercises, as evidenced by the field surveys undertaken for this thesis. To put it 
differently, it seems as if the lack of willingness on the part of government to genuinely 
embrace a system of participative and inclusive governance (especially at the level of 
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local government) and shortage of municipal capacity to put it into operation, as 
discussed in the previous two paragraphs, has so far successfully been able to 
circumvent the spirit, if not the letter, of a promising legislation—particularly with 
regard to the most destitute communities. This asymmetric situation is pointed out, 
among others, by Harvey (2002:38) who affirms that ‘there is little evidence to suggest 
that ordinary citizens are extensively and effectively involved in public hearings and in 
making legislative submissions, or that the education and public outreach 
programmes have substantially increased the extent and quality of their participation’. 
And it seems to be implied by Meyer and Theron (2000:i) who claim that ‘[p]ublic 
participation, unfortunately, has become a “buzz word”, the trendy and political correct 
concept or principle to incorporate in policy documents’.  
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Informally Housed People’s Availability: 
Interest and Positive Expectations 
 
 
The first three paragraphs of this chapter discuss the critical factors (i.e., leftist 
ideology, state decentralization and legislative requirements) that are expected to 
trigger or bolster local government’s willingness, capacity and obligation to involve 
poor communities in the formulation of public policies that affect their lives. This and 
the next two paragraphs address, instead, a set of motivations and resources at 
individual and collective level that are necessary or beneficial to participative 
governance—this time on the part of the local community. As the act of participating in 
a democracy is to be regarded as a voluntary activity that competes with all other 
interests and responsibilities that people may have, it is, first of all, important to 
explore what is behind it or, in other words, to examine what would make individuals 
living in poverty willing to participate in the decision-making of their local 
administration, which is the focus of the present paragraph. This paragraph is 
complemented by the following two, which delve into what would make community 
participants capable of conveying information and knowledge to government officials 
(neighbourhood knowledge) and exerting pressure on them to make decisions and 
take action in the best interest of their community (social action groups). 
 
Let me then start by addressing the following question: what would make a person 
living in an informal settlement willing to take part in meetings with local government 
officials and attempt to lobby for the regeneration of his or her neighbourhood? 
Lacking anything that makes it obligatory or any pay but perhaps a compensation for 
expenses incurred in attendance at meetings, community involvement in government 
policy-making implies that people have a specific interest in the process and a feeling 
that participation is worth the effort. If I may be forgiven for stating the obvious, there 
must be first of all a self-interested motivation for citizens to participate—motivation 
that is self-interested in the broadest sense of the word, including an altruistic 
motivation where the interests of others become those of the self. As Brynard 
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(1996:42) puts it, ‘people are reluctant to participate in local activities in which they 
have no particular interest . . . people tend to participate in planning only when there is 
some specific interest for them in its outcome’. What is this particular interest that may 
move a person living in poverty to take part in talks with the government? Two 
fundamental types of interests have been identified: one has to do with serving a 
personal or family purpose; and the other relates to serving the good of the 
community generally. If the people do not see the relevance to their own interests of 
the issues for which public hearings or meetings are convened, it would then lack the 
fundamental motive for participation. 
 
While a self-interested motivation, which is part of the human search for some kind of 
satisfaction, is a necessary condition for participation, it may, however, be insufficient. 
Unless citizen participants are fulfilled with some immaterial rewards (e.g., a sense of 
gratification for doing their civic duty, for socializing with other residents or perhaps for 
mingling with the authorities) or satisfied with some small material gains (e.g., the logo 
merchandise of the city or free refreshments and snacks sometimes handed out at the 
meetings!) that can be associated with the simple act of participating, it also ‘seems 
that people are unlikely to participate willingly in planning if they feel that their 
participation will have no significant effect on the final outcome,’ Brynard (1996:42) 
maintains. To put it differently, if members of the community who are interested in the 
issues to be discussed at a particular meeting with government officials felt they would 
accomplish little with their participation or if they regarded participation as a plain 
sham, feeling that decisions have already been taken elsewhere, they would probably 
decide not to get involved, especially if they had the option of freeloading, that is, 
restraining from participating in the hope of reaping possible benefits from the 
participation of someone else with similar concerns. 
 
Additionally, it is also worth mentioning that effective participation also requires a good 
amount of time set aside, not only to attend the scheduled meetings, but also to 
inform oneself about the issues to be discussed. None of the government–community 
meetings or other time-consuming modes of participation could indeed occur 
effectively without some spare time on the part of the citizens. Is time availability really 
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an issue with regard to informally housed people? To put it another way, should it be 
assumed that the least well-off citizens are also the least busy and therefore the best 
endowed with free time? On the one hand, one might believe that the unemployed or 
people with an occasional occupation would have more time to spare than people who 
have to spend regular hours at work. On the other hand, precisely because they are 
unemployed or have a precarious job, one might expect that the poor would have to 
spend all their time on the not deferrable constraint to meet their basic needs and 
those of their dependents—‘every hour spent in meetings . . . is time lost in the 
struggle for survival’, Narayan et al. (2000:206) comment. While the empirical studies 
of Verba et al. (1995:293) suggest that ‘free time does not vary systematically with 
occupation level’, it has been observed by the researcher in the course of the field 
surveys undertaken for this study that mass and committee meetings are always 
called on weekends because all other days are not convenient to most residents—
although this cannot only be attributed to the lack of time during the rest of the week 
but also to the absence of electricity supply in informal areas, which makes evening 
gatherings inappropriate. Besides, some of those serving on the residents’ 
committees operating in the four informal settlements that have been surveyed 
admitted that they probably would not have enough time to attend ward meetings with 
the councillor and government officials if these meetings were held in the best-located 
extensions of the ward a long way away from their homes, which, by the way, is 
usually the case. In this respect, it would seem appropriate to comment that municipal 
councillors and officials should do their best either to draw on the old saying ‘if 
Mohammad cannot go to the mountain, let the mountain come to Mohammad’ or 
provide reimbursement for the time spent and reasonable expenses incurred by 
community participants in preparing for, and attending, the meetings. Finally, the two 
most common reasons cited by the informally housed respondents with respect to  
time availability, or lack thereof, are long work hours required to meet minimum 
earnings and a busy family life for the women who have to take care of several 
offspring or a large extended family of grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts or 
cousins. 
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Having noted earlier that both personal interest in the topics being addressed and 
positive expectations from taking part in public hearings or meetings with government 
officials are necessary conditions for ensuring people’s availability to participate, it is 
important to discuss what is behind them and whether or not and what it may need to 
be done by the government to increase people’s motivation to get involved. By 
drawing upon Buckwalter and Parsons (1993), Verba et al. (1995), Plummer (1999), 
Fox and Lawless (2001) and Knight et al. (2002), it is possible to trace poor people’s 
interest in, and feeling of positive anticipation for, involving themselves in processes of 
public consultation and debate back to psychological, cultural or government-related 
factors—although these three categories are often found to have blurred boundaries. 
First, psychological factors revolve around the way people perceive themselves as 
possible contributors to the good of their family or the wider community. In this 
respect, one of the things learnt from the group of 16 ordinary informally housed 
respondents who were interviewed by the researcher during the field surveys 
undertaken for this thesis is that some poor people may have a feeling of personal 
inadequacy and may then decide not to participate in public forums or participate in a 
rather inactive manner. It is worth pointing out that this feeling of personal inadequacy 
seems to be generally absent or very limited among the group of 36 community 
leaders who were interviewed by the researcher. Second, cultural factors relate to the 
socially transmitted practice, or the lack thereof, of participating in community service 
efforts. In this respect, it is worth pointing out not only the importance of popular 
participation in political affairs but also of a tradition of civic voluntarism outside the 
realm of politics as a means to foster people’s willingness to get involved in processes 
of local governance. Although poor people’s involvement in political parties, unions or 
organizations that take political stands would generate quite a bit of exposure to 
political issues and thus an impulse to participate in local government’s decision-
making, it is maintained (Verba et al., 1995:3) that the participation in ‘the fundamental 
non-political institutions [such as the family, churches, community-based 
organizations, schools and workplaces] with which individuals are associated during 
the course of their lives’ would trigger the individual’s readiness to take part in 
consultations with politicians and government officials. With reference to the latter, it 
was a positive surprise to the researcher to find out that in all four informal settlements 
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visited during the field surveys conducted for this study there are in existence various 
community-based organizations (involved in areas such as crime prevention, housing 
and youth development) that are not only well known in the settlement where they 
operate but that are, in general, also prone to keeping ordinary people regularly up to 
date through public meetings that are actively attended by some hundreds of 
residents. Thus implies that ‘most citizens are open to participation’ and government 
cannot ‘claim it is dealing with a passive citizenry’, as remarked by Friedman 
(2002:22). Finally, government-related factors have to do with the type of relationship, 
and its history, between the government and the local community. In this respect, a 
relationship that is based on mutual trust and respect, and that has been able to 
achieve some positive results for the community over the years would probably lead 
residents to be eager about holding talks with their government. Of course, if poor 
people are to be confident in the government, integrity, transparency and readiness to 
help are important conditions to be met on the part of the public officials involved in 
the process. Besides, poor people’s interest in getting involved and positive 
expectations about what can be accomplished with their involvement would be 
enhanced when participation has proved fruitful elsewhere, especially in a 
neighbourhood right on their doorstep. However, feelings of mistrust, suspicion and 
resentment towards government officials or a sense of intimidation caused by an 
attitude of arrogant superiority or tactlessness on the part of politicians and public 
servants would impair any attempt to promote community participation until these 
feelings are resolved or less intense. Indeed, even when people were psychological 
motivated and culturally inclined to play a part in discussions on community matters, 
why should they get involved with someone they feel does not deserve their respect?  
Without prejudice to this general principle, it was, however, encouraging to find out 
that despite a general lack of trust towards elected and non-elected government 
officials, the great majority of informally housed respondents expressed a strong 
desire to be involved in local government policy-making as well as cautiously 
optimistic expectations about what could be accomplished with their involvement. Last 
but not least, it is sometimes the case that government officials have a propensity to 
empathize and establish effective interpersonal relationships with some community 
members or groups more than with others, which is liable to create opportunities for 
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unrepresentative participation from the community of concern. While it is possible to 
argue (Verba et al., 1995:17) that ‘personal connections among acquaintances, 
friends and relatives . . . are still crucial for political recruitment’ and should not 
necessarily be regarded as unhealthy, it is important to remember that it is not only 
the number of participant citizens that counts but also, and most importantly, their 
representativeness. 
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Informally Housed People’s Competence: 
Neighbourhood Knowledge  
 
 
Assuming that poor people are willing to interact with local government officials and 
be part of the municipal decision-making that impacts on their lives, it is also 
necessary to consider what resources individual community members and the 
community collectively would bring into play. Accordingly, the present paragraph takes 
care of discussing the contribution that poor people would make to the local 
participatory process at individual level, while the next one focuses on the ability of the 
community as a whole to assist in, and influence, local governance constructively 
through effective participation. Before proceeding, it has to be noted that its theoretical 
underpinnings derive from Verba et al.’s (1995) analysis of strengths and weaknesses 
of ordinary individuals living in the United States, especially minorities, which are 
expected to affect the way in which people participate, in and contribute to , their 
government decision-making—suitably modified to address the different target 
population of this thesis. 
 
With regard to the abilities, or lack thereof, of individual community participants, which 
are deemed to affect the usefulness of the participation process substantially, there 
are two main factors that are regarded as most beneficial and whose lack would be 
detrimental. One concerns people’s understanding of the problems and priorities of 
the area in which they live (neighbourhood knowledge), which is expected to 
complement that of government officials or government-employed professionals 
(outsiders). The other is about people’s capacity to relate effectively to government 
officials (interpersonal and communication skills), which would enhance the possibility 
of directing government policies towards the needs and preferences of the 
community. As it is obvious that people living in the same area can vary widely in the 
ability to see what needs to be done for their community and to convince the 
government of their case, it is important to reflect on the factors that would be at the 
origin of these participation skills. It seems that two major elements—the first 
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regarding the level of formal education and the second the professional or voluntary 
experience in working with others to try to deal with some of the collective problems—
account for much of the creation of these skills. If this is so, a question arises 
immediately: as a limited level of formal education and professional or voluntary 
experience in team working would generally be found among the poorest section of 
the population, are there enough skills relevant to the participation process that can 
be tapped in the context of informal settlements? Someone who has a limited or no 
formal education would presumably be less skilful in communicating information, 
conveying knowledge and exerting some influence on the decision-makers—which is 
actually what has come to light in conversation with the 52 informally housed 
respondents (all of them with a limited school education ranging from Standard 5 
(Grade 7) to Standard 10 (Grade 12)) who were interviewed by the researcher in the 
course of the field surveys conducted for this thesis. Similarly, someone who has little 
or no experience in working with others, not only inside the realm of politics (e.g., 
taking part in meetings of political parties, working as volunteer in electoral campaigns 
or organizing protest marches), but also in non-political institutions (e.g., attending 
and being active participant in discussion groups or other group activities in the 
workplace, in the school context or within voluntary and religious associations) would 
probably have more difficulty in articulating his or her arguments and would probably 
be less persuasive. Besides having an impact on its efficacy, level of education and 
experience in working with others on issues of common concern are also likely to 
affect the feasibility itself of the participation process. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, someone who, because of illiteracy or inexperience, does not feel 
confident about participating in public gatherings where one is supposed to come 
forward and voice one’s opinions publicly would rather choose not to or to participate 
passively.  
 
Having said that, I believe that the fact that a lot of poor people may not be very good 
at presenting their concerns, conveying proposals and selling them to the decision-
makers is not evidence of their unpreparedness to play a part in the formulation of 
government policies relevant to them. My belief is primarily based on a principle that 
can be stated as follows: who is actually so ‘poor’ that he or she is incapable of 
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contributing to the development of society? Or, changing standpoint, who is so ‘rich’ 
that he or she requires no co-operation at all? Notwithstanding limited critical thinking 
and communication skills on the part of many people living in poverty, it is then 
important to realize that informal settlers have first-hand knowledge of the specific 
problems and priorities confronting their settlement, of which municipal government 
officials and assisting professionals may not be aware. Besides, what may be a 
prevalent characteristic of the members of a given community does not at all dismiss 
the possibility of finding a few skilful residents with the passion and ability to interact 
with the government in the interest of the whole community—as it is the case with a 
great deal of community representatives serving on the residents’ committees in all 
four informal settlements who were visited by the researcher during the field surveys 
conducted for this study. As it is suggested in the next paragraph entitled ‘Informally 
housed People’s Collective Power: Social Action Groups’, a general lack in individual 
skills relevant to the participation process may be counterbalanced or even 
outweighed by the abilities and power of poor people’s organizations, whether 
community-based or external, as long as they do their best to serve as valuable 
interfaces between local governments and informally housed communities. 
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Informally Housed People’s Collective Power: 
Social Action Groups 
 
 
The present paragraph concludes the analysis of the enabling conditions for involving 
informally housed communities in the local government policy-making that affects their 
lives. It deals with the collective, organized strength of informal settlers with the 
ultimate view to illustrating how it may serve to pressure local government into dealing 
with what matters to their community. Relying on Ndlovu (2004), Habib (2003), 
Gaventa (2002), Deakin (2001), Grzybowski (2001), Kothari (1999), Reid (1999), 
Salamon (1999), Edwards and Hulme (1995) and other works that emerge, the major 
questions that are addressed here are the following: why would it be better for 
informally housed communities to promote their interests and priorities through or with 
the assistance of organizations that are specifically dedicated to their cause? On what 
foundations should informally housed people’s action groups be based to serve better 
the interests of the people they are meant to serve? Finally, what practical actions 
should these organizations take to ensure a positive impact on the living conditions of 
the people living in informal settlements? 
 
Let me answer the first question by reflecting on why informally housed communities 
should be in need of organizations such as residents’ associations, religious charities, 
volunteer organizations, philanthropic institutions and the like that would be in a 
position specifically to represent their will and serve their cause over and above the 
efforts of leftist political parties. Raising this preliminary question seems justified 
because of the existence of a theory that is reported, but not supported by, Hall 
(1995:4), which affirms that ‘because everyone has access to political power, there 
should be neither political nor tactical reasons to resort to social movements or 
collective behaviour’. Also from my perspective, this statement rings hollow because it 
overlooks the fact that political parties, and all the more coalitions of parties, which 
have the political ambition to acquire and maintain the role of governing the national 
state or a local administration, are somehow compelled to consider and reward a 
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wider range of interests and concerns than those defended by poor people’s 
organizations. The consequence of this is that it is likely that the demands of the 
poorest segments of the population would be only partly, and perhaps not even that, 
addressed by political groups and politicians that are constantly engaged in collecting 
electoral consensus from the majority of the people and not only from a section of the 
electorate. In this respect, there is surely a need, in the context of South Africa, for 
informally housed people’s organizations that are prepared to champion the interests 
and rights of the communities they serve fully in view of the fact that the self-
proclaimed leftist ANC-led government has thus far been very much concerned with 
mediating among the diverse interests of its considerable electoral basis (nearly 70% 
of the electorate voted for the ANC in the 2004 national and provincial elections) that 
is increasingly made up of middle-class and upper-middle class voters. On top of that, 
it is argued (Kitschelt, 2003:81) that poor people’s movements are also needed so as 
to make up for the ‘decline in the trust and confidence of mass publics in . . . 
democratic institutions’, which may also very much be the case for less politically 
mature democracies such as those found in many parts of the developing world—
although this statement can by no way be limited to them. This decline in the trust of 
the people towards government institutions also applies to South Africa, especially at 
the level of ward representation in local government, as explicitly revealed or 
suggested by 11 out of 16 ordinary informally housed respondents and 35 out of 36 
community leaders who were interviewed by the researcher during the field surveys 
carried out for this study. As a matter of fact, problems with housing and service 
delivery, which plague the poorest areas of the CTMM, were attributed to negligent 
and allegedly corrupt ward councillors who are said by many informally housed 
respondents to be good only at making vote-catching promises which they regularly 
fail to maintain. In the words of one respondent, their ward councillor is someone who 
‘may convene a meeting with the community, tell some lies to the people and then 
disappear until the time is good again for other lies’. 
 
Once agreement is reached on the general need for informally housed people’s 
organizations in addition to political parties of the left, it is necessary to establish the 
foundations on which these organizations should rest in order to work to the 
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advantage of the people they are expected to serve. Assuming that they operate 
within the context of a political system that ensures freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, freedom of assembly and other civil liberties, it is critical that informally 
housed people’s organizations develop their force in at least two directions: 
representation and networking. As regards representation, it is important that these 
organizations foster grassroots participation to guide and support their actions and 
increase their legitimacy. If they failed to do so, two serious problems would likely 
jeopardize their chances of being recognized as legitimate spokespersons of the 
people and achieve pro-community results. The first problem would be the 
development of a self-serving mentality, which tends to induce organizations allegedly 
concerned with the plight of the poor to take up actions ‘that may possibly be 
antithetical to the needs of the people’ they claim to serve, Kloss and Roberts 
(1974:11) remark. The second problem would be an increase in paternalistic modes, 
which may lead to unresponsive activities in spite of sincere intensions to provide 
relief to the community. As regards networking, it is important that informally housed 
people’s organizations try to get organized around networks at local, national and, if 
possible, international level, not only for mutual assistance and support, but with a 
view to ‘configur[ing] dominant processes and functions in our societies’, as it can be 
inferred by Castells (2000:501). Actually, global networks of poor people’s 
organizations would be particularly worthwhile—though logistically and financially 
difficult—considering the fact that many of the problems afflicting hundreds of millions 
of poor people living in developing world metropolises such as Johannesburg, Rio de 
Janeiro, Moscow or Bangkok as well as in rural villages throughout the South have 
their roots in the political and economic structures and processes that tend to polarize 
the world into haves and have-nots—a restatement of Marx’s famous dictum may be 
relevant here: ‘poor people’s movements of all countries unite!’ In this respect, the bad 
news for the future is that, in a globalizing world, the ‘winners’ of the planet would 
close their ranks in order to maintain the status quo everywhere or allow only a minor 
redistribution of power and resources to the poor. Similarly, the good news for the 
future is that in a globalizing world, the ‘losers’ of the earth would also find increased 
representation at international level: Northern NGOs, for instance, are not only 
‘challenging the policies of their governments and of the corporations and multilateral 
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institutions that are perceived to block, undermine, or co-opt ‘genuine’ development 
initiatives’, as maintained by Nyamugasira (2002:8-9), but are increasingly joining 
forces with poor people’s organizations of the South in order to redress the policies of 
national and local governments of developing countries that create and sustain social 
inequities.  
 
Bearing in mind that the achievement of an adequate degree of representation and 
networking is of fundamental importance to informally housed people’s organizations, 
the third question is addressed, namely, what ‘end-user’ activities they are expected 
to undertake in order to seek to achieve physical, social and economic improvements 
for the people they represent. Broadly speaking, informally housed people’s 
organizations can engage in direct actions (delivery of services) or indirect actions 
(advocacy). Direct actions are meant to support the needy by providing them with 
access to clean water, food, clothing, clinics, schools, housing, sanitation, social 
services, employment opportunities or microfinance schemes, to name but a few. 
Indirect actions, instead, are intended to influence the thinking and actions of policy-
makers at various levels by more or less confrontational or collaborative means such 
as, for example, marches, rallies, lawsuits, awareness campaigns or direct liaison with 
government bodies. Of course, the actual impact of both direct and indirect activities 
depends on the support, or rather the lack of it, received from the social, economic 
and political environment in which poor people’s organizations operate, which needs 
to be examined in the context of continuing competition for power, that is, the struggle 
for ‘the resource whose possession allows the allocation of every other politically 
distributable resource’, as Zolo (1992:44) puts it. In fact, it is contended (Burghardt, 
1982:17) that a ‘strategy that improves people’s lives must, despite all the nice 
phrases, be rooted in politics, either explicitly or implicitly’. What is this competition for 
power all about? Let me attempt to answer this question by drawing attention to the 
major stumbling blocks posed to the efforts of poor people’s organizations to build 
constructive relations with, and gain support from, both the general public and political 
decision-makers so as to be able to engage effectively in one type of activity or 
another. As regards the efforts to win the favour of the general public, it is worth 
noting that what is at stake is not only fundraising support for the several poverty-
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alleviation projects of the various NGOs, volunteer organizations, religious charities, 
CBOs, residents’ committees and other poor people’s action groups but also, and 
most importantly, public consent for profound social changes in favour of the poorest 
section of the population. In this respect, despite evidence of a general determination 
of the public to spare something for the organizations that support the less fortunate, 
the attempts of poor people’s movements to create the conditions for the democratic 
delegitimization of polarized societies in which masses of poor people strive to survive 
and privileged minorities bask in luxury beyond reason appear so far to have bounced 
back or produced little impact. With regard to the endeavour to achieve support from 
the political decision-makers, it is, once again, worth considering that it is not so much 
to secure grants or service contracts from the various tiers of government but rather to 
cause the political administrations—be it municipal, district, provincial or national—to 
rethink their budget allocation priorities and embark on courageous anti-poverty 
policies they normally would not take. In this respect, poor people’s organizations are 
certainly engaged in a mammoth battle: while serving the interests of the poor, which 
constitute a great deal, if not the majority, of the population in most developing 
countries, the struggle of poor people’s movements for improving living conditions and 
opportunities for the poor poses a serious threat to the powerful interests of economic 
potentates, ‘feudal barons’ and the upper middle class who profit and sometimes 
profiteer from the status quo. Because their interests are drastically different from 
those of the classes at the opposite end of society, privileged groups have a 
propensity to resist in one way or another the requests of the masses by way of 
pressing governments at local, national or international level to protect the resources 
at their disposal and their ambitions for the future rather than being more responsive 
to the needs of the deprived multitude. And especially where government’s elected 
and non-elected officials are personally tied to, or are themselves part of, a powerful 
economic elite, the chances of poor people’s movements winning decisive political 
support are likely to be very much against them. But while acknowledging that the 
prospects of poor people’s organizations to fight against the concentration of 
economic and political power are uncertain or perhaps even dark in some cases, I still 
believe that they are not illusory: their chances of bringing about fundamental social 
changes are still concrete insofar as direct actions to alleviate poverty are associated 
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with augmented pressure on both the general public and the political decision-makers 
so as to mainstream the interests of the poor into government policies. The stakes are 
high, for what is involved in this struggle for power is the humanization of the 
miserable results of certain double-edged trends of history such as industrialization, 
urbanization and globalization, which are particularly apparent in the countries and 
cities of the developing world. 
 
What follows is a discussion of the characteristics of pro-poor associational life in 
post-apartheid South Africa with reference to selected national and local organizations 
claiming to act on behalf of the poor. In this respect, it is first of all worth pointing out 
that South Africa’s formal transition to non-racial democracy that took place in 1994 
had to make significant changes in the way in which civics organize themselves and 
operate. As noted by Zuern (2004:1), ‘civil society organisations were expected to 
shift their focus from a largely conflictual, if not outright hostile, relationship with the 
state, to now play a more supportive role’, which is also presented by the same author 
as a ‘transition from protest to development’. A dramatic challenge particularly faced 
by the most popular national civic movement, the South African National Civic 
Organization (SANCO), which had ‘demonstrated its greatest strength through 
popular mobilisation against the apartheid state’, Zuern (2004:1) remarks. Established 
in March 1992 as a network of local associations with the intention of giving them a 
stronger voice and additional bargaining power, what exactly is present-day SANCO, 
which claims ‘to represent 4000 local branches’, as reported by Heller and 
Ntlokonkulu (2001:9), has become a controversial subject. On the one hand, some 
analysts (Zuern, 2004:2) describe SANCO as a ‘hierarchical organisation in which 
institutional structures constrain the aspirations of lower level community actors. On 
the other hand, others (Heller and Ntlokonkulu, 2001:12) hold the view that SANCO’s 
branches ‘operate quite independently of higher structures and in many cases have 
been able to nurture significant levels of community participation’. What seems less 
questionable is instead the ability, or lack thereof, of SANCO to act as an independent 
‘watchdog’ monitoring the actions of the government and holding it accountable when 
it fails. This is the product of its close relationship with the party in power—in the face 
of the fact that ‘SANCO leaders insisted at the outset that the new movement should 
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refrain from pledging loyalty to any party’, as recounted by Lodge (2002:207)—which 
has resulted in the ‘rapid absorption of SANCO’s leadership into ANC and 
government structures, blurring its ability to influence government policy and 
emasculating its independence’, Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001:12) contend. In fact, 
SANCO has so far been rather cautious in its criticism of the government and 
continually restates its support for the ANC, not only at national, but also, and perhaps 
even more unambiguously, at local level as evidenced by the ‘clear directives that all 
SANCO structures were to support the ANC’s election efforts’ (with the addendum 
that ‘any SANCO official or branch that sponsored independent candidates or 
opposed the ANC would be expelled’), which were issued by the national office in the 
run-up to the December 2000 local elections, Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001:19) inform. 
This reality should be regarded as unfortunate because it virtually prevents the largest 
civil society organization in the country from acting as ‘a countervailing force’ to the 
‘dominant party’s power’, Friedman (1999:116) suggests. As a result, it did not take 
long before internal tensions over the appropriate degree of civic autonomy and 
support, or rather opposition, to the ANC began to generate rebellious sentiments 
within SANCO which led to the secession of quite a few affiliate organizations and the 
formation of new breakaway civic structures with either a national scope (most 
notably, the National Association of Residents and Civic Organizations, which is 
viewed by Huchzermeyer (1999:131) as having ‘no political affiliation’) or a local 
one—although this did not prevent SANCO branches from continuing to constitute 
(together with ANC branches) the ‘most conspicuous ingredient’ of local associational 
life, as reported by Lodge (2002:221). 
 
A few year after the appearance of SANCO (for the record, it was in 1994), the South 
African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF)—which is today a national alliance of 
over 1 500 autonomous community-based organizations rooted in informal 
settlements and a small support NGO called People’s Dialogue on Land and 
Shelter—was formed in response to a need for a system of networking at the level of 
informal settlements. Unlike SANCO, SAHPF (or uMfelandaWonye, which literally 
means ‘we die together’) is an ‘organization that has no political affiliation but is rooted 
in an affirmation of the dignity and the strength of the homeless poor’, Bolnick 
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(1996:157) contends. SAHPF deserves to be praised for at least three reasons. One 
is the creation of an exchange programme to share experiences, alternatives and 
solutions both nationally (between info rmally housed communities that belong to the 
alliance) and internationally (with slum dweller organizations from Asia, Africa and 
Latin America), which is regarded by Baumann et al. (2004:200) as capable of 
providing ‘the confidence to overcome problems, the insight to abandon traditional 
solutions and the knowledge to address critical issues’. The second is the 
establishment of a national housing finance institution (uTshani Fund) owned and 
managed by the SAHPF, which is not only said (Bolnick, 1996:158) to have the 
capacity to ‘make a material difference to the lives of those who are most often 
excluded socially and politically’ but also (Baumann et al., 2004:200) to provide ‘the 
glue to bring community members together’. And the third, though to an apparently 
much lesser degree, is the pursuit of a strategy of critical engagement with 
government not only with a view to having its core activities supported but also, and 
perhaps most importantly, with the intention of ‘preventing evictions, stopping 
harassment [and] seeking alternative land’ for the long-term benefit of the people it 
represents, Bolnick (1996:167) explains. 
 
Besides nationally coordinated poor people’s organizations, autonomous community 
groups that do not belong to any national network or whatsoever also represent a very 
common, if not the most common, and lively means of associational life in South 
African informal settlements, as suggested by Pieterse (2003) and ascertained by the 
researcher during the field surveys conducted for this study. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that informally housed residents’ associations are quite diversified, ranging 
from a general committee dealing with a wide spectrum of issues of concern to the 
community to special-purpose committees or sub-committees dealing, for example, 
with crime, youth development or women’s affairs. With regard to the issue of 
representation of residents’ organizations operating in the informal settlements, it can 
be said that it was a pleasant surprise to the researcher to see that in all four informal 
settlements visited during the field surveys that there were representative committees 
(both general and special-purpose) made up of residents who are not only elected at 
mass meetings but who also keep the community informed and get their feedback on 
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a regular basis trough public meetings that are usually attended by some hundreds of 
concerned residents. This is important in that it offers the municipal government an 
opportunity to engage these organizations with a reasonable assurance that they 
provide a mouthpiece for the poorest of the poor to voice their views on matters 
affecting them. When it comes to the issue of networking, it clearly emerged from the 
field surveys that not only is there a lack of coordination among the committees of 
different informal settlements but even a general scarcity of awareness of what goes 
on in other settlements with similar characteristics—thus calling for concerted efforts 
on the part of both informally housed community representatives and concerned 
outsiders to try to create associations of informally housed residents’ committees with 
the object of enhancing information exchanges among the association members and 
forming solid alliances, especially at local (municipal) level, to advocate their shared 
rights to live a normal life. This would be particularly important given the fact that most 
community proposals or complaints receive little or no consideration by government 
officials at various levels, particularly by the ward councillors—as reported by the 
great majority of informally housed respondents (both community leaders and ordinary 
residents) who were interviewed by the researcher during the field surveys 
undertaken for this study. 
  
As part of the discussion on poor people’s collective power, it is also worth speaking 
of the participative role that traditional leadership can play in rural governance in post-
apartheid South Africa with particular reference to understanding whether or not they 
may play a part (in rural areas falling under traditional leaders such as kings, queens, 
chiefs, headmen and headwomen) that is similar to that played by poor people’s 
organizations in the urban setting—this time for the benefit of millions of informally 
housed rural people. In this respect, it is important to point out that post-1994 
constitutional and legislative provisions have been adopted, not only for restoring the 
integrity and legitimacy of traditional leadership, but also to define its place and role 
within the new system of democratic governance. For this reason, South African 
traditional leaders should in principle no longer be regarded as independent (local) 
government institutions—as was the case in the apartheid-era homelands or 
Bantustans—but rather equated with civil society organizations whose functions and 
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responsibilities especially, but not exclusively, with regard to local governance and 
land administration have been institutionalised—though this does not imply that 
traditional leaders would , in fact, be true representatives of, and play an effective 
development role in, their communities, as suggested, for example, by Ntsebeza 
(2005:69-70). To begin with, the supreme law of the country clarifies in section 211 
that traditional leadership and customary law shall remain ‘subject to’, and not conflict 
with, the Constitution and any applicable legislation. This is particularly relevant at the 
level of local government in that section 151 provides for the establishment of 
municipalities (whose executive and legislative authority is vested in their elected 
municipal council) ‘for the whole of the territory of the Republic’. It is then handed over 
to national and provincial legislatures (section 212) the responsibility of ‘provid[ing] for 
a role for traditional leaders as an institution at local level on matters affecting local 
communities’ as well as ‘for the establishment of [provincial] houses . . . [and a 
national] council of traditional leaders’. The White Paper on Local Government of 
1998 provides one of the first attempts at clarifying the relationship between traditional 
leadership and elected local government in areas inhabited by traditional rural 
communities. In section D(4) of this White Paper, it is recommended a co-operative 
model that ‘combines the natural capacities of both traditional and elected local 
government to advance the development of rural areas and communities’ in all areas 
falling under traditional leadership. Accordingly, it is not only put forward that ‘[b]oth 
district and local municipal Councils must inform and consult traditional leaders 
regarding municipal projects or programmes within the traditional leaders' area’ but 
also that traditional leadership ‘will have representation on such Councils’. The 
recommendations of the aforesaid White Paper have been incorporated in the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 which establishes in section 81(1) that 
‘traditional leaders must be allowed to attend and participate in any meeting of the 
council’ (though the number of traditional leaders that may participate in the 
proceedings of a municipal council may not exceed 10%, later increased to 20%, of 
the number of councillors, as stated in section 81(2)(b)) and makes clear in section 
81(3) that ‘[b]efore a municipal council takes a decision on any matter directly 
affecting the area of a traditional authority, the council must give the leader of that 
authority the opportunity to express a view on that matter’. As Pycroft (2002:121) puts 
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it, ‘this right to consultation does not undermine the rural municipality’s constitutional 
pre-eminence to determine how land should be used and how state development 
resources should be deployed within the council’s area’. The scope for participative 
decision-making involving traditional leadership is further specified in the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act of 1998 which makes provision in section 
29(1)(b)(iii) for traditional authorities ‘to be identified and consulted on the drafting of 
the integrated development plan’ of a municipality. More recently, the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government has issued the White Paper on Traditional 
Leadership and Governance (2003), which moves from the premise that ‘traditional 
leadership [is] to work closely with government in the reconstruction and development 
of rural areas’, as stated in the foreword by the chairperson of the task team that 
helped finalise the paper. In the same document, it is also unambiguously confirmed 
(chapter 2) that ‘traditional leadership has to function in a manner that embraces 
democracy and contributes to the entrenchment of a democratic culture, thus 
enhancing its own status and legitimacy amongst the people’. 
 
All these policies and legislations require a transformation of the institution of 
traditional leadership to conform to the constitutional principles such as democracy, 
non-sexism and non-discrimination that have begun to be dealt with in the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 (Framework Act) and the 
Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 (CLRB). According to section 3(1) of the 
Framework Act, a community that is recognised by the Premier of a province as a 
traditional community, that is, a community that it ‘is subject to a system of traditional 
leadership . . . and observes a system of customary law’, as stated in section 2(1), 
‘must establish a traditional council’, which will have responsibility over different 
aspects of rural development including: ‘administering the affairs of the traditional 
community in accordance with customs and tradition’; ’supporting municipalities in the 
identification of community needs’; ‘facilitating the involvement of the traditional 
community in the development or amendment of the integrated development plan of a 
municipality’; and ‘participating in the development of policy and legislation at local 
level, as set out in section 4(1). But the new idea is that the members of a traditional 
council must not only comprise traditional leaders and members of the traditional 
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community selected by the senior traditional leader but also ‘other members of the 
traditional community who are democratically elected for a term of five years, and who 
must constitute 40% of the members of the traditional council’, as stated in section 
3(2)(c)(ii). What is more, ‘at least a third of the members of a traditional council must 
be women’, as set forth in section 3(2)(b). On top of that, a traditional council is, 
among other things, to ‘keep proper records’; ‘have its financial statements audited’; 
‘adhere to the code of conduct’; ‘co-operate with any relevant ward committee’; and 
‘meet at least once a year with its traditional community to give account of the 
activities and finances of the traditional council’, as stated in sections 4(2) and 4(3). 
Complementarily, the CLRB provides for the democratic allocation and administration 
of communal land by traditional communities. Section 5(1) requires that communal 
land ‘must be registered in the name of the community . . . entitled to such land’. The 
community whose communal land is registered in its name is then required to ‘make 
and adopt its community rules [that regulate the use of communal land] and have 
them registered’, as set out in section 19(1)—rules that ‘are binding on the community 
and its members and must be accessible to the public’, as stipulated in section 19(3). 
It is also provided in section 21 that a traditional community ‘must establish a land 
administration committee’ (whose duties may be performed by the aforesaid 
traditional council), which represents and acts on behalf of a community owing 
communal land. 
 
Unfortunately, what seems to the researcher a balanced and conciliatory attitude on 
the part of government to transforming the institution of traditional leadership in line 
with the constitutional principles of democracy and equality, which is reflected in the 
aforesaid laws and policies, is not shared by all. In fact, it is severely criticized by 
opposite sides for granting too much or too little power to traditional leaders. Ntsebeza 
(2005:59), for example, holds the opinion that government has made too many 
concessions to traditional authorities, ‘effectively resuscitating the powers they 
enjoyed under the notorious Bantu Authorities Act of 1951’. On the contrary, it is 
reported (Reddy, 2004: 35) that the majority of the amakhosi (Zulu for leaders) are of 
the view that the government has made too little in support of traditional leadership 
and believe that ‘traditional authorities should be the municipalities in their areas’, with 
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the same powers and functions as all other local government authorities. In this 
respect, while it can be argued (Ismail et al., 1997:135) that ‘in a democracy we are 
making a serious mistake if we deny some people the right to their customs’, it is also 
important to make sure that traditional leadership—especially in the light of its being 
hereditary and consequently not subject to the electoral process—does not conflict 
with governance principles such as democratic representation, participative decision-
making, accountability, gender equity and respect for human rights if grave 
consequences for the prospect of democracy and development to the benefit of all, 
particularly the rural poor, are to be avoided. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Practical Issues in Involving 
Informally Housed Communities 
 
 
If only they [government officials] were willing to put 
themselves in our shoes for a while, they would 
understand what it means living down here. If they 
just spent more time with us, they would stop doing 
what they usually do and start pushing for a solution 
that ensures a more decent living for all of us. 
 
Simon Mthombeni 
Informally Housed Settler 
‘Plastic View’, Soshanguve, February 2005 
  
 
The previous chapter examines the conditions for involving the poorest section of the 
population in shaping local government policies. The present chapter pays attention to 
the practical process of involving the poor. Put differently, it considers how the 
previously discussed political and social circumstances that would benefit the 
participation process can translate into practices that would harness the development 
potential of participative governance while reducing to a minimum its negative by-
products. More precisely, this chapter, firstly, provides a review of such forms of 
participation as an ombudsman, public meetings and residents’ committees and 
discusses their specific relevance, or lack thereof, to communities living in informal 
settlements. It then examines a further set of practical issues (i.e., stakeholders to be 
engaged, degree of participation, timing of involvement and topics for which public 
debate may be sought) that need to be carefully worked through in the implementation 
of community participation. Finally, it elaborates on how to go about evaluating the 
participation process. It should also be noted that in the attempt to accomplish the 
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second objective of this thesis, the present chapter gives special attention to the  
South African context. In view of this, it also relies on the opinions, feelings and 
experiences collected from a group of interviewees—government officials and 
informally housed residents working for, or living within, the boundaries of the City of 
Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM)—who were asked by the 
researcher to offer practical suggestions on the best way to tackle the involvement of 
communities living in poverty. In a nutshell, the outcome of the present chapter is the 
identification of a set of practical guidelines on how to proceed with the involvement of 
informally-housed communities in South Africa, which needs to be combined with the  
political and social circumstances, discussed in the previous chapter, that benefit the 
participation process. 
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Forms of Involvement 
 
 
Let me begin by saying that I am not aware of an absolute best way in which to 
engage the poor in public management—the only golden rule that may have general 
applicability is that the choice of the form of involvement should be determined by the 
purpose to which community participation is going to be put. Accordingly, while 
exploring selected tools that can be employed to involve informally housed 
communities in the government planning that affects their lives, the researcher is 
ultimately concerned with linking each of these tools to the goal to which they relate. 
But before I get to the core of the matter and discuss a few forms of participation that 
are deemed appropriate to engage the poor, let me take up what I hinted at in the 
paragraph in Chapter 5, which is entitled ‘Local Government’s Capacity: 
Decentralization of Power and Resources’. As mentioned there, given the many and 
varied difficulties involved in figuring out what and how to do with informal settlements, 
it is important that there be proper decentralization (and specialization) of the local 
government structure so as to pool and coordinate the necessary expertise. In 
particular, it is advisable that there be in place a unit or an agency in charge of 
planning, coordinating and implementing local government responses to the diverse 
range of physical, social, economic and environmental challenges pertaining to 
informal settlements—including the responsibility of defining, promoting and managing 
mechanisms of public involvement. Having recalled the importance to have a 
dedicated municipal team to be tasked and funded to develop informal areas and 
liaise with informally housed communities, hereafter referred to as Informal Settlement 
Management Unit (ISMU), let me now turn my attention to what this unit should do in 
order to meet its specific responsibilities in the matter of community participation—
responsibilities that ought to be clearly set out in municipal policies and by-laws. 
 
The first priority of the ISMU should be to build awareness among its personnel—both 
senior managers and front-line staff—about participative governance principles and 
practices and to adopt appropriate incentives (and penalties) for the staff to apply 
what they are taught. As to awareness building (or capacity building on the design and 
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management of public participation processes), it involves conferences, workshops, 
discussion groups, manuals and other ways of educating ISMU staff, not only on 
potential advantages (and disadvantages) of community participation and efficacious 
ways to implement it, but also on how to attempt to renovate all sorts of attitudes and 
behaviours (e.g., lack of enthusiasm, commitment, flexibility, empathy with all parties, 
receptiveness, readiness to help and social feeling) that may hinder the participation 
process. As to incentives for ISMU staff to adopt participative approaches to project 
design and implementation, it would entail an adjustment of the evaluation parameters 
used to assess the performance of the personnel (and consequently decide on their 
salary increases and promotions) so as to include measurable indicators of the level 
of community participation in the decision-making under their control. Incidentally, it is 
worth adding that both awareness building and material incentives aimed at promoting 
community participation should concern the whole municipal administration (especially 
officials further up the ladder in all municipal departments) and not only ISMU staff. It 
would, in effect, be rather difficult to imagine that the ISMU team would have enough 
motivation to consider engaging with the community without visible support from 
higher-ranking officials such as heads and deputies of departments who are 
themselves informed and persuaded about the potential benefits of and ways to 
implement community participation. 
 
The second priority of the ISMU should be to build awareness among residents of 
informal settlements about the participation options made available to them by the 
municipality. This is complementary to what has just been discussed since even well-
conceived by-laws and implementation manuals to improve community participation 
would not produce the intended results if the target communities were not quite aware 
of any such policies. The task of informing informally housed communities as to why, 
how and when they could get involved in the government policy-making (or 
administrative assistance to community participation) may involve a broader range of 
instruments than those usually employed for communicating with the citizenry in 
general. Along with publicizing open government legislation and advertising scheduled 
public meetings and other participation opportunities by distributing pamphlets, 
making use of the local press, radio and the like, government’s request for public 
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participation targeting residents of informal settlements should also be made through 
more direct channels of communication aimed first of all at giving the people a feeling 
of acceptance and welcome. If regular consultations and co-operation with informally 
housed communities are to be developed, it is important that at least some community 
representatives be kept personally updated by government officials on the possible 
ways and purposes of getting involved with their municipal administration as well as 
encouraged to participate. In this regard, however, it is worth putting emphasis on the 
fact that while interacting only or primarily with community leaders is expected to 
increase the efficiency of the participation process, it may not be able to guarantee 
adequate representativeness of the general community. This point is further 
developed in the following paragraph under the section entitled ‘Stakeholders to Be 
Engaged’. 
 
Finally, the third priority of the ISMU should be to define the practical mechanics of 
participation, that is, to identify appropriate forms of involvement to provide informally 
housed communities with the opportunity to inte ract with the government in one way 
or another, depending on the ultimate desired goal of the participation process. While 
the choice of a suitable form of participation depends on the goal it is supposed to 
achieve, all participative governance arrangements are expected to be rooted in two 
basic concerns. First, governments are to make clear from the beginning what the aim 
of the participation process is, specifying the input expected from the communities 
living in informal settlements and be precise about how they intend to implement the 
process. As contended by Stewart (1976:72), ‘most of the unfortunate results seem to 
stem from failure to determine in advance what [communities] are supposed to do’. 
Second, while government officials are to do their best to encourage informally 
housed communities to voice their own opinions and concerns, it is also important that 
they find a simple way in which to let the people know what development opportunities 
they have, without dictating to them, and doing so on a regular basis. Given their 
supposed knowledge of the wider implications of alternative development options, 
local officials are not only expected to heed spontaneous ideas and proposals that 
may arise from resident communities but ‘need to have the flexibility and creativity to 
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encourage a variety of technical and managerial possibilities such that individuals and 
communities can choose what suit them best’, Shepherd (1998:203) maintains.  
 
The rest of the paragraph covers some practical ways that would trigger no-nonsense 
participation from communities living in informal settlements. A variety of surveys and 
analysis made by Burke (1968), Stewart (1976), Conyers (1982), Hughes (1985), 
Finlayson (1986), Clayton (1995), Abbott (1996), Das Gupta et al. (2000), Howell  and 
Leatherman (2000), Meyer and Theron (2000), Long (2001) and Rifkin and Pridmore 
(2001) were used and a lot of information, views, concerns and feelings of the 
respondents—both government officials and informal settlers of the CTMM—who 
were asked by the researcher to assess current practices and make practical 
recommendations to improve relations between local government and informally 
housed communities during the field surveys undertaken for this study were taken into 
consideration. As a result, three relevant forms of involvement have been singled out. 
It is also worth adding that these three mechanisms to achieve community 
participation in the context of informal settlements are not mutually exclusive and can 
be combined so as to suit local circumstances better.  
 
Ombudsman 
 
A first form of involvement would occur through the office of an ombudsman (a 
gender-neutral loan word from Swedish meaning ‘complaint handling’) that is 
prepared to be readily available and easily accessible to informally housed 
communities. The office of the ombudsman may in principle be either a section of the 
ISMU, a unit of the municipal bureaucracy or a local office of a national or provincial 
institution—the theory being that the more independent and decentralized an 
ombudsman office the better the chance of fulfilling its mandate effectively. The 
ombudsman requires adequate personnel who are suitably educated and trained to 
handle a wide range of grievances, frustrations and inquiries brought to them by 
people living in informal settlements. It is the job of the ombudsman (or local public 
protector) to exhaustively investigate complainant’s claims against the municipal 
administration and its elected or non-elected officials at all levels so as to come up 
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with valuable conclusions in the form of either informal guidelines for the parties to 
settle the dispute, official recommendations on how to sort out the problem or refer the 
case to other local or higher-level government offices or institutions whenever deemed 
necessary. A toll-free telephone line for lodging complaints and direct access to 
conveniently located venues where aggrieved residents of informal settlements may 
submit their claims to an investigator or perhaps put them in an input box would be 
greatly instrumental in facilitating operational flexibility and informality. Additionally, it 
would be of great help to the ombudsman to supplement spontaneous complaints 
recorded by its personnel (complaints register) with the information elicited by opinion 
surveys of the community at large (register for suggestions). Various questionnaires 
may be used, not only with the object of ascertaining grievances of the people on 
anything that they perceive as unfair or improper governance practice, but also to 
promote a more positive (rather than accusatory) form of community participation. The 
office of the ombudsman has the advantage to make it easy for interested informally 
housed individuals to establish contacts with their local government, which would 
result in a quantitatively large amount of input for a better government decision-
making. On the other hand, it is by its own nature liable to be a mediated way to 
involve the community, since it is likely to limit to a minimum the opportunity for the 
public to debate specific issues of interest and engage in regular negotiation sessions 
with the appropriate government offices. 
 
In South Africa, the ombudsman is called Public Protector. The Public Protector is one 
of the ‘independent state institutions supporting constitutional democracy’ and 
therefore subject only to the Constitution and the law, as stated in chapter 9 of the 
supreme law of the country. The Public Protector is appointed by the President of the 
Republic on the recommendation of a qualified majority of the National Assembly and 
is charged with the broad responsibility of investigating any act or omission on the part 
of government agencies and officials (both elected and non-elected) in any sphere of 
government that result in prejudice to a citizen. Although the office of the Public 
Protector is not in possession of any coercive authority, it has the power to make all 
necessary investigations and then take all proper steps such as recommending 
corrective actions, engaging in mediation between the parties or referring cases to 
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other state institutions (all the above known as extra-judicial powers) in order to 
resolve grievances over maladministration, reprehensible conduct, abuse of power 
and corruption as indicated by the Public Protector Act of 1994. While it is clear by its 
wide scope of control over the executive power that the South African Public Protector 
can in principle make a substantial contribution in protecting the people from any 
government wrongdoing—even when it falls ‘into the frequently grey and ill-defined 
area of ethics, where a law may not have been transgressed, but where the 
community’s sense of right and wrong is offended’, as noted by Pienaar (2000:60)—it 
is important to call into question its actual relevance to indigent communities such as 
those living in informal settlements. In this regard, the good news is that any 
aggrieved person or community is entitled to submit a complaint to the office of the 
Public Protector without any complicated procedures being involved and have it 
investigated and responded to at no cost. The bad news, however, seems so far to 
have outweighed the good by great margin: first, it took some years before provincial 
offices were established in each of the nine provinces of South Africa even though the 
national office of the Public Protector came into being on 1 October 1995; second, the 
current number of investigators is about as low as one per million people ; third, and 
more importantly, at present there are no regional offices open with the only exception 
of those operating in North West Province. These are stark facts that speak for 
themselves. Since almost no localized venues for lodging complaints are currently in 
existence, it is no surprise that the totality of the informally housed respondents 
interviewed by the researcher in the course of the field surveys carried out for this 
study had no idea, or only the vaguest, of what the office of the Public Protector was 
all about and how they could avail themselves of its services—notwithstanding the 
fact that all provincial offices have embarked on rolling out outreach programmes in 
various districts under their jurisdiction. Once informed by the researcher of the legal 
and constitutional mandate of the office of the Public Protector, however, most 
interviewees seemed highly excited by, or at least interested in, the prospect of 
approaching an independent institution outside the local government bureaucracy to 
voice their long list of unresolved grievances in an informal way and free of charge. 
But in this respect, it is important to remember that the office of the Public Protector is 
regarded as the office of last resort, which should be approached by aggrieved 
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persons or communities only once all other avenues in government have been 
unsuccessfully exhausted. 
 
In fact, South Africa’s municipalities are expected to have developed their own public 
complaint management systems and processes to handle citizens’ grievances and 
increase their confidence and involvement in local government. In relation to this, the 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (sections 36-41) provides for 
each municipal council to elect from among its members a chairperson (the Speaker) 
who must, among other things, ensure compliance in the council, subcouncils and 
council committees (most notably in the ward committees) with the Code of Conduct 
set out for councillors under schedule 5 of the same act. With this purpose in mind, 
the Speaker may authorize an investigation of allegations of non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Code and report the findings to the municipal council for action 
against a breaching councillor—action that may occur in the form of formal warning, 
reprimand, fine, suspension or removal from office, the latter two following 
pronouncement of the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for local government 
of the province in which the municipality is situated. When public complaints have to 
do with mismanagement or incompetence involving council employees, the Speaker 
may as well conduct an investigation and report the findings to the Municipal Manager 
and the Mayoral Committee for appropriate measures to be adopted, if necessary, or 
try to bring all parties involved around a table and sort things out in order to protect 
the rights of the community to adequate services. Being a municipal institution, the 
Speaker has a more decentralized structure than the Public Protector. In the CTMM, it 
has regional offices in all major areas. That notwithstanding, all four informally housed 
communities visited by the researcher during the field surveys undertaken for this 
thesis are minimally aware of the responsibilities of the office of the Speaker and how 
they could benefit from it. In fact, it could be easily seen that the interaction between 
the Speaker and informally housed communities is very poorly conducted in the 
CTMM. This can be attributed to a shortage of awareness-building measures used by 
the Speaker to inform the informally housed population about its role and importance 
for the community but it is also tied to a more disturbing inability, which is apparent 
especially among some of the Speaker’s regional managers, to ensure that informally 
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housed communities recognize the Speaker as a super partes institution that makes 
every reasonable effort to advocate for corrective government action to be taken to 
address unattended needs of the people living in abject poverty and not just as 
another ruling party structure that does its best to defend parochial interests. As a 
matter of fact, some of the Speaker’s regional managers are perceived by the greater 
part of the informally housed interviewees as being accomplices with elected and non-
elected government officials in ignoring the needs of the informally housed 
community. What impairs the objectivity and independence of judgement of some of 
the Speaker’s regional managers seems their alleged excessive familiarity with the 
various municipal officials, which is summarized by one respondent in the sentence 
‘they drink beer together!’ 
 
Public Meetings 
 
If it is to be ensured that a non-mediated information flow between government and 
informally housed communities occurs promptly and lasts over time, what is needed is 
a different form of engagement that allows for the simultaneous presence and 
interaction of all interested parties. A public meeting or, better, a regular series of 
public meetings where both informally housed individuals and relevant municipal 
officials have the opportunity to speak out and make clear what they care about would 
probably fill the bill. It is important that public meetings be held with some regularity in 
order to seek to promote satisfactory progress. The content of the debates, instead, is 
expected to evolve over time. Initial meetings would serve to establish an ambience of 
trust and mutual respect and enable all parties to speak about their priorities and 
goals for the future. Subsequent meetings would allow all parties to educate other 
participants about project proposals and ongoing projects and discuss in detail what 
they want or can do, how and when. It would also be important that public meetings 
form an interlocking process. A summary of the proceedings should be laid down in 
writing and shared with participants and, if possible, with the rest of the residents as 
part of a process that would enable the whole community to follow the progress and 
later assemblies to take due heed of previous directions. As regards the gathering 
place, it is imperative that public meetings intended for informally housed communities 
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be hold within their settlement, or as close to where they live as possible, so as not to 
discourage participation. As it is remarked by Meyer and Theron (2000:94), ‘[p]ublic 
participation often fails due to a lack of logistical arrangements’. The timing is also 
very important. In most informal settlements, weekend mornings are the only possible 
option in view of the fact that evening sessions are impractical due to the lack of 
electricity that most informal settlements face. Attendance by the community would 
also be fostered by the involvement of higher echelons of the municipal and provincial 
administration—first of all, the ward councillor. One of the main advantages of public 
meetings is that they are open to anyone who is willing to attend, which would result in 
a fair section of the population to have a chance to speak to and hear from the 
government directly without going through community representatives or residents’ 
committees—although many people feel uncomfortable speaking in front of large 
numbers of people. Precisely because no election or selection process of the 
participants is in place, public meetings may not secure the representativeness of the 
audience with the result that the interests of the most active participants may rise up 
to obscure the concerns of marginalized groups and the quiescent community. If 
those attending and participating in the meetings are expected not to be 
representative of the whole community, it is important that the government make clear 
from the beginning that public meetings are convened with the primary goal of 
exchanging information (information or educational meetings) or ideas (consultation 
meetings) on matters of common concern. To put it differently, If the best interest of 
the community at large is to be served, it is crucial that government decision-makers 
decide responsibly on the demands made by the participants in these meetings and 
avoid making any official commitment to the audience that their demands would be 
fulfilled unless all has been properly done to induce people and organizations 
representing all the different interests of the target community to speak freely at the 
meetings. 
 
In all four informal settlements visited during the field surveys conducted for this study, 
pubic meetings (popularly referred to as mass meetings) are a regular occurrence. 
They are informational, educational or consultative and are actively attended by some 
hundreds of residents. Most of these meetings, however, are basically an intra-
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community affair during which community leaders interact with the rest of the 
community. As a matter of fact, the attendance of government officials (especially of 
ward councillors) is sporadic and generally regarded by the community as fruitless 
with the only noticeable exception of the local officials of the South African Police 
Service. But there is evidently a stark divergence of opinions with regard to the 
frequency and, more importantly, effectiveness of government-community meetings. 
On the one hand, there are numerous politicians (especially of the ruling party) and 
civil servants who loudly, proudly and incessantly regard public meetings as a way to 
be accountable to the masses. On the other hand, the greater part of the informally 
housed respondents were more or less explicit in referring to the practice of Imbizo (a 
Zulu word that alludes to a forum to enhance dialogue between the government and 
the people and find out a solution to issues of common concern) as being much of a 
‘political game’, which is played by the political decision-makers to be able to publicize 
that they are answerable to the poorest of the poor and justify polices that could only 
emanate from the top down and not the other way around. When provocatively asked 
by the researcher: who, if not you, contributed to electing the current ward councillor 
(who is, in all four cases, a member of the African National Congress)?, the answers 
of the informally housed interviewees indicated almost in unison that in South Africa 
there is currently not much of a choice for them politically!  
 
Residents’ Committee 
 
The establishment of a committee of residents may be the vehicle to consolidate a 
two-way communication flow between the local government and an informally housed 
community at the same time as it may serve to ensure the representativeness of the 
participation process. In order to be representative and apt to advocate on behalf of 
the whole community, it is not only important that the membership of a committee of 
residents’ be selected in accordance with democratic procedures but also that 
endeavour to consult with as wide a cross-section as possible of the informally 
housed population on a regular basis. In this respect, it has to be borne in mind that 
the ultimate goal of a residents’ committee is to advise the government on the basis of 
the views and interests of the resident community—technically competent advice 
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arising from a non-representative committee would betray its own nature of being the 
committee of the residents, making it just another committee of experts. Whist non-
resident (outsider) advocates can and should be employed to enhance professional 
capacities and powers of persuasion of the residents’ committee, it is essential to let 
informally housed communities advocate for themselves. A residents’ committee is 
envisioned to work shoulder to shoulder with local government officials concerned 
besides liaising with higher tiers of government, non-governmental and religious 
groups, socially conscious business organizations and other informally housed 
residents’ committees. In order to make this happen, meetings between the local 
government and the committee are to be convened on a regular basis and as close as 
possible to the place where the committee members reside or transport should be 
arranged for or reimbursed to them. Moreover, while committee members should 
serve as volunteers and no remuneration should thus be offered to them, they should 
be entitled to receive reimbursement of genuine and pre-approved out-of-pocket 
expenses. Some of the responsibilities of a committee of residents would include 
submitting project proposals, commenting on government planned and ongoing 
programmes and being part of the decision-making leading up to community and area 
development. General residents’ committees may be formed for integrated and 
comprehensive planning efforts as well as special project committees or sub-
committees aimed at dealing with specific problem areas or impending community 
issues. Because a residents’ committee ought to be responsible for facilitating the flow 
of information within the community it serves, it shall be the duty of the members to 
keep minutes of the meetings with the government and report to the residents on a 
regular basis—although informal (unrecorded) discussions with government 
representatives are expected to remain an indispensable part of the participation 
process. It should also be noted that while the last word on government spending 
would normally rest with the government, the members of a residents’ committee may 
play a decisive political and operational role in shaping government policies relevant 
to their community. In other words, despite the lack of legally binding decision-making 
authority to secure government approval for the adoption of its recommendations, 
residents’ committees may be capable of exerting some degree of influence over 
policy and programme matters relevant to the community they represents as a result 
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of one-on-one negotiation sessions with the government. It may also be important that 
a residents’ committee be formally established as a legal entity if the community is to 
be eligible to receive certain government grant funds as it the case, for example, with 
the South African Government-funded housing option called ‘People’s Housing 
Process’, which is described in Chapter 3 under the paragraph entitled ‘Government 
Policies’. 
 
In all four informal settlements visited during the field surveys conducted for this study, 
residents have managed to set up democratically designated committees to try to deal 
with the most pressing problems of the community and hope to exert some pressure 
on local government decision-makers to improve the status quo. In all cases, it is a 
general committee dealing with a broad number of matters relevant to the community 
(though with little or no holistic perspective on the way forward) coupled with special 
purpose units or sub-committees such as a neighbourhood watch on crime or a youth 
development forum. Residents’ committees are welcomed and their efforts by and 
large appreciated by both community leaders and ordinary informally housed 
respondents who were invited to express their viewpoints on the matter. However, 
while being substantially pleased with the work of the residents’ committees, 
interviewees agreed on the view that community representatives by no means have to 
end up substituting for the community in a permanent way. Whether or not they were 
serving on a residents’ committee, respondents acknowledged the importance of 
holding mass meetings where committee members interact publicly with the 
community at large and where government officials (above all, the ward councillor) 
should be invited to be directly accountable for their decisions and actions to all 
residents. Although not unanimous, there was also a clear consensus on the degree 
of satisfaction, or lack thereof, with the liaison process between residents’ committees 
and the local government. In this respect, it was not difficult to ascertain that residents’ 
committees are at best only sporadically approached by government elected and non-
elected officials and, when this happens, community initiatives and complaints fall, for 
the most part, on deaf ears or receive minimal consideration by those in power, 
particularly the ward councillors. One of the main reasons adduced by various local 
government respondents (especially the ward councillors) for this lack of or minimal 
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interaction with informally housed residents’ committees is that there is in place in the 
CTMM a ward committee system, which is regarded as the one and only able to 
secure grassroots democracy through ten-member committees that are to be directly 
elected by the residents of each ward, including informally housed residents. Although 
it is reasonable to expect that ward committees should be the principal vehicle to 
promote public participation in local governance on account of their legally established 
powers and functions (sections 72-78 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures 
Act of 1998), it is the opinion of the researcher that their statement falls short, not only 
of being critical, but also logical. It is uncritical because it fails to recognize that some 
important provisions of the otherwise well-conceived CTMM’s policy document entitled 
Establishment of Ward Committees, which is supposed to fulfil the mandate received 
from the aforementioned act of Parliament within the CTMM, have so far not come 
into effect—at least with respect of the wards comprising the poorest areas of the 
municipality. For example, contrary to the purpose of section 5 that instructs that ‘in 
the composition of the Ward Committee . . . the diversity of interest and geographic 
representation be taken into account’, no representative from the large and populated 
informal settlement called Plastic View (situated in Soshanguve), has been identified 
and invited to serve on the ward committee for Ward 37 despite a clear interest of 
some community leaders in being considered as nominees. Besides, at odds with 
section 7.4 which indicates that a ward committee ‘should meet as frequently as 
possible . . . [and] . . . at least once a month’, it is lamented by the representatives of 
the informal settlement named Brazzaville (Atteridgeville), that the ward councillor for 
Ward 7 has adopted the habit to call ward committee meetings as and when he 
pleases, which happens to be infrequent. Similarly, notwithstanding the instructions of 
section 7.6 that a ward committee ‘shall strive to reach decisions on the basis of 
consensus’, a rather centralistic and allegedly untrustworthy management of the ward 
committee for Ward 17 on the part of the ward councillor is deplored by the leadership 
of the informally housed community of Morgan Village (Mamelodi). Not to mention the 
fact that the ward committee for Ward 48, whose membership includes a relatively 
high proportion of representatives of the informal settlement called Choba 
(Olievenhoutbosch), has been marginalized and disempowered because of the 
political sidelining by its own political party (African National Congress) of the 
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committee’s chairperson, namely the ward councillor. To top it all, none of the 
aforementioned ward committees can so far be said to have created notable 
conditions for the various informally housed communities falling under their jurisdiction 
to ‘participate in the preparation, implementation and review of the integrated 
development plan’ of the CTMM, in the ‘preparation of Council’s budget’ or in any 
‘strategic decision relating to the provision of municipal services’ as requested by 
section 4.1. Second, what affirmed by local government respondents is illogical 
because it ignores the possibility that a ward committee may not be able to protect the 
interests of some of its constituent communities. This is due to the fact that each ward 
comprises some forty or fifty thousand people living in a number of neighbourhoods 
(usually referred to as extensions), which have different degrees of physical, social 
and economic development, thus implying that specific community needs could be 
better met through the complementary work of residents’ committees that specifically 
represent the interests of particular communities (especially those living in poverty) 
within the ward. 
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Further Practical Issues 
 
 
The identification of one or more forms of involvement described in the previous 
paragraph is only one part of a wider operational process that aims to ensure the 
meaningful and effective participation of informally housed communities. The present 
paragraph is then intended to complement the previous one by addressing the 
following questions: Who exactly should be engaged? How much involvement should 
be allowed? When? And on what topics? Drawing on Happe and König (2003), 
McCarty et al. (1999), Attwood and May (1998), Clayton (1995), Sowman and Gawith 
(1994), Hughes (1985) and others mentioned in the sequel of the paragraph, the 
researcher tries to answer these questions.  
 
Stakeholders to Be Engaged 
 
It is maintained (Schmitter, 2002:14) that community participants, both individuals and 
organizations, should enjoy the status of ‘holder’—namely, they should ‘possess some 
quality or resource that entitle them to participate’. Let me elaborate on this general 
rule. To start with, I believe that all informally housed residents—both citizens and 
foreigners with residence permit—and associations of residents living in the areas 
affected by the government planning process would in principle qualify as holders. 
This definition of holder seeks to be wide-ranging but not necessarily all-inclusive, as 
illegal immigrants—who may constitute a large portion of the people living in certain 
informal settlements—would be left out until some concerted action at different 
government levels is taken to regularize their status. Within the informally housed 
community, those who are already involved in community-serving activities (e.g., 
social activists and community leaders) or are expected to have information and 
expertise for illustrating problems and suggesting possible solutions should then be 
given particular consideration in the recruitment process. Although a number of 
residents can often be regarded as subjects dedicated to serving their community or 
are well informed about problems and priorities of their neighbourhood, it is likely that 
this definition of holder would be much smaller ranging than the previous one. 
 187  
Besides, not only residents but also concerned outsiders such as social workers, 
clergy members and volunteers should also get involved as community animators, 
spokespersons, advocacy planners or playing other roles as long as they are 
accepted as part of the participation process by the same community they are 
supposed to serve. While it is important that outside advisers and facilitators be not 
self-serving but prepared to listen to the people they represent, they are expected to 
play a critical role in helping poor communities to articulate their interests. As 
maintained by Brynard (1996:45), there is usually a need for advocates to speak and 
act in favour of informally housed communities ‘because it has been proven that to get 
citizen participation by the poor and underprivileged it is necessary to do more than 
simply invite it’. On the other hand, it is important that the engagement of outsiders be 
placed on top and not as a replacement for that of insiders. As Abbott et al. (2001:91) 
put it, ‘when made by outsiders, whether in government or the private/NGOs sectors, 
and based exclusively upon externally perceived needs, [development projects] will 
have a very low chance of success’. Finally, it seems fair to add that participation 
should also be open to non-resident landowners—especially those whose land has 
been occupied without their consent or those who do not have a proven record of 
exploitation or abuse—as well as to representatives of the people residing in 
surrounding formal areas, whose viewpoints are expected to be quite different but 
perhaps as much justified in their own terms as those of the informal settlers. While it 
is important to realize that the participation of delegates on behalf of non-resident 
landowners and adjacent formally housed communities would result in more 
strenuous negotiations on the content of any particular in situ upgrading or relocation 
project proposals, it is maintained by Angel (1983:20) that ‘it should be easier to 
identify areas of common interests and areas of possible reciprocal exchange, once . . 
. the different participants are [brought into the decision-making process and their 
positions] clearly understood’. 
 
Not all the stakeholders mentioned above, however, could possibly be directly 
involved in the participation process, not only because it is found in practice that a 
number of poor people are not disposed to participating, but also because community 
participation does not have to become a stumbling block to good governance. As this 
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problem is usually circumvented by focusing on the involvement of individua ls and 
organizations, whether insiders or outsiders, which are supposed to represent the 
target communities, it raises the question of the representativeness of the 
representatives. Especially when there are conflicting or different needs and interests 
between members or groups within the informally housed community, it is therefore 
crucial to reflect on whether or not the non-participation or non-representation of large 
sections of informal settlers may result in biased priorities and unmerited mercies 
bestowed on those who decide to participate. Although it would be a mistake to 
oversimplify this point, it seems to the researcher that within the informally housed 
communities of the CTMM that were visited in the course of the field surveys carried 
out for this study there is not only a high degree of agreement among the residents 
with regard to what community needs and priorities should be addressed by the 
government but also a high level of trust in the leaders (representatives) of the 
community. This is evidenced by an intra-settlement consistency of the answers 
provided by informally housed respondents to the question ‘what would you do to 
improve the conditions of the area where you live?’ and by their critical but largely 
positive assessment in reply to the question ‘do you consider the members of the 
residents’ committees as representative of the whole community?’ As mater of fact, 
the researcher found little evidence of non-representation of particular interest groups 
on the residents’ committees that he happened to come close to—with the only 
noticeable exception of illegal immigrants who do not want to take any chance of 
being deported and therefore prefer not to come forward voluntarily, and a few splinter 
groups that have their own agenda and are thus very difficult to engage. Without 
prejudice to the principle expressed by Jaakson (1972:18) that ‘any group which has 
interests at stake in the plan should have those interests articulated’, it may then be 
possible that a relative small group of community activists (e.g., the members of a 
democratically elected residents’ committee) could be able to fairly represent the 
collective views of the people in their community. To put it differently, even a relatively 
small group of democratically voted community representatives who were asked to be 
involved in the government decision-making process would be expected to raise and 
stand up for much of the same concerns that would have been raised and defended 
by fellow settlers who did not take part in the process. Approaching this opportunity 
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from a different standpoint, it seems therefore possible for South African local 
governments to ascertain the priorities of the informally housed population of a 
particular settlement by engaging with a comparatively smaller number of 
democratically designated community spokespersons—smaller if compared to the 
number of representatives that is expected to be needed for an inclusive decision-
making process involving the public. It is, however, worth cautioning against always 
falling into the temptation of engaging exclusively with the very same community 
representatives. While it may fulfil the need to obtain quick responses and facilitate 
the delivery of timely outcomes, it may also result in the establishment or 
consolidation of local elites and in the priorities of the community at large not being 
fully addressed. In this respect, it is particularly important to point out that government 
officials who resolve to interact with residents’ organizations not only do their best to 
ensure that committee memberships be always gender-and-ethnicity inclusive but 
also directly accountable to the whole community through mass meetings to be hold in 
the bounds of the settlement. 
 
Degree of Participation 
 
The key point made in the previous paragraph is that it seems possible to be 
cautiously optimistic that a rather small group of democratically elected community 
spokespersons would, in the context of informally housed communities of South 
Africa, be able to truly represent the views of the community—as suggested by a 
strong intra-community agreement on the priorities to be addressed and trust in 
community leaders (representatives) perceived by the researcher in the course of the 
various field surveys undertaken for this thesis. The logical consequence of this line of 
argument is that the government should feel encouraged to consent to a reasonable 
degree of involvement from the residents’ committees in the definition of public 
policies and programmes that impact on their lives. Before giving an account of what 
degree of community involvement is actually accepted by the local government 
elected and non-elected officials in South Africa, let me call attention to one of the 
most famous theoretical analyses on the possible degrees of community 
participation—namely, Arnstein’s (1969) eight-rung ladder of citizen participation. The 
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two bottom rungs describe a situation of contrived participation where the people are 
basically involved as a public relations tool to serve the powerholders and their 
policies. This first stage of participation is actually regarded as ‘non-participation’ and 
it would result in the setting up of government-community hearings and meetings 
without giving the people a real chance to voice their concerns. To all intents and 
purposes, community participants would be passive listeners of a top-down, one-way 
and one-to-many communication process in which things are explained in the most 
vague and general terms and open only to nominal discussions. The degree of 
participation may then progress to the three rungs of ‘tokenism’ insofar as people are 
allowed to receive all relevant information and voice their opinions in a public forum. 
At this second stage of involvement, despite holding all information that allows one to 
make informed criticism, the people have still limited or no power to affect the 
decision-making process and change the status quo. Much of what happens during 
government–community meetings is that gentle government officials take note of the 
points raised by community participants but no follow-up action would normally be 
taken. Further up, there are the three upper rungs of ‘citizen power’ that enable the 
people to negotiate with the government and moreover manage to add community 
priorities to the government’s agenda. In respect of this third stage of involvement, it is 
worthwhile pointing out that it is seldom volunteered by the government but normally 
achieved through concerted citizen pressure. As argued by Arnstein (1969:222), ‘in 
most cases were power has come to be shared it was taken by the citizens, not given 
by the city. There is nothing new about that process. Since those who have the power 
normally want to hang onto it, historically it has had to be wrested by the powerless 
rather than proffered by the powerful’. 
 
Having recalled the three progressive theoretical stages or eight rungs of community 
participation, the picture of the degree of community involvement that emerges from 
the interviews with ward councillors and government officials of the CTMM who were 
asked about how and why they liaise or not with informally housed communities 
during the field surveys conducted for this study is somewhere in between the lower 
two stages or the lower five rungs of Arnstein’s ladder. More precisely, it is admitted 
by 26 out of 28 local government respondents that the main purpose of government–
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community meetings, which by the way happen to be few, is basically to inform the 
people about what the government has decided to do for their community and ask 
them to co-operate. Similarly, relatively little time has thus far been spent on listening 
to the viewpoint of the informally housed population affected by the government 
projects with regard to what actions should be planned and why and even less on 
taking it into account. Even when the community has the opportunity to express their 
opinion to those in authority, hardly any consideration is given to their representations. 
In most cases, it is either a one-way communication process arranged to keep 
possible community resistance to the planned government activities to a minimum or 
a nominal (token) two-way communication process designed to broadcast the artificial 
image of elected and non-elected local government officials prone to make proper use 
of traditional democratic mechanisms (imbizos) as prescribed by the constitution, laws 
and by-laws. In other words, there is very little experience in the CTMM of informally 
housed communities sharing in the determination of local policy content with the result 
that local policy-makers (especially ward councillors) are normally left to do what they 
like. While some government respondents from different departments see it as a 
shortcoming that informally housed people are not, or are minimally, involved in the 
relocation or in situ upgrading projects that concern their community, ward councillors 
seem almost in all cases to be the least interested in the meaningful involvement of 
the affected communities in the decision-making process that affects their lives, which 
is proudly assumed to be largely ‘technical’ and thus pertaining to the ‘experts’.  
 
Timing of Involvement 
 
It is also important that community involvement start at an early planning stage if it is 
to lay the foundations for constructive government–community interactions and avoid 
turning into a farce where all relevant decisions have already been made and are not 
subject to any change. This view is shared by Stewart (1976:68) who ascribes ‘much 
of the lack of success of public hearings . . . to the fact that they are held very late in 
the planning process . . . and citizens are not convinced that their participation at 
public hearings is effective in influencing decision-makers’. Besides, the involvement 
of the community at an early planning stage is supported by Howell and Leatherman 
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(2000:2) for the reason that ‘invest[ing] heavily in crafting detailed plans only to have 
them ‘shot down’ is a waste of time and resources’. Involving informally housed 
communities at a too early stage of planning, however, may delay the decision-
making process so much as to prove fatal to any efforts to finalize something within 
reasonable time. That is why it could be more appropriate that preliminary plans and 
alternatives be drafted and discussed internally by government officials—far better if 
they grew out of sound feasibility studies which are the result of participative 
evaluation activities—and be then submitted to , and openly and thoroughly discussed 
with, the affected communities and their non-governmental representatives with a 
view to considering community views and suggestions before the final plan is agreed 
upon and prepared for implementation. 
 
As regards to when government respondents of the CTMM normally start liaising with 
informally housed communities on specific development projects of mutual concern, 
the overall picture is again disappointing in that the engagement of the municipality’s 
poorest communities seldom seems to be asked for before relocation, in situ 
upgrading or other development projects that target these communities are drawn up 
(in conjunction with the contractor) and just about ready to be implemented. The main 
exception to this rule, if it can be called so, appears to occur when there is room for 
political expediency. For example, during an electoral period as the one currently 
under way in South Africa (local elections are to be held at the beginning of 2006), it 
was not difficult to find out about some of the visits paid by ward councillors to the 
surveyed informally housed communities with the mere object to inform the latter 
about a new, forthcoming, councillor-supported development plan for their area. 
Curiously enough, it has, however, remained considerably unclear to the various 
informally housed respondents who were interviewed by the researcher what the new 
plan is all about and when it is expected to be implemented, which seems to reinforce 
the speculation of electoral expediency. 
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Topics for Which Participation Should Be Sought 
 
Another issue of practical importance concerns the topics that are deemed 
appropriate to lie within the purview of community participation. From the perspective 
of the advocates of public participation in shaping government policies, of which the 
researcher happens to be one, informally housed communities ought to take part in 
the broadest possible array of local government policy-making, planning and budget 
decisions that impact on their lives. Accordingly, the involvement of communities living 
in informal settlements should be extended to all major settlement-related decisions to 
be made in preparing, amending or revoking municipal by-laws, development projects 
and budget allocations. Because settlement-related development is thought to be 
most effective in the context of integrated development, a link between all settlement-
related decisions should be ensured in order to optimize government–community 
efforts to achieve the long-term revitalization of the physical, social, economic and 
environmental character of a particular informal settlement. In this respect, the single 
most important choice before local government decision-makers (and first thing on the 
planning agenda to be addressed) is whether a particular informal settlement should 
be upgraded and integrated into the municipal fabric (brownfield development) or 
whether the relocation of the community to a different site should be followed instead 
(greenfield development), as observed in Chapter 2 under the paragraph entitled 
‘Policy Options’. This choice is supposed to be made with careful consideration not 
only of its technical, operational and financial feasibility but also, and at least equally 
importantly, of the long-term interests of the affected communities—the latter implying 
that residents of informal settlements should be consulted on this issue and their 
views taken into account. Legal constraints and ethical considerations aside, there 
may also be an eviction option available to the municipal council but its implications 
should be carefully evaluated with particular regard to the probable transfer of the 
problem to another area. Concurrently, it is essential to involve and gain community 
support in the prevention of and response to further land invasion in the area of 
concern in order to put a stop to a situation that would only serve to complicate and 
prolong an already cumbersome and time-consuming process to bring development to 
informal-housed communities—the implication being that the residents and their 
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organizations should be made co-responsible for the success of professionally-led 
patrolling operations of the land of concern. This notwithstanding, as strenuous and 
prolonged government–community negotiations are likely to be needed to 
compromise between the legitimate desires of the residents to remain where they are 
and the more often than not different but as much legitimate plans of the government 
for the use of the occupied land, it is also important that governments cannot just wait 
and do nothing until a consensus over the fundamental direction of housing 
development is eventually reached. If one think about those informally housed 
communities who live in exceptionally squalid conditions, it would indeed prove 
literally vital to promptly address the lack of essentials such as potable water, staples, 
garbage collection, health-care and emergency services or whatever other critical 
need may arise. 
 
As soon as an agreed decision between government and the community on what type 
of development has to occur (brownfield development, greenfield development or a 
combination of both—the latter being needed, for example, whenever dedensification 
is deemed necessary to the feasibility of in situ upgrading) has eventually been made, 
a number of ensuing topics of discussion would have to be identified and evaluated in 
a participatory way with a view to achieving sustainable outcomes for the target 
community as well as for the city at large. Without claiming to be comprehensive and 
bearing in mind that the contents of some categories may overlap, Table 6.1 provides 
a list of major concerns that are relevant to informally housed communities and that 
can be used to help guide in the identification of topics for which public debate may be 
sought. In South Africa, most of what is listed in the table is the responsibility of local 
government and what is not (e.g., education and housing) has a municipal 
government presence in one aspect or another of the service provision. While all the 
topics listed in the table could be debated with the community prior to any decisions 
being made, it is expected that the selection of topics for public discussion would be 
limited to a minimum in the event of municipal elected and non-elected officials 
unwilling or unable to engage with the poorest of the poor. In this respect, it is 
important to note that even though there are plenty of reasons to reckon that a 
number of technical issues do not really need to be open to public debate, it is not 
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seldom the case that the meaning of the term technical would be widened to such an 
extent that virtually little or no room for community participation remains. 
   
Table 6.1  Topics for Which the Involvement of Informally Housed 
Communities May Be Sought  
 
    
    
    
 Very Basic Human Needs   
 Access to clean water supply and nutrition programmes.  
 Social and Health Issues   
 Assistance to the unemployed, elderly and handicapped; emergency 
services; crèches; clinics; family planning; disinfestations. 
 
 Housing Issues  
 Tenure security; subsidized housing; in situ upgrading; community 
relocation; prevention of further land invasion.  
 
 Education Issues  
 Schooling of the youth and vocational training of the adults.  
 Environmental Issues  
 Garbage management; street cleaning; gardening.  
 Economic Issues  
 Income and employment creation; microfinance projects.  
 Security Issues  
 Street safety; housebreaking; gangs; illegal migrants; patrolling.  
 Local Governance issues  
 Local government accountability and corruption.  
       
   
 
When this happens to be the case, the engagement of informally housed communities 
in shaping government policies would then be ardently opposed by those who 
consider themselves ‘experts’, not really because of the technicalities involved in the 
decision-making, but simply because they are not prepared to abandon the belief that 
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supposedly uneducated poor people have nothing to teach to people like them—a 
circumstance that is regrettably perceived by the researcher to be anything but 
unusual among the local government respondents (especially ward councillors) who 
were interviewed during the field surveys conducted for this study. At the base of such 
reluctance lies the failure to recognize the fundamental need to include both local and 
professional knowledge and perspectives in the formulation of policies aimed at 
improving the future of informally housed communities. In particular, it should be 
borne in mind that as much as expert outsiders are needed to understand the 
multiplicity of social, economic and environmental implications of the proposals being 
considered and then identify a range of viable development options, community 
representatives are needed to ensure that also local needs and priorities are properly 
addressed.  
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Evaluating the Participation Process 
 
 
A structured evaluation of how the participation process has actually been carried out 
is an integral part of the operational process that seeks to define and refine adequate 
mechanisms for the involvement of informally housed communities in the local 
government’s policy-making. The present paragraph is therefore concerned with 
developing explicit criteria for an assessment of what is being achieved and lost 
through the direct participation of the poor in local governance so as to lay the 
foundations for future improvements of the ways in which community participation can 
be put into operation. Three key indicators have been identified to measure the 
success or failure of the participation process: productivity, consensus building and 
representativeness. 
  
Evaluating productivity has to do with the appraisal of whether or not the community’s 
input leads to favourable results in terms of understanding problems and priorities 
faced by the poor and working out pragmatic solutions. In evaluating the yield of 
citizens’ contribution, it is necessary to keep track of all comments, recommendations 
and project proposals and endeavour to weight their value against the time and 
resources spent by the government on dealing directly with the public. Evaluating 
consensus building involves the assessment of whether or not the community is 
satisfied with the participation process, appreciates the use being made of its 
contribution, and supports or is less resistant to government policies. In appraising 
citizens’ satisfaction with the participation exercise and its outcomes, it is important 
that the government continue to dialogue with the community on a regular basis so as 
to get people’s views and feelings on such issues as the perceived capacity of 
government officials to organize and facilitate the participation of the community, to 
communicate clearly with the public, to understand what the people need and want, to 
respect and be sensitive to all voices and to actually incorporate community’s 
priorities in the government’s agenda. Finally, evaluating representativeness has to do 
with the review of whether or not the participants are capable of expressing the views 
of the community at large rather than those of specific interest groups. In assessing 
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participants’ capacity of being representative, it is not only important to consider the 
number of citizens attending the meetings but also, and more importantly, to gather 
information from a sample of non-participants on their reasons for non-participation 
and the liaison, if any, between quiescent and active members of the community. 
 
In addition to gathering quantitative and qualitative information such as the number of 
participants, the quality of the inputs generated by the participant community and the 
resources spent by the government to organize and manage the participation process, 
evaluating community participation also implies that the government interrogate itself. 
Additional information should be collected through interviews and consultations with 
government officials directly involved in the participation efforts, whose experience 
can offer some lessons for trying to figure out and overcome some of the obstacles 
encountered with working with poor people. Last but not least, it is important that all 
information gathered during the evaluation process go through an integrated process 
of analysis so as to produce a set of recommendations to redesign and redevelop, if 
necessary, the participation process. Of course, it is hoped that this would not become 
just another ‘report on the shelf’ but be used by the government to maximize the 
extent to which the participation of the poor would be productive, representative and 
able to build consensus among the target community. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: Fostering a 
Bottom-Up Approach to 
Anti-Poverty Policy-Making 
 
 
Mais si nous voulons que l’humanité avance d’un 
cran, si nous voulons la porter à un niveau différent . 
. . alors, il faut inventer, il faut découvrir. Si nous 
voulons répondre à l’attente de nos peuples . . . il 
faut faire peau neuve, développer une pensée 
neuve, tenter de mettre sur pied un homme neuf.      
 
But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if 
we want to bring it up to a different level . . . then we 
must invent, we must make discoveries. If we wish 
to live up to our peoples’ expectations . . . we must 
turn over a new leaf, we must work out new 
concepts, try to set afoot a new man. 
 
Frantz Fanon 
Martinican Psychoanalyst and Philosopher 
Les Damnés de la Terre 
(The Wretched of the Earth), 1961 
 
 
The problem of poverty is not only enormous but also persistent. If despite continuing 
development efforts by different development actors at different levels there are 1,1 
billion people trying to survive on less than one dollar a day and 2,8 billions (or 45% of 
the world population) on less than two dollars, as estimated by the World Bank, there 
is probably something that should be done differently to try to get out of it. There is 
seemingly a need to mainstream a different pattern of development if humanity wants 
to respond successfully to the poverty and suffering that hundreds of millions of 
people continue to face every day especially in the developing world. It could be 
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reasonably assumed that a different pattern of development would be triggered by 
stronger international co-operation and fairer international relations aimed at 
redistributing a greater share of wealth-creating assets and capabilities from richer to 
poorer countries. Additionally, a more equitable distribution of resources and 
opportunities for the poorer members of society would be needed domestically, within 
each country and each city, especially where poverty is most severe. The implication 
of the latter is the enhancement of the current state of pro-poor governance policies at 
national and local level with a view to ensure equitable and universal access to basic 
services and opportunities. In this respect, it is important that governments, especially 
those of poverty-stricken developing countries and cities, be in a position to be 
competent, accountable and participative. Competent governance is necessary to 
effect positive change in the struggle against poverty. Accountable governance is 
needed to prevent the waste, fraud and abuse of public funds that are supposed to be 
used for those who need them most. Last but not least, participative governance is 
considered important to enhance the prospects of building anti-poverty strategies 
around what matters most to the people they are expected to benefit. 
 
Actually, it is held (Narayan and Petesh, 2002:461) that ‘poverty can be reduced only 
if we build strategies around what we have learned from poor people, from their 
realities as they experience them’. The argument goes that because the poor know 
about poverty first-hand, they would be in a position to revive government’s capacity 
to respond effectively to their needs and priorities. Put differently, the involvement of 
the poor in the design of anti-poverty policies is regarded as an invaluable opportunity 
that should be used to make poverty alleviation efforts more demand-driven and 
therefore more relevant to the people they are meant to serve. This is particularly true 
at local government level, not only because it is at this level (rather than at the level of 
provincial or central government) that a higher proportion of poor people and poor 
people’s organizations may have an opportunity to convey their valuable knowledge 
about local conditions to government officials and pressure them into being more 
attentive to their needs and requests, but also because local government is the 
branch of government that is concerned with matters that most directly affect people’s 
lives and livelihoods. 
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But this value does not come without a price. Because of the complexity of public 
management, participative democracy is liable to slow down the process of 
governance and may become advantageous to the interests of some people or 
groups of people at the expense of others if attention is not paid to the representation 
and consideration of all voices in the community, to name some drawbacks. For these 
reasons, it is key to the realization of an effective bottom-up approach to anti-poverty 
policy-making that an analysis be conducted to collect evidence that can be used to 
determine whether or not certain enabling conditions are in place and what practical 
issues of involvement need to be worked out—an analysis that is seldom combined 
into a single contextualized study. Accordingly, this thesis has sought to identify and 
examine, within the context of South Africa, what conditions would be more conducive 
to the involvement of poor communities such as those living in informal settlements in 
the design of local government policies that affect their lives and what practical steps 
should be taken to get the most out of it. It is the opinion of the researcher that the  
writing of this thesis has been generative of contributions of an original character. The 
originality of this research lies particularly in the way the researcher combined the 
results of previous studies in different subject areas such as poverty alleviation, local 
governance and community participation and the evidence from the field research in a 
coherent strategy that resulted in two overarching outcomes: the identification of a six-
factor framework representing the critical conditions that would benefit the democratic 
participation of the poorest communities of South Africa in the policy-making of their 
local government accompanied by a set of practical guidelines on how to proceed with 
the involvement of the poor. The combination of the aforesaid critical conditions and 
practical guidelines are believed to form a consistent body of original knowledge that 
is infrequently brought together by the existing literature. That notwithstanding, the 
researcher acknowledges that other research may need to be done to complement 
the outcomes of this thesis. A first area for further work could focus on the 
engagement of informally-housed communities in terms of material and psychological 
benefit or cost gained or borne by the individual participants. A second area of study 
could investigate what should be done to generate motivations of the required kind 
and enough resources for the participation of the have-nots in local governance. 
Finally, a third area for further research could concentrate on the measurement of the 
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financial impact of different methods of engagement of informally-housed community 
on the municipal budget. That being said, it is now possible to go through the research 
outcomes one by one.  
  
The aforesaid six-factor framework can be grouped into two categories of three each. 
The first category refers to certain characteristics of governments (political context), 
which would make a difference in their willingness, capacity and obligation to hear out 
and consider the views of the informally housed population. In this respect, the study 
has found that, first of all, there needs to be in place a genuinely progressive 
government with a continuing commitment to the principle of proletarian justice and 
the belief that all people count as a legitimate source of political power regardless of 
their wealth or income. If guided by both principles (or ideological resources), local 
governments would not only more aggressively fight poverty (within the limits of their 
responsibilities and budget) but, in so doing, would also be more apt to liaise with the 
poorest of the poor and involve them in the policy-making that impacts on their lives. 
Regrettably, it seems that these crucial ideological resources are too often honoured 
by the supposedly progressive ANC-led government coalition of South Africa, which at 
present rules the country, all provinces and all major municipalities, more in rhetoric 
than in reality. 
 
Second, there needs to be capacity at local government level to organize the 
involvement of the poor without it resulting in tokenism, elitism or other undesirable 
consequences. This implies a proper level of decentralization of both the national 
state (through the transfer of relevant powers and functions to municipalities) and the 
local tier of government (through appropriate intra-municipal decentralization). 
Regrettably, in the face of a new municipal government system with enhanced powers 
and functions entrenched in the Constitution of the country, South African policy-
makers have managed to create the conditions for an exceptional centralization of 
local government due to the amalgamation of numerous municipalities into larger 
ones (most notably, into megacities) and the disproportionate empowerment of the 
upper tier of local government (district municipalities) at the expense of the lower one 
(local municipalities). This also negatively affects the level of decentralization of 
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powers and resources achievable within the local administration itself as evidenced by 
the mediocre results of the current ward committee system especially with regard to 
the representation and consideration of the interests of the informally housed 
population. 
 
Third, there is a need for legislative provisions at both national and municipal level in 
respect of open government and public participation. However, this condition is 
regarded as complementary to and not a substitute for the shortage of willingness and 
capacity on the part of government officials to embrace the challenges and 
opportunities that come with the full adoption of a participative and inclusive system of 
governance. In view of that, one can only react with mixed feelings to the various 
provisions for the free flow of government information and public consultation, which 
happen to be entrenched in the South African Constitution, and in several laws and 
policy documents of the country at all tiers of government. 
 
The second three factors relate to certain characteristics of the communities living in 
poverty (social context), which would have a bearing on their motivation, ability and 
power to be active part of the governing process. In this respect, the study has, first of 
all, shown that it is crucial to bear in mind that community participation in government 
policy-making is a voluntary activity that is undertaken in the individual’s own time and 
therefore competes with all other interests and responsibilities that people may have 
to look after. The consequence of that is that it is necessary that the members of the 
community have a specific interest in the participation process and a feeling that 
participation is worth the effort. In relation to the motivation to participate, it was a 
pleasant surprise to the researcher to find that in all four informal settlements visited 
during the field surveys conducted for this study there are numerous people (both 
community leaders and ordinary citizens) that still express their willingness to interact 
with government officials with a view to resolving serious issues relating to their 
livelihood in the best interest of the community, notwithstanding some reasonable 
feelings of mistrust, suspicion and resentment towards (or a sense of intimidation 
caused by arrogance or tactlessness on the part of) various politicians and public 
servants, especially the ward councillors. 
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Second, there needs to be among the informally housed community an understanding 
of the problems of the area in which they live and how to resolve them 
(neighbourhood knowledge), which would complement that of government officials or 
government-employed outsider professionals. When this is the case, it would be 
important that governments acknowledge that informally housed residents have 
valuable first-hand knowledge of the issues confronting their settlement and draw 
upon it to devise and implement better solutions for community development. On the 
subject of neighbourhood knowledge, the picture that emerges from the field surveys 
carried out for this study is one of a knowledgeable community leadership who, in 
spite of a limited formal education that may diminish their critical thinking and 
communication skills, would have the ability to assist in the planning for the 
improvement of the conditions of living of their community. 
 
Third, there needs to be community organization at informal settlement level in order 
to pressure local government into dealing with what matters most to the residents. It 
is, however, critical that poor people’s organizations be representative (foster 
grassroots participation to guide and support their actions) and networked (are 
organized around networks at local, national and if possible international level for 
mutual support and exert more political influence). With regard to the issue of 
representation of informally housed people’s organizations, it came as a pleasant 
surprise to the researcher to see that in all four informal settlements visited during the 
field surveys there exist representative committees that are not only elected at public 
meetings but that also keep the community informed and receive their feedback on a 
regular basis through mass meetings that are usually attended by some hundreds of 
concerned residents. This is important in that it gives local government officials an 
opportunity to engage these organizations with a reasonable assurance that they 
provide a mouthpiece for the poorest of the poor. When it comes to the issue of 
networking, it clearly emerged from the field surveys that there is a dearth of 
coordination among the committees of different informal settlements, which reduces 
their chances to be influential. 
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By using the same research methodology, which integrated the results of a series of 
in-depth interviews with 80 respondents (52 informally housed people and 28 local 
government officials of the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality) and a 
selection of 216 relevant works of scholars from both the international and local scene 
in a coherent scheme, it was also possible to investigate how the previously 
discussed conditions that would benefit the participation process can translate into 
practices that would harness the development potential of participative governance 
while reducing to a minimum its negative by-products. In this regard, the study has 
discussed the relevance, or lack thereof, of three common forms of participation to 
communities living in informal settlements. A first form of involvement would take 
place through an ombudsman (or local public protector) that is readily available, easily 
accessible and well trained to handle a wide range of grievances, frustrations and 
inquiries brought to it by people living in informal settlements. It is the responsibility of 
the ombudsman, not only to examine informally housed people’s claims on anything 
that they perceive as unfair or improper governance practice, but also to promote 
more positive (rather than accusatory) forms of involvement that may come in the 
form of suggestions, recommendations or proposals for development. An ombudsman 
would have the advantage of making it easy for interested informally housed 
individuals to establish contacts with their local government, which would result in a 
quantitatively large amount of input for a better government decision-making. On the 
other hand, it is by its own nature a mediated way of involving the community in that it 
would limit to a minimum the opportunity for the public to debate specific issues of 
interest and engage in regular negotiation sessions with the appropriate government 
offices. In South Africa, the ombudsman is called Public Protector. It is a national 
independent institution that has no coercive power but has the authority to exercise 
several extra-judicial powers. Although any aggrieved person or community is entitled 
to submit a complaint to the Public Protector without any complicated procedures 
being involved and have it investigated and responded to at no cost, the relevance of 
the South African Public Protector to informally housed communities has so far been 
irrelevant due to a minuscule number of investigators (as low as one per million 
people) and, more importantly, to the fact that there are almost no regional offices for 
lodging complaints open at the moment. It is then no surprise that the totality of the 
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informally housed respondents interviewed by the researcher in the course of the field 
surveys carried out for this study had no idea, or only the vaguest, of what the office of 
the Public Protector was all about and how they could avail themselves of its services. 
The role of the ombudsman could in principle be more effectively carried out by the 
Speaker (chairperson of the municipal council) who, among other things, has the 
mandate to ensure compliance in the council, subcouncils and council committees 
such as ward committees with the Code of Conduct set out by national legislation for 
councillors. That notwithstanding, all four informally housed communities visited by 
the researcher during the field surveys undertaken for this thesis are minimally aware 
of its role and responsibilities and how they could benefit from it, which can not only 
be attributed to a shortage of awareness-building measures used by the Speaker to 
inform the informally housed population about its role and importance for the 
community but also to a more disturbing inability, which is most evident among some 
of the Speaker’s regional managers, to ensure that informally housed communities 
recognize the Speaker as a super partes institution that makes every reasonable 
effort to advocate for corrective government action to address the needs of the people 
living in abject poverty and not just as another ruling party structure that does its best 
to defend parochial interests. 
 
A second form of involvement would occur through public meetings. Unlike the 
ombudsman, public meetings would ensure a non-mediated information flow between 
government and informally housed communities. It is important that public meetings 
be held with some regularity in order to seek to promote satisfactory progress. It 
would also be important that public meetings form an interlocking process that 
enables the whole community to follow the progress and later assemblies to take due 
heed of previous directions. As regards the gathering place, it is imperative that public 
meetings intended for informally housed communities be held within their settlement, 
or as close to where they live as possible, so as not to discourage participation. One 
of the main advantages of public meetings is that they are open to anyone who is 
willing to attend, which would result in a fair section of the population to have a 
chance to speak to and hear from the government directly without going through 
community representatives or residents’ committees. Precisely because no election or 
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selection process of the participants is in place, public meetings may not secure the 
representativeness of the audience with the result that the interests of the most active 
participants may rise up to obscure those of marginalized groups and the quiescent 
community. In all four informal settlements visited during the field surveys conducted 
for this study, pubic meetings (popularly referred to as mass meetings) are a regular 
occurrence. Most of these meetings, however, are basically an intra-community affair 
because the attendance of government officials (especially ward councillors) is 
sporadic and generally regarded by the community as fruitless. But there is evidently 
a stark divergence of opinions with regard to the frequency and, more importantly, 
effectiveness of government-community meetings. On the one hand, there are 
numerous politicians (especially of the ruling party) and civil servants who loudly, 
proudly and incessantly regard public meetings as a way of being accountable to the 
masses. On the other hand, the greater part of the informally housed respondents 
were more or less explicit in referring to the practice of Imbizo as being much of a 
‘political game’, which is played by the political decision-makers to be able to publicize 
that they are answerable to the poorest of the poor and justify polices that could only 
emanate from the top down and not the other way around. 
 
A third form of involvement would take place through a residents’ committee. The 
establishment of a committee of residents may be the vehicle to consolidate a two-
way communication flow between the local government and an informally housed 
community at the same time as it may serve to ensure the representativeness of the 
participation process. In order to be representative and apt to advocate on behalf of 
the whole community, however, it is not only important that the membership of a 
committee of residents be selected in accordance with democratic procedures but 
also that it endeavours to consult with as wide a cross-section as possible of the 
informally housed population on a regular basis. Some of the responsibilities of a 
committee of residents would include submitting project proposals, commenting on 
government planned and ongoing programmes and being part of the decision-making 
leading up to community and area development. While the last word on government 
spending would normally rest with the government, it is important to note that the 
members of a residents’ committee may play a decisive role in shaping government 
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policies relevant to their community. In all four informal settlements visited during the 
field surveys conducted for this study, residents have managed to set up 
democratically designated committees. Residents’ committees are welcomed and 
appreciated by both community leaders and ordinary informally housed respondents 
who were invited to express their viewpoints on the matter. However, interviewees 
also agreed on the view that community representatives by no means have to end up 
substituting for the community in a permanent way and acknowledged the importance 
of holding mass meetings where committee members interact publicly with the 
community at large and where government officials (above all, the ward councillor) 
should be invited to be directly accountable for their decisions and actions to all 
residents. This study has also found that despite a good degree of representativeness 
that characterizes the surveyed informally housed resiedents’ committees, the 
opportunities they have to interact with government-elected and non-elected officials 
is at best sporadic. Although this may partly be explained by the fact that ward 
committees (rather than any other residents’ board) should be the principal vehicle to 
promote public participation in local governance on account of their legally established 
powers and functions, it is the opinion of the researcher that government officials 
ignore the possibility that the needs and priorities of a ward’s constituent communities 
could be better taken care of through a residents’ committee that specifically 
represents the interests of a particular settlement (or neighbourhood or extension) 
rather than those of a whole ward that is usually vast and diverse. 
 
These three mechanisms to achieve community participation in the context of informal 
settlements (i.e., ombudsman, public meetings, residents’ committees), which are not 
to be seen as mutually exclusive but can be combined so as to suit local 
circumstances better, are only one part of a broader operational process aimed at 
ensuring the meaningful and effective participation of informally housed communities. 
Some other questions need to be answered: who should be engaged? How much 
involvement should be allowed? When? And on what topics? Let me deal with them 
one by one. 
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First, although participation ought in principle to be open to any interested person, it is 
important to note that it does not have to become a stumbling block to good 
governance. As this problem is bypassed by involving individuals and organizations, 
whether insiders or outsiders, which are supposed to represent the target community, 
it raises the question of the representativeness of the representatives. Especially 
when there are conflicting or different needs and interests between members or 
groups within the informally housed community, it is therefore crucial to reflect on 
whether or not the non-participation or non-representation of large sections of informal 
settlers result in biased priorities and unmerited mercies bestowed on those who 
decide to participate. Although it would be a mistake to oversimplify this point, it 
seems to the researcher that within the informally housed communities that were 
visited in the course of the field surveys carried out for this study there is a relatively 
high degree of cohesiveness among the residents with regard to what community 
needs and priorities should be addressed by the government and it was found little 
evidence of non-representation of particular interest groups on the residents’ 
committees the researcher happened to come close to—with the only exception of 
illegal immigrants who do not want to take any chance to be deported and therefore 
prefer not to come forward voluntarily and a few splinter groups that have their own 
agenda and are thus very difficult to engage. It may then be possible that a relative 
small group of community activists (e.g., the members of a democratically-elected 
residents’ committee) could be able to fairly represent the collective views of the 
people in their community or, in other words, would be expected to raise and stand up 
for much of the same concerns that would have been raised and defended by fellow 
settlers who did not take part in the process. It is, however, worth cautioning against 
always falling into the temptation of engaging exclusively with the very same 
community representatives. While it may fulfil the need to obtain quick responses and 
facilitate the delivery of timely outcomes, it may also result in the establishment or 
consolidation of local elites and in the priorities of the community at large not being 
fully addressed. In this respect, it is to be pointed out that government officials who 
resolve to interact with residents’ organizations not only do their best to ensure that 
committee memberships be always gender-and-ethnicity inclusive but also directly 
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accountable to the whole community through mass meetings to be hold in the bounds 
of the settlement. 
 
Second, it is important that community participants are not turned into passive 
listeners of a top-down, one-way and one-to-many communication process in which 
things are explained in the most vague and general terms and open only to nominal 
discussions. On the contrary, if community participation is to become meaningful and 
effective, not only the people need to be given all information that allow them to make 
informed criticism, but they should also be given a chance to suggest, recommend 
and propose solutions to improve their living conditions. Regrettably, it is reported by 
the local government respondents who were asked about how and why they liaise or 
not with informally housed communities during the field surveys conducted for this 
study that the main purpose of government–community meetings, which by the way 
happen to be few, is basically to inform the people about what the government has 
decided to do for their community and ask them to co-operate. Relatively little time 
has so far been spent on listening to the viewpoint of the informally housed population 
affected by the government projects with regard to what actions should be planned 
and why and even less on taking it into account. In most cases, it is either a one-way 
communication process arranged to keep possible resistance to planned government 
activities to a minimum or a nominal (token) two-way communication process 
designed to broadcast the artificial image of elected and non-elected local government 
officials prone to make proper use of traditional democratic mechanisms (imbizos) as 
prescribed by the constitution, laws and by-laws. While some municipal officials from 
different departments see it as a shortcoming that informally housed communities are 
minimally or not involved at all in the relocation or in situ upgrading programmes that 
concern them, ward councillors almost every time seem to be the least interested in 
increasing the degree of involvement of the affected communities in a decision-
making process that is proudly assumed to be largely ‘technical’ and thus pertaining to 
the ‘experts’.  
 
Third, it is also important that community involvement start in principle at an early 
planning stage if it is to lay the foundations for constructive government–community 
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interactions and avoid turning into a farce where all relevant decisions have already 
been made and are not subject to any change. Involving informally housed 
communities at a too early stage of planning, however, may delay the decision-
making process so much that it could be fatal to any efforts to finalize something 
within reasonable time. That is why it could be more appropriate that preliminary plans 
and alternatives be drafted and discussed internally by government officials and be 
then submitted to, and openly and thoroughly discussed with, the affected 
communities and their representatives with a view to considering community views 
and suggestions before the final plan is agreed upon and prepared for 
implementation. If the principles outlined above serve as guidelines to help 
government officials decide on the appropriate time of involvement, the overall picture 
would again be disappointing as regards the time period normally chosen by 
government respondents of the City of Tshwane (Pretoria) Metropolitan Municipality 
(CTMM) to start liaising with informally housed communities on specific projects of 
mutual concern. In fact, the engagement of South Africa’s poorest communities 
seldom seems to be asked for before relocation, in situ upgrading or other 
development projects that target these communities are drawn up and are just about 
ready to be implemented. 
 
Fourth, it is important that informally housed communities ought in principle to take 
part in the broadest possible array of local government policy-making, planning and 
budget decisions that impact on their lives. Accordingly, the involvement of 
communities living in informal settlements should be extended to all major settlement-
related decisions to be made in preparing, amending or revoking municipal by-laws, 
development projects and budget allocations. In particular, the single most important 
choice before local government decision-makers (and first thing on the planning 
agenda to be addressed) is whether a particular informal settlement should be 
upgraded and integrated into the municipal fabric (brownfield development) or 
whether the relocation of the community to a different site should be followed instead 
(greenfield development). This choice should be made with careful consideration not 
only of its technical, operational and financial feasibility but also, and at least equally 
importantly, of the long-term interests of the affected communities, the latter implying 
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that residents of informal settlements should be consulted on this issue and their 
views taken into account. Concurrently, it is essential to involve and gain community 
support in the  prevention of, and response to, further land invasion in the area of 
concern in order to put a stop to a situation that would only serve to complicate and 
prolong an already cumbersome and time-consuming process to bring development to 
informal-housed communities—the implication being that the residents and their 
organizations should be made co-responsible for the success of professionally led 
patrolling operations of the land of concern. As soon as an agreed decision between 
government and community on what type of development has to occur (brownfield 
development, greenfield development or a combination of both) has eventually been 
made, a number of ensuing topics of discussion would have to be identified and 
evaluated in a participative way with a view to achieving sustainable outcomes for the 
target community as well as for the city at large. In South Africa, most of the issues 
that impact on informally housed people’s livelihood are the responsibility of local 
government and what is not (e.g., education and housing) has a municipal 
government presence in one aspect or another of the service provision. That 
notwithstanding, the topics for which the involvement of informally housed 
communities is sought is currently limited to a minimum. While there are plenty of 
reasons to reckon that a number of technical issues do not really need to be open to 
public debate, it is not often the case that the meaning of the term technical is 
widened to such an extent virtually little or no room remains for community 
participation. 
 
A final issue of practical importance concerns the evaluation of how the participation 
process has actually been carried out. Evaluating the participation process requires 
the definition of explicit criteria so as to assess what is being achieved and lost by the 
involvement of poor communities and lay the foundations for future improvements of 
the ways in which community participation can be put into operation. Three key 
indicators have been identified to measure the success or failure of the participation 
process: productivity, consensus building and representativeness. Evaluating 
productivity has to do with the appraisal of whether or not the community’s input leads 
to favourable results in terms of understanding problems and priorities faced by the 
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poor, and working out pragmatic solutions. Evaluating consensus building involves the 
assessment of whether or not the community is satisfied with the participation 
process, appreciates the use being made of its contribution, and supports or is less 
resistant to government policies. Finally, evaluating representativeness has to do with 
the review of whether or not the participants are capable of expressing the views of 
the community rather than those of specific interest groups. Evaluating the 
participation process also implies that the government interrogates itself. Precious 
information is expected to be collected through interviews and consultations with 
government officials directly involved in the participation efforts, whose experience 
can offer some lessons for trying to figure out and overcome some of the obstacles 
encountered with working with poor people. Finally, it is important that all information 
gathered during the evaluation process undergoes a process of analysis to produce a 
set of recommendations to redesign and redevelop, if necessary, the participation 
process. Of course, it is hoped that it would not become just another ‘report on the 
shelf’ but be used by the government to maximize the extent to which the participation 
of the poor would be productive, representative and able to build consensus among 
the target community. 
 
A key question for the years to come is whether the character of local governance can 
be reformed in favour of greater inclusion that would be truly for all, regardless of 
individual’s economic means. This thesis is an attempt to contribute to this effort in the 
belief that a more sustainable improvement of the quality of life in informal 
settlements, which is one of the most serious challenges confronting South Africa and 
most developing countries at the beginning of the third millennium, would be best 
achieved through the participation of those who are most directly interested in 
changing their living conditions for the better.  
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